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Preface
This book contains six essays, the first five of which are based on 
presentations made at the twenty-ninth Annual Public Lecture Series 
sponsored by the Department of Economics, Western Michigan Uni 
versity during the academic year 1992-93. The final essay is based on 
a public lecture delivered by a University Visiting Scholar in Econom 
ics during the fall of 1993.
In co-directing the public lectures and in preparing this book, we are 
first indebted to the authors of the essays without whom this volume 
would not have been possible. We are grateful to our colleagues in the 
Department of Economics at Western Michigan University for their 
support during our effort in organizing and directing the Lecture Series 
and the Visiting Scholar Program. We are thankful to the College of 
Arts and Sciences and the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research for their co-sponsorship of the Lecture Series, and we thank 
the University Visiting Scholar Program for sponsoring the public lec 
ture on which the final essay of the volume is based.
We are also thankful to the members of the Economics Department 
Lectures Committee for the 1992-93 academic year, Professor Emily 
Hoffman of Western Michigan University, and Dr. Timothy Bartik of 
the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Finally, we express our thanks and appreciation to the W.E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research for their cooperation and the high 
quality of editorial services rendered in the publication of this volume.
Sisay Asefa and Wei-Chiao Huang 
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Sisay Asefa and Wei-Chiao Huang 
Western Michigan University
Human capital, as viewed by economists, involves a process of 
investment that enhances human labor productivity by means of 
advances in knowledge and its applications. It specifically involves 
investment expenditures on education, training, health, nutrition, and 
related factors that increase the productivity of the labor force. Nobel 
Laureate T. W. Schultz (1956) was one of the first economists to iden 
tify the deficiency of the standard neoclassical production function in 
neglecting the critical role of human capital. More recent empirical 
studies of economic growth by Hagen (1980), Denison (1985), and 
Jorgenson (1988), have shown that human capital investment has made 
a significant contribution to the economic growth of industrial nations 
such as the United States. The essays in the present volume explore the 
various national and international dimensions of human capital and 
development ranging from the economic implications of demographic 
trends in the United States (Richard A. Easterlin), the effect of popula 
tion growth and human capital on development (D. Gale Johnson and 
Julian L. Simon), the relationship among human capital, the family, 
and economic development (Mark R. Rosenzweig), and the crucial 
issue of workplace training in the United States (Peter B. Doeringer 
and Ann P. Bartel).
In the first essay, Easterlin begins by challenging Benjamin Watten- 
berg's book, The Birth Dearth, which predicts a decline of the United 
States economy due to an aging population and low fertility over the 
next century. Easterlin presents the rationale offered by Wattenberg 
and others for their pessimistic views about the economic effects of 
future demographic trends of the United States. He makes the argu 
ment that these popular views about the adverse effects of declining 
population growth on future economic development do not stand up to 
long-term historical facts. In supporting his thesis, he examines the his 
torical record of selected Western industrial countries over the last cen 
tury. These data include demographic variables such as the historical
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relationships between population growth and economic growth, the 
size of the total dependency burden (youth and old age) in relation to 
the rate of economic growth, the size and age of the labor force, and 
the implication for overall educational/human capital level of the labor 
supply. Based on these demographic data over the last century for 
eleven Western industrial nations including the United States, Easterlin 
concludes that the historical experience and evidence raise serious 
doubt about the "secular stagnation thesis." He notes that projected 
demographic trends are quite small by historical standards, and the 
projected aging of the labor force is within the range of historical expe 
rience. He further contends that any rise in old-age dependency will be 
offset by declining youth dependency for the United States and West 
ern industrial nations, and that the projected total dependency rates are, 
on average, similar to the late nineteenth century for these countries, 
thereby casting some doubt on the whole stagnation thesis. The level 
ing of fertility below replacement level is not out of line with the data 
on completed fertility in this century, according to Easterlin. These 
data show long-term fluctuations of about half a century duration, and 
that the emerging labor market conditions seem to favor a new 
upswing; the data show a total fertility rate above the 1980 trough for 
all the countries examined. Easterlin points out that even the possibil 
ity of a new baby boom, dismissed by existing demographic projec 
tions, cannot totally be ruled out.
In the next essay, Johnson takes up another aspect of human capi 
tal focusing on the value of a human being with little or no formal 
investment. His essay is relevant to low-income countries of the world 
with relatively low human capital investments of their populations. In 
examining the evidence on the effect of population growth on per capi 
tal income growth of developing countries, Johnson challenges the 
popular view of the negative relationship between population growth 
and per capita income in developing countries, as advanced by the pro 
ponents of "the Population Bomb Thesis." His essay summarizes some 
of the major findings of a working group organized by the National 
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, which is also 
critical of the pessimistic view about the effects of population growth 
on economic growth of developing countries. Johnson presents three 
empirical propositions that cast serious doubt on the commonly held 
view about the negative relationship between per capita income and
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population growth. First, significant increases in per capita income in 
Western industrial nations occurred between the eighteenth and twenti 
eth century when their populations were also rising rapidly and life 
expectancy was increasing. Second, developing countries achieved 
higher per capita income, a rise in life expectancy, and reduced infant 
mortality since about 1950, when population growth began to rise rap 
idly. Specifically, Johnson points out the fact that between 1950 and 
1980 developing countries experienced a rapid population growth of 
over 2 percent, paralleled with per capita income growth of 2.6 per 
cent. Third, he presents evidence from regression results based on 
cross-country data that show no significant relationship between popu 
lation growth and economic growth. According to Johnson, other vari 
ables such as economic policy, may be more important than population 
and human capital variables included in these results. He supplements 
this view by referring to recent empirical evidence by Levine and 
Renelt (1992) which presents results on the effect of various policy 
factors and population growth on the economic growth of 119 coun 
tries. None of the regressions showed a significant relationship 
between population and economic growth. Thus, Johnson makes the 
point that much of the human suffering in developing countries over 
the years has been caused by nonpopulation growth factors such as 
civil wars, state policy failure, and economic mismanagement. Johnson 
also summarizes some findings related to nine questions that came out 
of the NRC report on population growth and economic development 
that deal with the effect of population growth on the supply of exhaust 
ible and renewable resources, environment, worker productivity, levels 
of schooling and health, income inequality, rural-urban migration, and 
social costs of fertility. He concludes that there is little evidence from 
this report "to support the position that a family imposes negative 
externalities on society when it chooses to have another child." He 
qualifies his argument, however, by pointing out that a very high popu 
lation growth in excess of 3 percent in the short run, "may reduce rates 
of per capita income growth primarily due to the stress placed on insti 
tutions such as education, health, and city public services," and so 
NRC's evidence is more relevant to a moderate population growth rate 
of 1.25 to 2.5 percent. Governments of developing countries should, 
according to Johnson, pursue social and economic programs such as 
primary education, maternal and child health care, and social security
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programs that have the external effect of reducing population growth. 
He concludes his essay by presenting a rationale for what he calls 
"positive population policy," whose aim is to assist "every family in a 
country to have the number of children each family desires" without 
coercion. For such a policy to materialize, governments must provide 
relevant information, including contraceptive materials and services, to 
every household on a voluntary basis.
Rosenzweig's essay explores the relationship among human capital, 
the family, and economic development. He examines two related 
aspects of this complex relationship. First, whether family relation 
ships and stability are related to the rate of economic growth. Second, 
how economic development affects the level and returns to investment 
on human capital. Realizing that the study of these relationships is a 
complex task in the context of a modern industrial economy such as 
the United States, he bases his analysis on data from the simpler 
(developing) economy of rural India. He uses time-series data that 
describe farm household behavior under traditional technology and 
cross-section data on farmers across India before and after the green 
revolution technical change. He organizes his essay by first discussing 
some key features of a traditional agrarian economy before technical 
change, including the relationship between family stability and human 
capital under this setting. After examining his data on the features of a 
traditional economy, he includes some evidence on specific hypotheses 
about the relationship between human capital and family structure with 
emphasis on risk-mitigation and experience as important elements of 
human capital. Rosenzweig then examines how technical change 
affects human capital investments and family structure, and draws 
some possible policy implications. According to Rosenzweig, experi 
ence (learning by doing) is the most valuable form of human capital 
under traditional static technology. Consequently, education which 
enables farmers to acquire knowledge outside such environment, pro 
vides little or no return. It follows that the elders have the largest 
amount of human capital and respect, resulting in family stability and 
intergenerational interdependence. The introduction of technical 
change, however, reduces the value of past experience and erodes fam 
ily ties, which leads to family breakups and instability even though the 
rate of return from formal schooling may increase. Thus, according to 
Rosenzweig, technical change can have a destabilizing effect on the
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family by reducing returns from experience, by decreasing the role of 
risk-spreading arrangements among family members, and by weaken 
ing coping mechanisms in an uncertain traditional economic environ 
ment. Another important policy implication that he draws from these 
findings is that a significant decline in fertility in growth areas relative 
to other areas of India was achieved without any direct intervention by 
the government, indicating that such efforts are unnecessary in an envi 
ronment of continuous technical change and economic growth.
In the following two essays, Doeringer and Bartel both deal with the 
issue of workplace training in the United States. Doeringer's essay is 
concerned with whether the workplace training system of the United 
States will survive international competition. He points out that the 
crux of the nation's human capital deficiency problem may not be due 
to its schools, and that educational reform may not be central to solv 
ing the problem, especially in the short run. Instead, he notes, the prob 
lem may be rooted in the weakening of the nation's workplace system 
for raising labor productivity, which he defines broadly to include 
effort, commitment, problem-solving capacity, and job skills. 
Doeringer's view is that while educational improvement may be an 
important part of a long-term solution, it is unlikely to rebuild the pro 
ductive capacities of the present workers who are already out of school 
and who will constitute two-thirds of the labor force during the next 
decade.
Doeringer further examines some features and experiences with 
such alternative systems of workplace training in the United States as 
the Fordist system, the high-commitment system, and the low-wage, 
Employment-at-Will System. The traditional Fordist system involves 
raising productivity through "soft bargains" reached collectively 
between labor and management. The high-commitment system empha 
sizes individual rather than collective effort bargains to encourage the 
individual worker to internalize the goals and objectives of the com 
pany and to take action to achieve these goals. The employer in return 
provides intensive career training and development, fair compensation, 
and an implicit guarantee of permanent employment, with a result of 
continuous improvement in productivity and career earnings. The rela 
tively new employment-at-will system allows firms to keep wages as 
low as market competition will allow, with an indefinite period of 
employment that quickly adjusts to changing labor market conditions,
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with no commitment from employers and no expectations of job secu 
rity by workers. He observes that such firms do not invest on human 
capital development and do not depend on effort bargains, but rely on 
market incentives to motivate training investments and effort. 
Doeringer's essay is also concerned with the evolution of workplace 
training systems and their effects on productivity. His view is that it is 
an open question whether the traditional Fordist and high-performance 
workplace systems will survive in some form in the future labor mar 
ket or if the low-wage, employment-at-will model will prevail.
Bartel analyzes another dimension of the issue of workplace train 
ing in the United States. Her essay is concerned with whether Ameri 
can workers are getting sufficient on-the-job training or if workplace 
training is underproduced. She explores this question by reviewing 
data available on the amount of training received by U.S. workers rela 
tive to other industrial countries, by examining data on the rate of 
return to investments in on-the-job training, by evaluating alternative 
suggestions to alleviate the underinvestment problem, and finally by 
discussing her own research findings about the relationship between 
technological change and training.
Bartel identifies two general sources of data, based on surveys of 
individual workers and employers, to study workplace training. She 
notes that both types of data report underinvestment. Even though the 
National Longitudinal Surveys of Mature Men, Young Men, Young 
Women, and Youth (NLSY) are the best employee-based sources of 
data, according to Bartel, these data have some measurement prob 
lems, as they do not measure informal training. Informal training 
appears to be quite important for U.S. workers, since it is found to 
occur at the same rate as formal training programs.
Bartel's essay also examines comparative training systems in three 
industrial countries: Germany, France, and Japan. The German system, 
which is based on an apprenticeship contract signed between a com 
pany and the government, is too rigid and narrow. Thus, it cannot be 
shown that German workers are better or more trained than American 
workers if the various dimensions of training are considered. The 
French system relies on a mandated training tax where employers of 
ten or more workers must spend a certain proportion of their labor cost 
on continuous education and training of employees or pay tax equal to 
the required amount minus the actual training expenditures. It cannot
Introduction 7
be concluded that American workers receive less training than French 
workers because, while the training incidence is higher in France, its 
length is much shorter. Finally, the Japanese training system applies 
only to large firms that employ only one-third of the workforce. The 
majority of the workforce is employed in small firms where employ 
ment is not guaranteed and very little training is done.
While the comparative data do not provide any conclusive evidence 
to confirm relative underinvestment, Bartel uses the rate of return data 
to reach "a conclusion that there is underinvestment in job training" in 
the United States. She then explores some possible causes of underin 
vestment, such as higher relative turnover rate, inability of the 
employer to evaluate the quality of applicants' general skills, minimum 
wage constraint, and inability of young workers to pay for their own 
training.
Bartel addresses the merit of alternative policy options to increase 
investment in training, including government-provided training, pay 
roll-based national training tax imposed on employers, and subsidies 
and incentives for employees from the government. She notes that 
these options, especially the first two, are generally inadequate.
Finally, Bartel examines the issue of training in relation to techno 
logical change and concludes, based on her own research, that 
employee training will increase as a simple by-product of technologi 
cal change during the next decade. In sum, her essay shows that while 
the high rates of return to training may be consistent with a possible 
underproduction of training in the United States, technological change 
will increase the incentives for investment in training, thereby requir 
ing no external government interference with the market for labor 
training.
The final essay by Simon addresses the issue of the very-long-run 
effect of human capital on economic progress. Simon's essay is in the 
tradition of his provocative and often controversial views on the effect 
of population on economic development. The basic question addressed 
in his present essay deals with "the cause of so many of the world's 
population now being long-lived and endowed with much wealth and a 
high standard of living, with an even larger proportion likely to enjoy 
these benefits in the coming decades," compared to several centuries 
ago. In other words, he queries "why the rapid progress of the past two 
centuries did not begin centuries or millennia earlier. ...Was there
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something extraordinary about the human numbers or the level of tech 
nology in 1700 or so?" His answer is simply that today's technology is 
the sum of increments of knowledge in the past, and the additional 
knowledge was produced by people and therefore must have been 
influenced by human numbers. He adds that other possible factors such 
as culture, politics, and economic and social systems are also influ 
enced by numbers. Thus, Simon's basic hypothesis is that the size of 
human population as measured by population density and number of 
people combined with the technology produced by them is the root 
cause of the speed of economic progress. It is his view that had popula 
tion been frozen at the level of some 10,000 years ago, economic 
progress would not have reached the present state. His basic rationale 
is the obvious notion that if there were more people there would be 
more human capital to create knowledge that leads to economic 
growth. Simon's essay provides some evidence in support of what he 
terms "population-induced social change" by reviewing some sketchy 
time-series and cross-sectional data on the relationship between popu 
lation and rate of economic growth and between population and natural 
resource availability, including some evidence on the relationship 
between population and structural factors that affect the rate of eco 
nomic growth. Simon's basic premise is that higher density and larger 
population were, historically, necessary conditions for economic 
progress. Whether they were sufficient depends on the nature of partic 
ular societies, which have also been capable of retrogressing with pop 
ulation growth. While he supports the basic Malthusian proposition as 
relevant in the short-run subsistence economy under static technology, 
Simon's model refers to the very-long-run effects of population growth 
as the only exogenous variable, while other variables, such as institu 
tions and technology, are all endogenously determined. This leads to 
one of his major points, that "no other element was as essential as the 
combination of knowledge and population numbers" in the very long 
run. Thus, Simon's proposition is that human economic progress is a 
function of population numbers, and all related social and economic 
dimensions are a function of population size and density in the very 
long run. He reinforces this view by reviewing some historical evi 
dence about how more people bring about more ideas, more knowl 
edge, expanded markets and cities, and higher productivity and income 
over the long run. He notes that even the spread of diseases has been
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positively influenced historically by population, as for example a more 
dense population reduced the "virulence of mass killers" such as 
malaria by practicing intensive cropping.
Finally, we are impressed with the quality and insights of the essays 
resulting from this lecture series. The individual authors present a com 
plementary and well-integrated approach that challenges conventional 
wisdom and views about the various dimensions of human capital and 
economic development from the domestic and international perspec 
tives. Our aim in this introduction was to highlight some of the critical 
issues discussed. We invite the reader to explore the details and the 
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The Birth Dearth, Aging, 
and the Economy
Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going?
Richard A. Easterlm 
University of Southern California
In his recent volume, The Birth Dearth, Benjamin Wattenberg sees 
the American economy, fettered by low fertility and an aging popula 
tion, as grinding to a virtual halt over the next century. Wattenberg 
writes for a popular audience in a self-styled "speculative and provoca 
tive" fashion. But his work forms the tip of a substantial iceberg of 
recent scholarly opinion offering similar and even wider-ranging argu 
ments about the longer-term economic prospects of the United States 
and other advanced industrial economies. In a nutshell, recent low 
rates of childbearing, "the birth dearth," by causing low or negative 
population growth and population aging, are seen as exerting a serious 
drag on the economy. This happens because of slower growth of mar 
kets, decreased productivity growth, and an increased burden of depen 
dency.
These arguments are typically long on speculation but short on 
facts, especially with regard to history. I propose here to offer a correc 
tive. First, I recapitulate briefly the theoretical arguments and note 
some counterarguments that have been advanced. Then I turn to the 
historical facts and assess the arguments in the light of actual experi 
ence, both that of the United States and of advanced western and north 
ern European countries. If population growth plays such an important 
role in determining economic growth, then one would expect to find 
that population growth and economic growth go together. Is this, in 
fact, the case? And how do prospective rates of population growth 
compare with past experience are they, for example, far lower than 
what has gone before? What of the outlook for the dependency bur 
den? Does this involve magnitudes that appear unprecedented? How
ll
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has economic growth varied with the dependency burden in the past? 
How serious is the prospective aging of the labor supply, as distinct 
from population? What are the implications of aging for the educa 
tional attainment of the labor supply?
In discussing these questions, I take as given (as do Wattenberg and 
others) the current projections of population stagnation here and 
abroad. Typically these projections come in three variants high, mid 
dle, and low with the middle projection being most favored. But even 
the high-fertility projection assumes only a modest eventual increase in 
rates of childbearing, to an average of around 2.1 births per woman. 
This magnitude of 2.1 is called replacement-level fertility, because it is 
the rate of childbearing per woman needed to maintain population size 
constant over the long run.
These projections whether low, middle, or high of future low 
fertility are critical to the forecasts of stagnating population and rising 
old-age dependency. But how much confidence can we place in projec 
tions that seek to peer a half century or more into the future? Does the 
history of population forecasting, and particularly of projections of 
rates of childbearing, argue for accepting these forecasts? If not, would 
alternative forecasts substantially alter the outlook for population 
aging? In the concluding section, I address these questions in short, 
the prospective continuation of the "birth dearth" itself.
Effects of Population on the Economy: Theoretical Arguments
The theoretical arguments are of two general types one relating to 
the impact of population change on the demand for goods, the other 
relating to the impact on the supply or production capabilities of the 
economy (for specific references, see Easterlin 1991).
The demand argument focuses on the effect of a declining rate of 
population growth. The growth rate of population, it is said, governs 
the growth rate of markets, and thus of the demand for consumer goods 
and also capital goods such as housing, factories, and machinery. 
Declining population growth discourages business, causing markets to 
expand less rapidly or cease to grow altogether.
The Birth Dearth, Aging, and the Economy 13
The arguments about supply-side effects stress the impact of popu 
lation aging. The population is seen as comprising three parts young, 
middle-aged, and older with the older segment growing relative to 
the other two. Now assume that for any given attribute affecting pro 
duction capabilities, say, physical strength, the older group is relatively 
low. Other things being constant, if the elderly's share of the popula 
tion grows, then the average degree of physical strength in the popula 
tion as a whole will decline. Aging of the population would thus reduce 
production capacity by lowering the physical capacity of the popula 
tion.
The specific attributes to which this argument is applied are numer 
ous. The older population is supposed to be less well educated, and 
thus less skilled. The older population is assumed to be less likely to 
save and thereby to finance capital accumulation. The older population 
is said to be more fixed in its ways, less innovative and creative, and 
thus an obstacle to technological progress. The older population is 
claimed to be less geographically and occupationally mobile, and 
therefore less able to take advantage of new opportunities essential to 
economic progress. In combination, these arguments assert that, in 
general, aging of the population will retard the growth of production 
capabilities by lowering the quality of the labor supply, reducing the 
rate of capital accumulation, and lessening the rate of technical 
progress.
In addition, the older population is said to be different in the type of 
dependency burden it presents. Per capita public expenditures on 
retirement and health are greater for the older population. Hence, as the 
proportion of elderly grows, so too will the proportion of taxes to 
income needed to finance public retirement and health spending. Thus 
the "burden of old-age dependency" raises the specter of an insupport 
able tax burden on the working-age population, lowering the motiva 
tion of workers to work and save.
Although this is a formidable set of arguments, it has not gone with 
out challenge. Regarding the demand argument, it is pointed out that 
markets depend on total spending, not number of spenders. Even with 
the number of spenders constant, spending per person and thus total 
spending will continue to rise as per capita income grows. On the sup 
ply side, it is pointed out that arguments about physical strength are of 
dubious relevance to a labor force dominated by white-collar and ser-
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vice workers. Whether older workers are less educated depends on the 
historical nature of educational progress. Moreover, age stands for 
experience, and an older labor force is a more experienced labor force. 
Nor is it clear that the older population saves less; older persons, it is 
said, may be hesitant to spend down their assets because of uncertainty 
about health costs and the timing of death, as well as the desire to leave 
an inheritance.
As always, such "on the one hand," "on the other" arguments leave 
one in a sea of uncertainty. Hence the need for historical facts, to which 
we now turn.
The Evidence
As we examine the facts, we look at the United States and at ten 
European nations in the forefront of the demographic changes that 
have caused concern. The population projections used are the same as 
those underlying the present gloomy forecasts of long-term economic 
stagnation.
What Has Been the Historical Relation Between 
Population Growth and Economic Growth?
If population growth were a major factor influencing economic 
growth, then one might expect to find that higher population growth 
and higher economic growth go together. Is this, in fact, the case?
Figure 1 presents growth rates since 1870 of population and real per 
capita income for each of the eleven countries. Average growth rates 
over four long periods are given. The periods are those identified by 
Angus Maddison in his book, Phases of Capitalist Development 
(1982), as development "phases" common to these countries, except 
that the most recent period in his study, 1973-1979, has been updated 
to cover 1973-1986.
Studying the figure, one notes that fluctuations in the two series go 
together in most countries. Conceivably, one might seize on this to 
argue that declines in population growth cause declines in per capita 
income growth, but this is to argue that the tail wags the dog. Note that
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Figure 1. Rate of Growth of GDP Per Capita (solid line) and
Population (dotted line), Specificed Country and Period 
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in all countries the swings in population growth rates are quite small 
compared with those in per capita income growth.
Even more doubt about the importance of population growth in 
determining economic growth arises when one compares long-term 
trends in the two series. While population growth has trended down 
ward in most of these countries over the last century, real per capita 
income growth has trended upward. Typically the two post-1950 
observations on real GDP per capita in figure 1, including even that for 
the recent relatively depressed period, 1973-1986, lie above those for 
the two earlier periods. In contrast, the post-1950 rates of population 
growth are about the same as or lower than the pre-1950 rates. This 
inverse association between trends in economic growth and population 
growth is contrary to what one would have expected if declining popu 
lation growth were exerting a serious drag on the economy.
How Sizable are Projected Declines in Population Growth 
Compared With Past Experience?
The population growth rates projected for these countries in the next 
century are, in fact, not a great deal different from their current rates. 
The average annual growth rate of population in 1973-1986 was only 
0.3 percent; the projected growth rate, at its lowest for the period 
2030-2050 averages -0.3 percent (United Nations 1988b). The pro 
spective decline in population growth rates is thus, on average, 0.6 per 
centage points over an interval of six decades, or a tenth of a 
percentage point per decade. As we have just seen, per capita income 
growth has trended upward in these countries, while population growth 
has trended downward. It is hard to believe that such a modest further 
decline in the rate of population growth would in itself produce a dra 
matic adverse departure from the historic pattern of secularly rising per 
capita income growth.
How Sizable Are Projected Increases in the Overall 
Dependency Burden Compared With Past Experience?
The dependency burden is sometimes discussed as though it com 
prises elderly dependents alone, but it is obvious that the burden of 
dependency on the working-age population involves infants and chil-
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dren as well as older dependents. Thus, to put dependency changes in 
proper perspective, one needs to look at the size of the entire depen 
dent population, young and old, relative to the working age population. 
To this end, figure 2 presents, for the same eleven countries since 1880, 
the ratio to the working age population aged 15-64 of the sum of the 
two dependent age groups, persons under age 15 and over age 64. Sub 
sequently, we will consider the two age groups separately. The vertical 
broken line in each panel is at 1990, separating actual experience from 
projected. The horizontal line in each panel, about which most of the 
curves fluctuate, is at a value of 0.6, indicating that, on average in this 
period, there were about 0.6 dependents per member of the working- 
age population.
How sizable is the prospective increase in dependency when viewed 
in historical perspective? Figure 2 shows a projected peak in depen 
dency for all of the countries in 2040, half a century hence. How does 
the height of this peak compare with the highest level reached in the 
past century? In three countries (France, Germany, and Switzerland) 
the projected peak is clearly higher; in three others (Norway, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States), clearly lower; and in the rest, 
it is about the same. On average, the total dependency rate in these 
advanced industrial countries will about match its historic high in the 
period since 1880. The projected levels in 2040 are clearly higher than 
those prevailing at the current time, and it is this contrast that gives rise 
to much of the current concern. But extending the period of compari 
son backward a full century, one finds that in only three of the coun 
tries is projected dependency higher than in the past. Moreover, in no 
case does the projected high fall outside of the past century's experi 
ence of these countries taken as a whole the highest projected ratios 
are somewhat less than 0.8, as was true of the highest ratios in the late 
nineteenth century.
Thus, the outlook for the total dependency burden, when viewed 
against the experience of the past century, is not unprecedented. This 
conclusion holds under a variety of sensitivity tests. Varying the con 
cept of dependency for example, instead of population ratios, using 
nonworkers to workers does not alter the picture. Nor does focusing 
on the "highly" dependent population, that is, old-old plus young- 
young. Neither do changes in the source used for the projections  
OECD, UN, IMF, etc. Nor does allowance for wide variation in immi-
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Figure 2. Total Dependency Ratio, Actual and Projected, Specified
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gration. Among current projections, the only case in which total depen 
dency would rise to levels unprecedented in the past century is that 
which assumes a mortality revolution at the oldest ages. Although this 
possibility cannot be wholly ruled out, it is not this projection that 
underlies current gloomy accounts of the economic impact of popula 
tion aging. Rather, such accounts are based on the more moderate mor 
tality projections on which the projections used in figure 2 are based.
What Has Been the Historical Relation Between the
Dependency Burden and the Rate of Economic Growth?
Figure 3 bears on the relation between the dependency burden and 
the rate of economic growth. It is designed to assess whether increases 
in the dependency rate have been associated with decreases in the rate 
of economic growth. The four time periods used in figure 1 are again 
used here, 1870-1913 through 1973-1986.
As can be seen, although growth of total output (GDP) per capita 
(the solid line) has varied markedly from one period of economic 
growth to another, the total dependency rate (the dotted line) has not. 
In most of the countries, the dependency rate is highest in the period 
1870-1913, thereafter it is fairly stable (figure 3). In the post-World 
War II period the contrast is dramatic. Growth rates of real per capita 
income in the period 1950-1973 were almost double those from 1973 
to 1986, averaging 3.5 versus 1.9 percent. In contrast, in almost all of 
the countries, the dependency rate was nearly the same in the two peri 
ods, and the eleven-country average was, in fact, virtually identical, .55 
versus .54. One would be hard put to argue that dependency had much 
to do with the dramatic post-1973 drop in economic growth rates, and 
not surprisingly, it is never mentioned in scholarly attempts to explain 
this decline.
What Does the Prospective Rise in Old-Age Dependency Imply 
for the Tax Burden on the Working-Age Population?
Although overall dependency will not be so much different, the pro 
spective age composition of dependency will be. As shown in figure 4, 
youth dependency is trending downward and old-age dependency 
upward. Seen in conjunction with the total dependency trend, this shift
20
Figure 3. Rate of Growth of GDP Per Capita (solid line, right scale) and 
Average Total Dependency Ratio (dotted line, left scale), 
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Figure 4. Youth and Elderly Dependency Ratio, Specified Country,
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puts in a rather different light the issue of the prospective burden on the 
working population of rising old-age dependency. Clearly, a declining 
burden of young dependents compensates for a growing burden of 
older dependents. Analysts of government spending sometimes recog 
nize this by noting the offset to rising government retirement and 
health spending provided by declining education expenditures (Holz- 
mann 1988; OECD 1988). But the relevant comparison must go 
beyond this to consider the full economic costs per dependent, that is, 
the private as well as public costs of supporting infants and children 
compared with the elderly. If the working-age population needs to 
spend less out of its income to support children, then more funds are 
potentially available for supporting older dependents (United Nations 
1988a).
It is one thing to count heads and compare the number of younger 
versus older dependents. It is another to assess the full economic costs 
of supporting an average younger versus older dependent. Clearly, the 
standard of support for both children and older dependents is socially, 
not physiologically, determined. Moreover, there is the need to con 
sider nonmarket production and consumption of the two groups. 
Indeed, it is because of the ambiguity regarding costs of dependents 
that it is important to have a clear picture of the numbers of younger 
versus older dependents, as in figure 4.
The amount of empirical work that has actually been done on rela 
tive costs of the two groups is small, but what has been done suggests 
that economic costs per dependent (private plus public) are, in fact, not 
much different for older and younger dependents (Easterlin 1991). If 
this is so, then the economic burden of dependency on the working-age 
population is unlikely to be noticeably higher in the first half of the 
twenty-first century than in the twentieth century, since the increased 
cost of supporting a larger proportion of older dependents will be offset 
by the decreased cost of supporting a smaller proportion of younger 
dependents. This implies that the real issue to be faced is largely politi 
cal, namely, how to capture via taxation the savings of households 
from supporting fewer younger dependents, so that these funds can be 
used to meet the rise in public expenditures needed to support older 
dependents. The question of political feasibility is a serious one, but it 
does not seem insurmountable, given that the workers to be taxed 
would themselves eventually be beneficiaries of such taxation. In any
The Birth Dearth, Aging, and the Economy 23
event, the issue is clearly different from that suggested by the view that 
the prospective economic burden on workers of support of dependents 
will somehow be unprecedented. This does not seem to be the case.
But what about the implications for the prospective tax burden on 
the working-age population? Clearly, if public expenditures grow rela 
tive to GNP over the long run, so too will taxes. For one thing, as was 
noted, increased public spending on retirement and health care would 
be partly offset by decreased public spending for schooling. Hence, the 
net increase in public spending and thus in taxes would be less than the 
increase in retirement and health spending. Moreover, as shown in 
table 1, projections to 2040 by OECD for most of the countries cov 
ered here, using the present demographic scenario, indicate that a quite 
modest average annual growth rate of real earnings (between 0.3 to 0.8 
percent) would suffice to keep the tax burden per head of the working- 
age population in 2040 at the same level as in 1980. This growth rate of 
earnings is well below that experienced in the past. This projection 
assumes no change in benefit levels for the older population, but it also 
fails to allow for the fact that the taxable capacity of the working-age 
population would be enhanced by fewer younger dependents per 
worker and by higher labor force participation of females. Nor is there 
any allowance for a possible "peace dividend" due to the end of the 
cold war. Thus, it seems unlikely that there would be adverse incentive 
effects because of an undue tax burden associated with population 
aging.
How Sizable is the Prospective Aging of the Labor Supply, 
and What Does It Imply for the Overall Educational 
Level of the Labor Supply?
What is the outlook for the age composition of the working-age 
population itself? Will there be, as some have argued, a disproportion 
ate number of older workers and a consequent possible decline in inno 
vation, mobility, and thus productivity growth? To assess this question, 
figure 5 presents data from 1880 through 2025 for the ratio of the pop 
ulation aged 20-34 to that aged 35-64, that is, the younger working- 
age population relative to the older. The trend in this ratio is clearly 
downward; there will be relatively fewer younger and more older 
workers. In most countries, however, the projected level around 2025
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is not much below that around 1960. World Bank projections (Bulatao 
et al. 1990), which have ratios for 2025 much like those shown here, 
imply an increase to 2050 in the proportion of the young in all of the 
countries, ranging from 2 to 10 percentage points, as lower birth rate 
cohorts replace higher birth rate cohorts at ages 35-64. Thus, while a 
relative scarcity of younger workers (or surplus of older workers) is in 
prospect for the first quarter of the next century, it is not greatly out of 
line with the degree of scarcity experienced three decades ago, and it is 
projected to lessen between 2025 and 2050.
Table 1. Average Annual Growth Rate of Real Earnings Per Worker 
Required to Maintain Tax Burden Per Worker Constant, 1980-2040, and 
Actual Growth Rate of Earnings, Eight Countries, 1965-1987 
(percent per year)
(I)(2)


























SOURCES Column 1. Calculated from OECD (1988, p 41). The OECD projection is based on 
the demographic projections underlying figure 2 and an assumption of constant age-sex specific 
labor force participation rates. Column 2. Compensation per employee in the business sector as 
reported in OECD (1990), adjusted by the consumer pnce index (OECD, various dates). The 
period used for the actual growth rates is the longest for which historical OECD data are avail 
able, United States data are since 1948. 
a.1970-1987 
b 1948-1987
What about the impact of labor supply aging on the educational 
attainment of the labor force? In considering this, one should note that 
in a number of these countries, the educational level of the older work 
ing-age population will improve substantially over the next thirty 
years, as those who benefited from the pre-1970s upsurge of schooling
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reach older ages. Table 2 shows the prospective changes in educational 
attainment of older workers implied by recent census data. If schooling 
of the young continues to stagnate as it did in the 1970s (OECD 1983, 
1984), the average level of education of the labor force as a whole 
would, nonetheless, be higher, as less-educated older cohorts are 
replaced by better-educated ones. If schooling of the young resumes its 
prior uptrend, then the average education of the labor force will rise 
even more. In either event, the favorable trend in educational attain 
ment at older ages will offset the supposed adverse effect of aging on 
education of the labor supply.
Table 2. Actual and Projected Percentage of Those Aged 55-64 

























SOURCES United Nations (1974, 1980), U S Bureau of the Census (1984, 1987).
a The age group for Denmark and Norway is 45-64, for Sweden, 55 and over. For Sweden, the
percentage is for those with some secondary level education or higher.
There is a tendency to think of the older population in terms of the 
low educational levels that prevailed in the past. It is time to recognize 
that in many countries older workers will be much better educated than 
heretofore, and not much different in educational level from younger 
workers. In the future the generally higher educational level of older 
workers (and possible younger workers as well) should be an impor 
tant factor, along with the greater experience of older workers, com 
pensating for a negative effect, if any, of aging on innovation and 
mobility.
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The Outlook for the Birth Dearth
So far the analysis has accepted without question the view embod 
ied in current population projections that fertility will remain quite low, 
perhaps declining further or rising to near-replacement levels at most. 
But how good are these projections? To answer this, one might reason 
ably ask: did population forecasters foresee either the enormous post- 
World War II baby boom or subsequent baby bust? The answer is no. 
While the baby boom was taking off in the late 1940s, population fore 
casters were still predicting a continuation of the low fertility rates of 
the 1930s. Eventually, in the 1950s, with the baby boom at full throttle, 
forecasters abandoned their low fertility projections for high fertility 
forecasts only to be caught by surprise once again as fertility started to 
plunge in the 1960s. In the last two decades, as fertility rates plum 
meted to new lows in advanced industrial countries, forecasters have 
switched back to low fertility assumptions, as in the forecasts we have 
just been examining.
How much faith can we put in the current projections? Not much. 
Rather than predicting the future, fertility projections basically track 
the recent past. Instead of admitting this, however, forecasters typically 
try to buttress their projections with supporting judgments. The latest 
United States Census Bureau high fertility projection foresees an even 
tual rate of childbearing only slightly above replacement, about 2.2 
births per woman. In commenting on this, the Bureau assures us: "it is 
clearly possible that fertility might eventually surpass [this level]...but 
that does not seem likely given the social, economic, and demographic 
trends of the last two decades" (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989, p. 
21). Similarly, in a recent volume, authoritatively entitled Future 
Demographic Trends in Europe and North America, the United 
Nations' 1988 high projection of the total fertility rate (which also 
reaches an eventual mean value of about 2.2 for industrialized coun 
tries) is dismissed as "too high and not very probable." Instead, the 
author opts for fertility rates considerably below replacement levels as 
more probable, an average of about 1.6 to 1.9 births per woman 
(Klingerl991,p. 159).
Such statements have a familiar ring. Over four decades ago, in 
1948, the then leading American scholarly demographic publication
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opined regarding future fertility rates that "...the range of uncertainty 
is between rates somewhat below replacement and rates slightly above 
such replacement" (Population Index 1948). Needless to say, this state 
ment was made after the post-World War II American baby boom was 
underway, when fertility soared far above replacement levels.
A similar fate may be in store for the more recent statements quoted 
above. As shown in table 3, in a number of advanced industrial econo 
mies, the total fertility rate in 1990 was noticeably above its 1980s 
trough, and in none was it below. The U.S. Census Bureau's high pro 
jection of total births in 1990, published in 1989, was over 5 percent 
below actual experience. Even allowing for the fact that work on the 
projection was completed in 1987, how could the high projection fall 
so far short in only three years? Indeed, although the latest recession 
has put the usual damper on fertility, total births in 1991 were again 
above the high projection of the Census Bureau, by almost 4 percent. 
Compared with the medium projection, that used in the forecasts here, 
births in 1990 and 1991 averaged almost 12 percent higher than pro 
jected.
Table 3. Current Total Fertility Rate (TFR) Compared With That at 
Most Recent "Baby Bust" Trough, Twelve Countries, 1980-Present
Baby bust trough Current (preliminary) Percent
change in 









































































SOURCES- Calot (1988); Van de Kaa (1988), Monmer (1990); Monnier and Guibert-Lantoine 
(1991, p. 955).
The Birth Dearth, Aging, and the Economy 29
Clearly, the fertility experience of the past few years here and 
abroad hints at the possibility of a new fertility upswing. Historical 
experience does provide a basis for projecting an upturn in fertility. If 
we extend our historical perspective beyond the past two decades, we 
find that over the past century there has been a long-term swing in fer 
tility rates in almost all advanced industrial countries. This is illus 
trated by estimates of completed fertility presented in table 4. 
Typically, the initial trough occurs among women born near the begin 
ning of the century and the subsequent peak among those born in the 
early 1930s. Although completed fertility for most women born in the 
two decades after World War II is not yet exactly known, the projected 
figures for women born in 1950, who are now very close to the end of 
their childbearing, are very similar to those of the cohorts born at the 
beginning of the century. A new upswing would extend this pattern 
nicely. Although the historical record does not prove that fertility will 
increase as in the past, recent experience hints at this. Certainly, the 
historical record suggests that an increase in fertility is a possibility 
that forecasters ought at least to recognize.
This possibility finds further support when we consider the prospec 
tive labor market for young adults in the coming decade. The numbers 
of those who will be reaching the childbearing ages will be unusually 
low, an echo of the recent baby bust. Also, immigration from low- 
income countries in Europe is likely to be increasingly restricted. Other 
things constant, this scarcity of younger workers will make for a favor 
able labor market for adults in the family formation ages, a reversal of 
the situation experienced by their predecessors, the baby boom 
cohorts. The biggest conjectural factor is the growth rate of aggregate 
demand. The prospective reduction in military outlays and consequent 
easing of spending pressures on government budgets give some basis 
for thinking there may be a return to the expansive monetary-fiscal pol 
icies of the earlier post-World War II era. Moreover, smaller numbers 
at the younger end of the labor market should make for more vigorous 
expansion of aggregate demand by the monetary-fiscal authorities by 
lowering the unemployment rate corresponding to full employment. If 
aggregate demand is expanded more rapidly, then demand-side condi 
tions will also take a turn more favorable to young adults. Although the 
outlook is uncertain, it hardly warrants dismissing the possibility of a
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strong labor market for young people that would induce a fertility 
upswing.
Table 4. Swings in Completed Fertility Since Around 1990
Initial trough Peak Projected
Children Children Children
Birth per Birth per Birth per
cohort woman cohort woman cohort woman














































































SOURCE Calot (1988) The Netherlands is omitted because it does not have a swing in fertility. 
Compared with the other countries here, it starts at a much higher initial level (around 3 children 
per woman) and trends downward 
n.a.=not available
Ongoing rates of childbearing, historical fertility experience, and the 
prospective labor demand-supply conditions for young adults thus sug 
gest as a serious possibility a prospective upswing in fertility. If this 
possibility were introduced into projections it would, of course, sub 
stantially alter the outlook for population growth and dependency 
rates. Over the next decade or two, population growth and dependency 
would be higher than now projected as the population under 18 grew 
more rapidly than expected. (No doubt, there would also be a renewed 
upsurge of fears about excessive population growth.) But in the period 
when dependency is currently expected to reach projected highs, after 
2025, there would be a tendency for the dependency ratio to decline as 
the newest baby boom cohorts reached adulthood and expanded the 
numbers in working ages.
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While all of this is conjectural, it is hardly any more so than the pre 
vailing consensus of a continued birth dearth. This consensus rests 
solely on a projection six decades hence of experience merely of the 
last two decades. It is hard to see why projections sixty years down the 
road should not be based on historical experience of at least compara 
ble length. The possibility of a substantial fertility upswing would 
seem to deserve more weight in assessments of population prospects 
than is given to it currently.
Summary
The central question at issue here is whether the demographic pat 
terns projected for the future low or negative population growth and 
population aging are likely to have important adverse effects on 
future economic growth, that is, whether the projected patterns of pop 
ulation growth imply secular stagnation on the economic side. To 
answer this, we have focused particularly on the record of the last cen 
tury.
As it turns out, historical experience raises serious doubt about this 
secular stagnation thesis. In the past, growth rates of real per capita 
income have trended upward despite a downward trend in population 
growth. This is hardly what one would expect if population growth 
were exerting a serious drag on the economy. Also, in the post-World 
War II period, economic growth rates have differed sharply between 
periods with little or no differences in dependency. Nor are projected 
demographic changes markedly out of line with past experience. 
Future declines projected for the rate of population growth are quite 
small; hence it is hard to see why a substantial new negative effect on 
economic growth should emerge. Projections of aging of the labor 
force itself do not yield magnitudes out of line with previous experi 
ence. Moreover, there will be a sharp increase in the educational attain 
ment of older workers. Negative effects, if any, of labor force aging on 
innovation and mobility are likely to be offset by a markedly higher 
educational level of the older population, as well as the greater experi 
ence of older workers.
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Similarly, the outlook for the total dependency burden on workers, 
when viewed in historical perspective, is not unprecedented. Projected 
total dependency rates are, on average, about the same as in the late 
nineteenth century, since rising old-age dependency is projected to be 
offset by declining youth dependency. An assessment of the projected 
change in tax burden per worker suggests that this is not likely to be so 
great as to have serious adverse incentive effects.
Indeed, the longer-term historical record raises doubt about fertility 
leveling off below replacement levels, as currently projected. Com 
pleted fertility in this century shows a long-term swing of about fifty 
years duration, and labor market conditions are now emerging that 
favor a new upswing. In all of the countries considered here ,the cur 
rent total fertility rate is above its 1980s trough, and in a number of 
them the increase is sizable. If a new baby boom were to occur, it 
would change the dependency outlook in a more favorable direction in 
the period after 2025, the period when current projections place the 
dependency burden at its highest. It is hard to understand why the pos 
sibility of a new baby boom is so blandly dismissed in demographic 
projections.
In the literature on less developed countries, recent years have seen 
a growing skepticism that population growth has important adverse 
effects on long-term economic growth (see, e.g., Kelley 1986, 1991; 
U.S. National Research Council 1986). It seems likely that a similar 
fate is in store for the current literature foreseeing dire consequences 
for economic growth in the demographic outlook of developed coun 
tries.
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Can There Be Too Much 
Human Capital?
Is There a World Population Problem?
D. Gale Johnson 
University of Chicago
Most of the emphasis in the study of human capital is on investment 
in people and the consequences of that investment social and private 
returns, social and private costs, the effects of human capital upon pro 
ductivity and national output growth, on-the-job training versus formal 
education, and the substitution between quality and numbers of chil 
dren. I plan to discuss a rather different aspect of human capital, 
namely, the value of a person a human being with little or no for 
mal investment other than that common in the majority of the develop 
ing countries of the world.
My interest in the value of a person whose primary human capital 
consists of a combination of physical capability, native intelligence, 
and a limited education investment is in exploring whether population 
growth has a measurable negative effect upon real per capita income in 
developing countries. As I use the term, a negative effect exists if the 
total marginal product of an additional individual is less than the aver 
age product of the existing population. This definition of a negative 
effect does not require that the marginal product be negative, only that 
it be less than the average product or per capita income level. This is a 
very stringent test, much stronger than what is generally considered.
I believe if the majority of people were asked what was the relation 
ship between population growth and per capita real incomes in devel 
oping countries they would answer that there was a negative 
relationship that population growth reduces real per capita incomes 
below what they would otherwise be. This was the common viewpoint 
expressed in the popular press prior to and during the 1992 world con 
ference on the environment in Rio de Janeiro. It is the intent of the
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Population Crisis Committee, certain agencies of the United Nations, 
and the authors of The Population Bomb to create such an impression. 
It is certainly the answer given by officials in the People's Republic of 
China responsible for the country's population programs.
There have been relatively few voices putting forward a contrary 
view; Julian Simon has been the most prominent. A few years ago 
(1986) a Working Group was organized by the National Research 
Council of the National Academy of Sciences, and after many meet 
ings and several studies commissioned, it issued a report (NRC 1986), 
Population Growth and Economic Development: Policy Questions, 
which has been ignored except for reviews in a few scholarly journals. 
I hope I will be forgiven if a significant part of this paper is devoted to 
presenting the major findings of that report which, I believe have stood 
the test of time very well. But I may be biased I was the co-chairman 
of the Working Group.
Why is Population Growth Bad?
It is useful to start with the arguments that support the view that 
population growth has adverse effects upon economic growth in devel 
oping countries. The case is quite simple and straightforward. The 
earth is considered to be finite in terms of physical space and 
resources. The exploitation or use of its resources is subject to dimin 
ishing returns additional inputs (including labor) applied to the land, 
water, minerals, and forests will yield a diminished return. Therefore, 
other things equal, more people will mean a reduction in the marginal 
productivity of labor and, eventually, lower per capita incomes. These 
relationships seem so obvious that they are seldom spelled out so 
explicitly. The basic argument hasn't changed from that given by 
Malthus nearly two centuries ago.
The fact that only a small minority of the world's population eats 
less well today than did the majority of Europeans at the time Malthus 
wrote seems not to have dimmed the attractiveness of his model of 
human behavior (Fogel 1992). It is estimated that in the period 1781- 
1790, daily per capita calorie consumption in France was 1,753. As of 
1965, how many countries in the world had a smaller caloric supply?
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The answer is: exactly two Mozambique and Somalia (World Bank 
1992). It was not until the second quarter of the nineteenth century that 
France's calorie consumption equaled that of India today. At the end of 
the eighteenth century England's daily per capita production of calo 
ries was 10 percent below the Indian daily consumption in 1989. It is 
sad to note that in 1989 there were three countries, all torn by war and 
revolution, that had less than 1,753 calories per day Mozambique, 
Ethiopia, and Chad and as of 1992 they have probably been joined 
by Somalia and Sudan. Yet the view that increased food supplies would 
soon be followed by increased mouths to feed should not be too sur 
prising, since this view was expressed more than two millennia ago in 
Ecclesiastes 5.11: "When goods are increased, they are increased that 
eat them."
The World Bank's World Development Report 1984 dealt with the 
issue of population change and development. The discussion, which is 
both competent and balanced, gave rather little weight to the impor 
tance of diminishing returns to or scarcity of resources except for the 
possible adverse effects of population growth on the environment. Nor 
was the claim made that rapid population growth stopped development 
or caused a fall in real per capita income. Instead, the consequences 
were that rapid population growth, such as that occurring in most 
developing countries, slowed economic development (p. 105). It 
attributes the negative effects of rapid population growth to two fac 
tors. The first was internal to the family; a large family reduces the 
investment in each child in terms of time and other resources. Since 
poor families have the most children, this makes it more difficult to 
reduce poverty. The second factor was that "rapid population growth 
weakens macroeconomic performance by making it more difficult to 
finance the investments in education and infrastructure that ensure sus 
tained economic growth" (p. 105). This work represented an important 
shift in the scholarly discussion of population growth, but seems not to 
have penetrated the popular discussion.
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What Are the Facts?
What are the facts concerning the relationship between population 
growth and development as measured by the growth in real per capita 
incomes? This may seem like a simple question and, at one level, it is. 
But as will become clear, it is far from a simple question. Or it may be 
a simple question with a complex answer or answers.
I shall present some empirical information concerning the relation 
ships between population growth and economic development. Let me 
note in advance that the empirical relationships presented do not prove 
causality; they do not prove that population growth has either a posi 
tive or negative effect upon development and growth. For this reason 
the Working Group (NRC 1986) did not present any regressions relat 
ing population growth to various variables, such as per capita income 
growth. Spurious correlations abound. Why do I present such data 
then? I do so because those who believe that population growth is the 
source of most human ills either implicitly or explicitly claim that a 
negative relationship holds between population growth and economic 
and social development. A recent pamphlet of the Population Crisis 
Committee, The International Human Suffering Index, presents, in 
color no less, a comparison between an index which it calls the Human 
Suffering Index and the annual rate of population increase. Two state 
ments are made: "Most countries with high human suffering scores 
have very high rates of population growth," and "Virtually all the 
countries with low human suffering scores have low rates of popula 
tion growth." But there appears to be a very weak statistical relation 
ship between the two variables except between the 57 countries 
classified as having Minimal and Moderate Human Suffering versus 
the 83 others. Within the 83 other countries, whose fates include those 
classified as subject to Extreme Human Suffering, there was almost no 
relationship between population growth and the index; the square of 
the correlation coefficient is 0.06. This means that 94 percent of the 
variation in the suffering index was due to something other than differ 
ences in population growth rates. If one's only source of information 
on the status of the life of people in developing countries were the dis 
cussion of the Human Suffering Index, one would hardly guess that life 
expectancy at birth has increased from no more than 35 years in 1950
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to 62 years in 1990 in the low-income countries (less than $600 GNP 
per capita in 1990).
Why It Is So Hard To Know
Why is it so hard to determine how population growth affects eco 
nomic development? As noted, the interrelationships between popula 
tion and economic growth are very complex. First, if economic 
development is measured by changes in per capita real income, at cer 
tain income levels increases in per capita income will result in an 
increase in population growth through influences that reduce mortality, 
especially infant mortality. For the developing economies, there is a 
strong negative relationship between income levels and infant mortal 
ity. Thus, if income and population growth are compared for the same 
time period, it is likely that there will be a positive relationship 
between the two. Introducing lags as I have may not entirely eliminate 
the problems associated with the direction of causality. Second, the 
effects of population growth can differ in the short and long run, with 
the short run being perhaps as long as half a century. Other things 
equal, in the short run an increase in population growth would be 
expected to lower the rate of growth in real per capita incomes. An 
increase in population growth rates will be accompanied by an increase 
in the number of children and in the dependency ratio. The labor force 
declines as a percentage of the population. In the long run the effects of 
investment in human capital can be realized. Positive effects through 
invention and innovation and increasing returns to scale can result 
from population growth when there is time for adjustment and 
response to changing conditions. Slow or nil long-run increases in pop 
ulation also increase dependency as the population ages. Thus, in the 
long run (after one or two generations), slow population growth can 
have similar effects upon per capita productivity as rapid population 
growth may have in the short run.
A possible reason for the belief that an increase in population in the 
developing countries will either lower the actual average income or the 
rate of growth of income is the implicit assumption that individuals in 
these countries consume everything they produce. This assumption is
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incorrect. The people of the developing countries do not consume 
everything they produce. According to World Bank data (1992, pp. 
234-235), the domestic savings rates of the low-income countries are 
equal to or greater than the rates for either middle- or high-income 
countries. Thus if resources are productively invested, over a lifetime 
an additional person would make possible an increase in the productive 
potential of a country. This conclusion assumes that savings rates are 
independent of population growth rates, and that point is addressed 
below. It may be noted that the savings estimate excludes savings that 
result in human capital investment. If the succeeding generation has 
more education and more adequate health care than the current genera 
tion has, this increases the probability that a significant positive rate of 
population growth either will have a positive or nil effect on per capita 
real incomes in the long run. Consequently, in considering the effect of 
population growth on income growth we must consider the total effect 
and not solely the marginal product of labor. This is why I earlier used 
the term "total marginal product" of an additional person which 
includes not only the marginal product of labor but the increase in 
investment and any effects through increasing returns to scale.
Some Empirical Relationships
There are a number of empirical relationships or propositions that 
merit our attention. The first two are of a very general nature, and the 
third involves regressions between population growth rates and real 
per capita incomes with the inclusion of other relevant variables. These 
empirical propositions raise some questions concerning the validity of 
the commonly held view that higher rates of population growth have 
adverse effects upon economic well-being. I do not claim that these 
empirical relationships imply causality, but only that each is worth 
pondering and exploring.
The first of the empirical relationships is that the significant 
increases in the real incomes in the industrial countries of Europe and 
North America occurred in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twen 
tieth centuries during a period of historically rapid population growth 
that followed a long period of slow population growth. From 1650 to
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1750 population growth rates were very low in both the industrial and 
developing regions at 0.33 and 0.34 percent annually (see table 1). At 
these rates population doubling would require two centuries. From 
1750 to 1900 population growth rates were higher in the industrial than 
in the developing regions and this difference continued through the 
first two decades of this century.
Table 1. Population Growth Rates and Distribution of World Population 
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SOURCES Bogue (1969, p. 49), United Nations (1988)
As late as 1840 life expectancy at birth in six European countries 
and Massachusetts was 41 years (table 2). It reached 50.5 years by 
1900 and then increased rapidly reaching 71 years by 1955. While we 
have little knowledge of life expectancy at birth in the developing 
regions prior to 1950, it is unlikely that there was any significant 
improvement in the prior century. However, since 1950 the increase in 
life expectancy can only be described as spectacular, increasing from 
35 years in 1950 to 62 years in 1990 (World Bank 1984 and 1992). Life 
expectancy at birth in the United States was approximately 42 years in 
1880; it did not reach 60 years until 1930. Thus, the lowest income
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countries in the world achieved a greater increase in life expectancy in 
25 years than was achieved in the United States in twice that long. This 
improvement in the developing regions was achieved during a period 
of rapid population growth.
Table 2. Expectation of Life at Birth for Six European Countries and 














SOURCE United Nations (1962,






























Similar rapid progress has been made in the developing world in 
reducing infant mortality and child death rates since 1950 (table 3). 
The infant mortality rate declined from 165 in 1950 to 72 in 1985, 
while the child death rate fell from 27 to 11; both are rates per 1,000. 
The infant mortality rate in the United States in 1900 was 160, and it 
declined to approximately 80 over the next quarter century (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 1971, p. 55).
The second of the empirical propositions is that the developing 
countries had rapid economic growth in the three decades from 1950 to 
1980 with population growth rates exceeding those ever realized in the 
industrial countries. Population growth rates were 2 percent or more 
while the per capita GDP grew at an annual rate of 2.6 percent during 
the three decades (National Research Council 1986, p. 5). Prior to 
1950 population growth rates had been much lower, generally 1 per-
Table 3. Life Expectancy at Birth, Infant Mortality Rate, and Child Death Rate
Life expectancy at birth 
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SOURCE: World Bank (1987).
a Income designations are based on per capita income (in 1985 U.S. dollars), low income, $390 or less, lower-middle income, $400-$ 1,600; upper-mid 
dle income, $1,600-$7,420 
b Rates are per 1,000 
c Data for Africa are for 1982.
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cent or less, and there had been slow or nil increases in real per capita 
incomes.
Economic growth was relatively slow during the 1950s in the low- 
income countries. If we look at a somewhat later period, 1965 to 1985, 
the rate of income growth was quite spectacular. The per capita gross 
national product for the low-income countries grew 2.9 percent annu 
ally for 1965-85 and exceeded the 2.4 percent of the industrial econo 
mies (World Bank 1987). Since low-income countries were defined as 
those with less than $400 per capita GNP in 1985, some rapidly grow 
ing countries that were poor in 1965 were excluded from the calcula 
tion because they grew out of the low-income category by 1985; had 
these countries been included, the growth of income would have been 
even higher.
The third of the empirical propositions is that the evidence does not 
support the view that for developing countries the rate of population 
growth has a negative effect upon per capita income growth for the 
period since 1950. Some results are given in table 4 for three decades. 
In the simple model it was assumed that per capita income growth in a 
decade was a function of population growth and per capita income 
growth in the prior decade. Enrollment ratios for primary schools and 
per capita gross domestic products were included. School enrollment is 
included to provide a rough indication of society's investment in 
human capital. Per capita GDP is included to determine if there is a 
convergence effect among the developing countries. Per capita GDP 
growth in the prior decade was included because of the possible cau 
sality between income growth and population growth and the possibil 
ity of continuity in per capita income growth from one decade to the 
next. The coefficient for population growth was positive but not signif 
icantly different from zero for each of the three decades for low- 
income countries. For middle-income countries the coefficient was 
negative and significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level 
for the 1960s, but was not significant for either of the other two 
decades. Thus, of the six coefficients for the developing countries, only 
one indicated that there was a (weak) negative relationship between 
past population growth and current growth of GDP per capita. The 
variables included had surprisingly little relationship to the real per 
capita growth rates. The correlation coefficients were very small and 
none of the coefficients were statistically significant at the conven-
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tional 5 percent level. Obviously other variables, including policy vari 
ables, are much more important in influencing income growth rates 
than population growth or the human capital measures that I have 
included.


































































NOTES GDP data are from Summers and Heston (1991); and World Bank (various years) 
Lagged population and lagged GDP growth rates are for the pnor decade, lagged GDP level is 
beginning year of the decade Africa and Latin America dummies are 1 for country in region, 0 
otherwise Constant terms not presented
*Statistically significant at 5 percent level
**Statistically significant at 10 percent level
Table 5 is from Levine and Renelt (1992), who included population 
growth as one of the variables in their analysis of the influence of pol 
icy factors on economic growth in 119 countries. In none of the regres 
sions was there a statistically significant effect of population growth on 
the rate of economic growth. Several of the policy or policy-related 
variables had a statistically significant coefficient, especially invest 
ment and government share. A study by Singh (1992) for twenty-nine 
developing economies obtained negative but insignificant coefficients
Table 5. Cross-Country Growth Regressions (Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real Per Capita GDP)
Independent variable
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Growth of domestic credit (GDC)
























































SOURCE: Levme and Renelt (1992)
NOTES Regressions (1), (3), and (4) use primarily World Bank and IMF data, while regressions (2) and (5) use Summers and Heston data Coverage
includes all countnes with data given by the sources except major oil exporters
*Statistically significant at the P=0.05 level
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for the population growth variable. In each of these studies the periods 
for income and population growth were contemporaneous.
Population Growth Only One Factor
Before summarizing the results of the NRC study on population 
growth and economic development, I want to make a point that is all 
too often ignored in the popular discussions of the subject. Population 
growth is only one factor in determining the economic well-being of 
the citizens of a country. And, looking around the world today at the 
observed differences in real per capita incomes, it seems to be a rather 
minor factor in explaining such differences. Governmental policies are 
of far greater importance. Much of the human suffering witnessed in 
recent years has not been caused by excessive population growth or too 
large populations; most of the real causes are to be found in civil war 
and strife and governmental mismanagement and failures. Bangladesh 
is a probable exception to this conclusion, but I am not sure that there 
are any others.
China is a clear example of the dominance of factors other than pop 
ulation growth in explaining real income growth over the past four 
decades. While there has been a reduction in population growth rates 
over the past three decades, the small decline in the population growth 
rate after the early 1970s can't account for any significant part of the 
sharp changes in the growth of income per capita. Using the Summers 
and Heston (1991) estimates, per capita GDP grew at an annual rate of 
2.3 percent from 1960-1973, by 3.7 percent from 1973-1980 and, dur 
ing major policy reforms, 7.8 percent from 1980 to 1988. Population 
growth rates in Taiwan closely parallel those of the mainland, but from 
1960 to 1980 the real income growth rate was double that of the main 
land. This difference can only be explained by policy factors. From 
1980-1988 the per capita income growth rate on the mainland 
exceeded that of Taiwan.
Most African countries, unfortunately, provide further evidence of 
how the national policy framework dominates changes in economic 
welfare. From 1973-1980, thirty out of forty-six African countries had 
negative real per capita income growth rates (Summers and Heston
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1991). The same number had negative per capita growth rates during 
1980-1988. During these two periods the African countries generally 
followed import substitution policies with heavy taxation of agricul 
ture, especially of export commodities. The beginning of the shift to 
market-oriented policies did not begin generally until the mid-1980s 
and is just now beginning to influence the pattern of growth.
Propositions: Population and Growth
In the report, Population Growth and Economic Development'. Pol 
icy Questions (NRC 1986), nine questions were posed and the avail 
able evidence was used to answer them. I shall now paraphrase the 
nine questions and provide a brief summary of the report's conclu 
sions.
1. Would slower population growth increase the per capita supply of 
exhaustible resources?
In reflecting upon this question, it should be remembered that over 
the past century the real prices of exhaustible natural resources have 
declined, not increased (Simon 1981). The decline in the prices of such 
resources relative to wages or earnings has been striking; for oil and 
coal the time cost today is about a fifth of what it was a century ago. 
The same pattern of decline in relative scarcity has prevailed for non- 
fuel resources such as copper.
An important point is that no exhaustible resource is essential or 
irreplaceable. As the easily available supplies of such a resource are 
extracted, the real cost of extraction and the price increase, which 
encourages economy in the use of that resource and stimulate the 
search for substitutes. One reason that real copper prices have declined 
is that aluminum, which is derived from a plentiful resource (bauxite), 
has been substituted for it in many uses, especially wire.
A little reflection will convince you that the number of people who 
will enjoy the use of an exhaustible resource will be the same whether 
population growth is slow or fast. Exhaustion will occur sooner with 
rapid population growth than with slow population growth, but the 
number of people who will have used the resource will be the same. If 
you contend that with more time provided by slower population
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growth it would be possible to learn how to economize on the use of 
the resource, you have already lost most of your argument that rapid 
population growth results in undue resource exhaustion. The applica 
tion of more resources to find ways to economize on use of the 
exhaustible resource is an effective substitute for more time. With a 
larger population there are more human resources to devote to the 
problem at an earlier time.
2. Would slower population growth increase the per capita availabil 
ity of renewable resources and thus increase per capita income?
Up to the present, the decline in the per capita availability of renew 
able resources, such as land, has not resulted in a reduction in per cap 
ita income. Instead, the long-run trend in the prices of farm products 
that depend upon land, especially the food crops, has been a declining 
one over the past century (Simon 1981).
We need to bear in mind that the use of renewable resources is influ 
enced by existing institutional arrangements. Some institutional 
arrangements, such as common property or property rights, that are 
limited and uncertain may have disastrous effects upon the conserva 
tion of renewable resources. Consider the near extinction of certain 
kinds of whales or the depletion of certain fishing areas. These 
occurred where common property existed and, until recently, no effec 
tive mechanism existed for avoiding the "tragedy of the commons." 
The tragedy of the commons occurs because it is in the interest of the 
individual to use or harvest the commons as long as what is harvested 
has a value greater than the costs, even though this activity reduces the 
total output. Consequently, if serious problems do occur due to the 
diminution of the productivity of renewable resources, it will probably 
be because appropriate institutional arrangements do not exist.
3. Will slower population growth alleviate pollution and environ 
mental degradation?
Environmental resources, such as air and water, are almost always 
common property; unless appropriate institutional arrangements exist, 
these resources will be overused whether population is growing rap 
idly, slowly, or not at all. There is an optimum level of pollution, 
namely, the level at which the marginal cost of reducing the pollution 
equals the value of the marginal harm done by the pollutant. But where 
air or water are common property, no enterprise or person has to bear 
more than a small part of the cost of pollution created. Public policy
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has the responsibility of internalizing the cost of pollution by adopting 
measures, such as regulations, fees, or incentives for pollution abate 
ment, that force or induce producers to limit the amount of pollution to 
the socially optimum level. Please note that enterprise is used here in a 
very broad sense and includes enterprises owned publicly, such as the 
Tennessee Valley Authority or the local school district, as well as those 
owned privately; no form of ownership has a monopoly on pollution.
Major sources of pollution in the world today, however, are not 
associated with rapidly growing populations but with either popula 
tions with high incomes or in countries that had socialist economic sys 
tems. Feshback and Friendly (1992) chronicle the story of how having 
the means of production "owned by all the people" led to environmen 
tal disaster in the Soviet Union. People with high incomes consume 
more than people with low incomes, and their demands upon produc 
tion resources and the potential for environmental disruption are 
greater. It follows that if population growth has little or no effect on 
income growth, more people increase the potential for environmental 
disruption; but the actual amount of environmental disruption is a 
function of many variables other than either per capita incomes or pop 
ulation.
Based on research done since 1986, it is now possible to say more 
about the effects of developing country economic growth on the state 
of the environment. A major factor in economic growth is the openness 
of the economy to the world economy the degree of trade liberaliza 
tion. Because of the comments about the North American Free Trade 
Agreement by groups that the press calls environmentalists, I start by 
noting the probable effects of world trade liberalization upon the envi 
ronment. This is a topic ably addressed in a recent paper by Kym 
Anderson (1992).
The probable direct effect of world trade liberalization would be to 
reduce pollution overall. Two effects are worthy of note. Agriculture is 
an important source of ground water pollution, especially in the indus 
trial countries. This is due to the relatively heavy use of chemicals in 
crop production and the concentration of livestock production in large 
units. Trade liberalization for farm products would shift crop produc 
tion from countries with high farm output prices and heavy chemical 
use to countries that have and would continue to have lower levels of 
fertilizer and pesticide use. If there were worldwide trade liberalization
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in agricultural products, grain production would shift from Western 
Europe to Argentina, Australia, Thailand, and the United States. With 
the lower crop prices in Western Europe, chemical use would be signif 
icantly reduced. While use of chemicals would increase some in the 
countries expanding-crop production, the use level would be relatively 
low due to the price relationships between crops and fertilizer. The 
expansion in U.S. crop production would result from the return of idled 
land to cultivation; chemical use would fall.
The second direct effect of trade liberalization relates to the use of 
energy. Most developing countries hold energy prices below world 
market prices, resulting in excessive use of energy per unit of output. 
In China and India coal prices have been kept at hardly more than half 
the world market prices. Not only is an excessive amount of coal and 
other energy used, but energy is used inefficiently because it has not 
paid to invest in new and less polluting combustion technology. Ineffi 
ciency in combustion leads to a high level of pollution per btu con 
sumed.
If the developing countries liberalize trade, including trade in 
energy, energy prices will rise to world market levels and there will be 
an incentive to conserve in the use of energy and thus reduce pollution.
One of the sources of environmental disruption in the low-income 
developing countries is the harvesting of forests for firewood and the 
consequent erosion and silting of rivers. As labor becomes more valu 
able, wood becomes less competitive as fuel. Its main cost under the 
conditions in the low-income developing countries is time, since the 
institutional arrangements permit harvesting without paying for the 
trees. Deforestation occurs not only because labor is so cheap, but 
because the rights to utilize the forest are not well defined.
The available evidence indicates that pollution abatement is a nor 
mal good. This means that the income elasticity of demand for pollu 
tion abatement is positive and that as real per capita incomes increase, 
people demand more pollution abatement. It is not only that more 
effort and resources are devoted to pollution abatement, but the accept 
able standards for pollution become more stringent. Consequently, it 
can be expected that as per capita incomes increase in the developing 
countries, less and less pollution will be acceptable and permitted. 
Restraints on pollution are a function of per capita incomes, population 
density, and urbanization.
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Those who opposed NAFTA because of presumed environmental 
effects apparently failed to consider such rational responses. Theirs is a 
highly condescending and even insulting view of the people of devel 
oping countries. The progress that developing countries have made in 
environmental improvement where it really counts, namely, in saving 
lives, has been enormous over the past four decades. Earlier I referred 
to the sharp reduction in infant mortality. A large share of this decline 
resulted from environmental improvements better handling of sew 
age and the provision of safer and cleaner water. These changes 
occurred because the people of the developing countries had more 
income and allocated increased resources to improving their environ 
ment. And the evidence is clear: they have been highly successful at 
improving the environment where it really counts in saving lives and 
reducing illness.
4. Will slower population growth lead to more capital per worker 
and higher per capita worker output and income?
Does slower population growth increase the rate of saving? The 
NRC (1986) Working Group, after reviewing various ways in which 
population growth could influence the savings rate, concluded: "We 
have found little evidence that the aggregate savings rate depends on 
growth rates or the age structure of the population" (p. 87). Subse 
quently, A.C. Kelley (1988) presented the results of his research on the 
effect of population growth on savings and investments in developing 
countries. He considered three possible reasons for negative effects 
upon economic growth: age dependency, capital shallowing, and 
investment diversion. The age dependency effect is due to the large 
proportion of children who do not work; the children may also be 
responsible for investment diversion to consumption. Capital shallow 
ing is nothing more than a reduction in the amount of capital per 
worker if savings decline on a per capita basis. Kelley concluded that 
the empirical research had not substantiated any of these effects (p. 
459). He also noted that where the economic analysis was rather more 
sophisticated and included second order effects such as economizing 
on resources and supply effects, the "puzzle of reconciling the apparent 
divergencies between theory and fact disappears" (p. 460).
5. Do lower population densities cause lower per capita incomes by 
reduced stimulus to innovation and reduced economies of scale?
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One of Adam Smith's greatest contributions to economics was his 
analysis of the interrelationships between specialization, the extent of 
the market, and the existence of economies of scale. The NRC Work 
ing Group concluded that for manufacturing, the economies of scale 
can be achieved at an unspecified moderate-sized city. The liberaliza 
tion of international trade in agricultural products and the international 
flow of capital and technology probably does mean that low rates of 
population growth are without significant effect upon innovation in 
manufacturing productivity. And the same answer seems to apply if the 
question is put differently: Does rapid population growth reduce the 
growth of labor productivity in manufacturing? The answer also seems 
to be in the negative.
The Working Group concluded that low density of population could 
and probably did have adverse effects upon productivity in agriculture. 
This effect resulted from the costs of the infrastructure, such as roads, 
communication, marketing services, agricultural research and exten 
sion. While Boserup (1981) showed how increased population density 
influenced the intensity of cultivation and encouraged technological 
change, it cannot be ruled out that after a certain density of agricultural 
population is reached, the productivity effects of increased density are 
either nil or negative. This still seems to be an open question.
6. Will slower population growth increase per capita levels of 
schooling and health?
This question needs to be considered in two parts. The first is the 
effect of an increase in the average number of children in a family 
upon family expenditures on education and schooling. The evidence 
supports the conclusion that having more children reduces the amount 
spent on each child.
The second part is the response of the public sectors to an increase 
in the number of children. T.P. Schultz (1987) found that the percent 
age of school-age children enrolled in school was not associated with 
the size of the school-age population relative to the total population. 
He found, however, that expenditures per child were a negative func 
tion of the relative size of the school-age population. These results are 
quite striking; they indicate that during recent years of rapidly growing 
populations in developing countries, these countries were able to 
increase the places in school rapidly enough to keep pace. In fact, in 
almost all developing countries the percentage of school-age children
Can There Be Too Much Human Capital? 55
in school has increased. Increasing the number of places, unfortu 
nately, was apparently associated with little increase in total expendi 
tures on education as the percentage of the population in school 
increased.
The Working Group could not isolate any effects of population 
growth on health expenditures due to the poor quality of the available 
data.
7. Will slower population growth decrease the degree of income ine 
quality?
In the short run the effects of slower population growth on income 
inequality depend on the distribution of the fertility decline among 
income groups. If the fertility decline occurs first in the higher income 
groups, the short-run effects will be to increase the inequality of the 
income distribution. If the fertility decline is greater in urban than in 
rural areas, there will be a short-run increase in income inequality, 
since urban incomes are significantly higher than rural incomes in 
developing countries
In the long run the effect of a decline in fertility on the distribution 
of income is likely to work through increasing the amount of capital 
per worker as the number of entrants to the labor force declines. This 
conclusion depends on the earlier conclusion that savings rates are 
independent of population growth or age composition. In effect, if 
labor becomes more scarce, it may command a higher share of the 
national product and in this way somewhat reduce the inequality in the 
distribution of income.
8. Will slower population growth facilitate the transfer of workers 
into the modern sector and alleviate problems of urban growth?
It cannot be doubted that rapid urbanization has occurred in the 
developing countries since 1950, nor can one doubt that the rapid 
growth was a response to population growth rates. Approximately 60 
percent of the increase in urban population has been due to natural 
population growth; the remainder has been due to migration from rural 
areas (NRC 1986, p. 67).
But once these facts are noted, it is important to recognize that part 
of the rapid growth of cities such as Mexico City and Cairo has been 
due to policies that subsidized living in cities, especially by providing 
large food subsidies that in most cases were not available to farmers. In 
addition, the income differences between urban and rural populations
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in developing countries have been very large, generally with urban per 
capita incomes ranging from 2.5 to 5 times rural incomes. Often the 
low rural incomes have reflected an urban bias, as well as the taxation 
of agriculture through low prices for farm products and high prices for 
farm inputs.
Consequently, governmental policies have had a role in rapid urban 
ization in the developing countries. If agriculture and rural areas were 
permitted to share more fully in economic growth, there would be less 
concern about too rapid urbanization. But economic growth does result 
in a shift of population from rural to urban areas, and this shift can be 
avoided only at large cost. Except to protect the relatively high 
incomes of those now in the cities, it is not obvious why there should 
be objection to the growth of urban populations.
9. Can a couple's fertility behavior impose costs on society at large?
The apparent answer is in the affirmative. Where there are public 
goods such as parks and roads, another child increases congestion. 
Given that most schools are publicly financed, an additional child 
imposes costs upon taxpayers generally. Furthermore, additional chil 
dren will in due course increase the number of workers and thus reduce 
wages, resulting in a potential increase in income inequality. This is 
essentially the answer in the NRC Working Group report.
It was an answer that I found unconvincing because it ignored the 
general thrust of the report, namely, that population growth had little or 
no effect on per capita income growth. True, some negative effects 
were noted, such as on the quality of education or at least on per capital 
education expenditures. But there were also some positive effects, such 
as economies of scale. On balance it seems to me that there is little evi 
dence to support the position that a family imposes net negative exter 
nalities upon society when it chooses to have another child. The family 
does impose certain costs upon others, but the most important of 
these the cost of schooling is a cost that most societies have chosen 
to bear publicly for the general benefits that a society derives from hav 
ing a well-educated population.
At least the Working Group came down against governmental coer 
cion to control fertility decisions, although it was unwilling to use the 
word coercion and instead said that it preferred using changes in incen 
tives rather than quantity rationing. Quantity rationing limiting the 
number of children a couple may have can only be imposed by the
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application of coercion. Finally, the following was stated: "It is impor 
tant to note, however, that current data and theory are inadequate to 
quantify the size of the external effects; certainly there is no evidence 
to suggest that drastic financial or legal restrictions on child bearing are 
warranted" (p. 84).
What is the Value of a Person?
The last of the questions concerning whether an added birth imposes 
costs upon society generally, is not quite the question that I posed at 
the beginning of this paper. The question I posed was whether adding 
to the population lowered the level of per capita income. Put another 
way, the question was whether in a developing country the total mar 
ginal product of a person of average human capital was below the aver 
age product of that economy. I interpret the evidence, including the 
research and conclusions of the Working Group, to support the conclu 
sion that the population growth rates that we have observed in recent 
decades have had little or no significant effect upon the level or the rate 
of growth of per capita income in either the long or the short run.
I wish to note two caveats to the conclusion that I have just stated. 
First, there are reasons to argue that moderate rates of population 
growth are more supportive of economic development than either low, 
including negative, or high rates. I define moderate rates of population 
growth in the approximate range of 1.25 to 2.5 percent. Population 
growth rates of 3 percent or more may reduce rates of per capita 
income growth primarily because of the stress placed upon institutions, 
such as education, health, and city governments, by the high rates of 
adjustment required. High rates of population growth may require rates 
of response that are beyond the capabilities of such institutions. Sec 
ond, even if population growth rates have no significant effects upon 
economic development, governments should pursue many ordinary 
economic and social programs, such as universal elementary educa 
tion, maternal and child health care, and institutions that assist individ 
uals in providing personal financial security, that have the effect of 
reducing the rates of population growth, although that is not the pri 
mary objective of such programs.
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A Positive Population Policy
I strongly support a positive population policy that seeks the objec 
tive of assisting every family in a country to have the number of chil 
dren that each family desires. By definition, such programs must be 
voluntary; coercion and compulsion are simply not consistent with 
each family achieving its objectives. Thus I strongly favor govern 
ments making both relevant information and contraceptive materials 
available to every family that desires such information and materials. 
As I argued above, a case has not been made that there is a significantly 
negative externality to the number of children a family has. But, 
because I believe that the welfare of families is enhanced if they are 
given the resources that they need to limit the number of children to the 
number each family desires, I believe that governments should accept 
the responsibility of assuring that such resources are available and their 
availability is highly publicized.
I would argue that governments should go well beyond what many 
would argue is a passive population policy such as I have described, 
though in most real world situations policy makers would not agree 
that such a policy can be carried out without addressing some real con 
flicts. While ruling out coercion, governments can and do influence the 
number of children a family desires as well as the number a family has. 
This can be done by influencing conditions that are recognized to have 
an effect upon the number of children desired. Education, especially of 
women, has major impacts on both the desired and the actual number 
of children. Creating conditions that reduce infant mortality leads to a 
reduction in the number of children born, though with a lag.
In many rural communities old-age security is achieved primarily 
through having several children, especially male children. In rural 
China, for example, the rural reforms have not produced any alterna 
tive sources of old-age security to having one or more sons. While the 
ownership of land is one means for providing security in one's older 
years, private ownership of farm land does not exist in China. Not only 
can rural families not own the land they farm, they cannot assume that 
the land use rights assigned to them can be readily marketed. There are 
other alternatives for making provision for the uncertainties of old age 
and death, such as life insurance and access to reliable savings institu 
tions that are allowed to have positive real interest rates. The most
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immediate and direct approach for the provision of old-age security in 
China would be the extension of the social security system to the entire 
population, rather than restricting it to the employees of the govern 
ment and state and some collective enterprises.
The cost of providing a pension to all rural residents 65 years and 
older at 80 percent of the average annual income of all rural residents 
would not be beyond the financial resources of the Chinese govern 
ment. In 1989 there were 56 million persons living outside of cities 
who were 65 years of age or older. If the average pension were 50 yuan 
per month, the annual cost would be 34 billion yuan. This is less than 
the budgetary cost of the grain price subsidy in 1991! This subsidy 
went to urban residents who, on average, had far higher incomes than 
rural people. It appears that the grain price subsidy is being phased out. 
It would be hard to think of any alternative use for those funds that 
would create greater happiness and contribute more to the future via 
bility and tranquility of the Chinese society than the creation of a uni 
versal social security system.
Such a system, especially if combined with providing the institu 
tional and legal framework for individuals to make some provision for 
their financial security, would achieve two major objectives. It would 
significantly alter the incentives to have large numbers of children, and 
it would reduce the neglect and mistreatment of female babies. Put 
more directly, much of the pressure in rural China for violating the 
restraints of the coercive population policy would be eliminated if rural 
families had viable alternatives to a son or sons to provide security for 
their old age.
Coercive population programs do great harm, not only to families 
but to a nation. Fortunately, policies and programs that will lead to 
reductions in population growth rates need not be coercive. The appro 
priate criteria for evaluating programs that directly influence the num 
ber of births is the degree to which families are assisted in having the 
number of children they desire. Lacking evidence that family decisions 
with respect to the number of children have adverse external effects 
upon others, there is no basis for coercive behavior by governments. 
Even if there were some adverse external effects, however, I would 
still hold that decisions with respect to the number of children should 
be made by the family. It is difficult to imagine that anyone who 
accepts the Western concept of human rights would approve of the use 
of coercive restraints placed on such a fundamental right.
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Family issues particularly the notion that there has been a decline 
in "family values" as signaled, for example, by a lack of respect for 
elders and family instability have become an important theme of 
political debates in the United States in recent times. Another impor 
tant theme has been the relationship between economic development 
and human capital investment. This essay is concerned with the rela 
tionships between human capital, the family, and economic develop 
ment. In particular, it examines two related questions: First, do family 
arrangements and family stability, as characterized by the structure of 
households and their dissolution and marital patterns, reflect the rapid 
ity of economic development, such that enhanced growth and develop 
ment can cause a "breakdown" of the family? Second, how does 
economic development affect the returns to and investments in differ 
ent types of human capital? I will attempt to show that these two ques 
tions are linked, that the technological transformation of an economy, 
by altering the value of different kinds of human capital and increasing 
incomes, also affects the nature and stability of family relationships.
To understand the complex relationships among growth, human 
capital, and the family would be quite difficult in the context of an 
economy such as that of the United States. Distinguishing the effects of 
development on the returns to human capital investments from the 
effects of human capital investments on development, for example, is a 
formidable task. Moreover, the measurement of economic growth and 
the technical change that underlies it is fraught with difficulties when 
the economy is as technologically differentiated as in the United 
States. As a consequence, I look for some answers to the questions
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about the family-human capital-growth nexus in a simpler economy, 
that of rural India.
There are three key reasons for studying the Indian rural economy to 
understand better the relationships between family, human capital, and 
development. First, that economy is relatively homogenous with 
respect to production compared to the United States. The most impor 
tant economic activity by far is agricultural production, and as a conse 
quence it is easier to characterize the economic constraints facing 
individuals and households.
Second, an important and recent source of economic development in 
India is clear the "green revolution." There is no question that a 
major source of rural development and growth was technical change 
that was essentially exogenous to the Indian economy. In particular, the 
widespread availability of substantially more productive varieties of 
wheat and rice, which began in the early and mid-1960s, was not due 
to increases in human capital investments or to changes in family 
arrangements in rural areas. Moreover, because the technological 
change was crop-specific, not all of the Indian economy could benefit 
directly from the new grain varieties. The geographically selective 
nature of the green revolution and its relatively clear timing means that 
we have a natural experiment in which we can compare, before and 
after the technical change began, areas now experiencing growth pro 
pelled by agricultural technical change with those areas without such 
growth.
The third and essential reason for examining the Indian economy is 
that there are excellent data describing that economy. We can thus 
exploit the green revolution experiment. In particular, there are two 
sets of data that (1) characterize the behavior of Indian farmers over 
time in an environment relatively untouched by the green revolution, 
and (2) describe farmers across all of India, both within and outside of 
green revolution areas. Thus there is information that describes family 
arrangements, schooling, and agricultural production prior to and after 
the onset of technical change in the same areas, as well as in areas 
without significant agricultural productivity growth.
I use results from prior studies undertaken by me and others over the 
last decade based on these data describing Indian farm families to 
examine hypotheses about families and the role of human capital as 
affected by economic growth. First, I will briefly discuss the key fea-
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tures of undeveloped agricultural economies typical of a low-income 
country such as India prior to the green revolution, how these charac 
teristics influence family arrangements and stability and the value of 
human capital, and how technological change affects these factors. I 
will then describe the data sets and what they say about the characteris 
tics of families and households and related behaviors that require 
explanation. This section is followed by an examination of the evi 
dence pertaining to specific hypotheses about the relationship between 
human capital returns and family structures and arrangements under a 
no-growth, low-income regime, with particular attention to risk mitiga 
tion and experience as human capital. I then turn to an examination of 
the evidence on how agricultural technical change affects human capi 
tal investments and family structure, and conclude with some specula 
tions about the policy implications of the results.
Hypotheses About Family Arrangements and Human Capital 
Returns in Agricultural Settings
The Agricultural Environment Prior to Technical Change
The four most important features of the environment experienced by 
agricultural households in a setting without technical advances are: (1) 
intertemporal variability in rainfall, a critical productive input; (2) spa 
tial covariability in rainfall families living close-by experience simi 
lar weather at the same time; (3) stationarity in weather, making it 
possible to assess weather risk and the consequences of weather, once 
realized, for production and income; and (4) the absence of insurance 
for adverse rainfall conditions or shortfalls in incomes. As a conse 
quence of fluctuating rainfall, and other weather conditions, house 
holds experience fluctuating incomes and have a need for mechanisms, 
alternative to formal insurance, to smooth their consumption.
There are two principal means of consumption-smoothing. Farmers 
can attempt to reduce the impact of weather variation on incomes by 
altering their productive practices or inputs prior to the realization of 
rainfall, by installing irrigation facilities, for example. 1 These ex ante 
adjustments to the riskiness of rainfall can be supplemented by
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attempts to transfer income from good-weather periods to bad-weather 
periods by ex post adjustment to realized weather outcomes. Saving, 
by storing output, or borrowing from the more fortunate are examples. 
Note, however, that neighbors are of limited help in bad-weather times, 
as they are likely to experience shortfalls at the same time as the "dis 
tressed" household because of the covariant nature of rainfall.
In this economy, experience is the most valuable form of human 
capital. Given the stationarity of weather, farmers learn over time the 
best ways of coping ex ante and ex post with the varieties of rainfall 
based on their experience. Moreover, if land plots are differentiated, 
the returns to such experience are specific to plots of land or the local 
economy. As a consequence, schooling, which enables farmers to 
acquire knowledge outside their immediate environment, provides lit 
tle return. Because of stationarity, traditional practices based on years 
of experience (learning by doing) are optimal, with book knowledge 
about other environments of little value.
Where experience is valuable, the elderly have the highest levels of 
human capital; it would be expected in such stationary environments 
that elders would be "respected." In particular, where the returns to 
plot-specific experience are high, there are incentives for children and 
parents to farm together on the family land. By working on the family 
land, the children acquire specific knowledge about that land, and that 
land then becomes more valuable to them than any other land in the 
economy and is worth more to them than to any anonymous agent. The 
children will thus want to remain on the family land that they will 
inherit. The gains from keeping the land within the family, arising from 
plot-specific experience, are shared intergenerationally, with the adult 
children perhaps working at lower rates of pay than hired laborers or 
working harder in exchange for future returns they will earn on the 
family land from their experience on it. Thus, the existence of experi 
ential returns leads to intergenerational co-production and to little land 
divestment. Family stability with highly valued elders should be char 
acteristic of the stationary but risky traditional economy. 2
Note that this plot-specific experience hypothesis turns the "old-age 
security" hypothesis on its head the vertical extension of farm house 
holds is not due to the need by the elders for support from their more 
productive children, but rather reflects the enhanced value of the 
elders' human capital, relative to their children, which is tied to the
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family land. The value of accumulated experience as a factor in bind 
ing together two generations of family members also implies that there 
is no reason for adult siblings to co-produce after their father dies. 
Each sibling essentially brings no additional embodied knowledge to 
the farming enterprise.
Specific experience, given the natural immobility of land, is a cen 
tripetal force tying family members together and contributing to ex 
ante consumption-smoothing. However, the scope for mitigating the 
effects of adverse weather is limited. What can be done if such actions 
fail to sustain incomes? Some means by which income shortfalls are 
made up ex post is required. However, by concentrating in one loca 
tion, the family gives up the gains from spatial diversification, which 
makes ex post consumption-smoothing more difficult. The covariant 
nature of weather risk and the need to smooth consumption would cre 
ate an incentive for the family to diversify income sources spatially. 
Thus there is also a centrifugal force tending to spread family members 
over space, given risk prospects.
While risk considerations increase the returns to the spatial spread 
of income sources, the costs of coordinating and monitoring a geo 
graphically diverse income-pooling scheme also rise with the separa 
tion of partners in the scheme. Indeed, it is the positive association 
between risk-spreading from locational diversity and information and 
monitoring costs entailed in limiting the scope for cheating that is in 
part responsible for the absence of crop or income insurance. Can the 
family sustain an efficient income-pooling scheme across space while 
minimizing moral hazard and maintaining the gains from experience 
that are tied to specific plots of land?
Consider first the possibility that the family simply splits, with some 
members migrating to settle apart from the origin household. The pro 
ductivity of the new, split-off household would be lower than that of 
the origin household, as the specific experience returns would be lower 
on the newly acquired land. Indeed, ex post income-pooling consider 
ations would lead to the minimization of the similarity of both land and 
weather across the two households and thus minimization of the rele 
vance of experience on the family land. An alternative scheme, how 
ever, would have one family member transferred into an existing, 
established household with experience on its own land and income 
covaring minimally with that of the origin household. In this case, the
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origin household has an incentive to support the destination household 
to the extent that the household cares about its former member. More 
over, to the extent that the family member cares about the origin fam 
ily, the family member will see to it that the destination household does 
not cheat the departed family member is like a resident agent of the 
origin household. Thus, altruism, an important characteristic of fami 
lies, contributes to the efficiency of spatial income pooling by creating 
a verification and monitoring capacity.
This latter scheme describes the typical pattern of marriages in rural 
India, as will be described below. Daughters typically leave the village 
in which they are born to live with their new husband in his household 
of birth. Why are daughters and not sons mobile? Given the division of 
labor in which women contribute less time to agricultural production, 
there is smaller loss from the reduction in experiential capital upon the 
migration of a woman compared to a man. Thus, an arrangement in 
which men are immobile and inherit the family land, and in which 
there are maritally mobile women establishing ties with spatially 
spread families, facilitates risk-sharing in the face of covariant risks 
while maximizing the returns from experience capital (Rosenzweig 
and Stark 1989).
Effects of Technical Change
One of the most important potential effects of the introduction of 
technical change is on the returns to human capital. First, under a new 
technology, past experience becomes less relevant to production deci 
sions. The new regime of best production practices that characterize 
the new technology obsolesces experience. As a result, it may be 
expected that one of the ties holding families together, the value of 
experience specific to the family's land, would erode, with a conse 
quent increase in family breakups and an increase in land sales. In 
addition, as the value of elders' experience is reduced, such groups 
may become more vulnerable.
A one-shot change in technology immediately reduces the value of 
past experience, but if there are no further changes in technology, 
experiential returns eventually will increase, as farmers become more 
familiar with the new technology under different varieties of weather 
and on their own plots of land. Under a regime of constant changes in
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technology, however, long-term experience never has substantial value 
and, as hypothesized by T. W. Schultz (1975), the returns to formal 
schooling rise. This is because under constant change, farmers better 
able to cope with that change and adapt to new practices earn higher 
returns. And it is this skill that formal schooling may help to foster. 
Farmers experiencing a flow of new technologies may need to decode 
the new information better, for which literacy may be quite useful.
In an environment of persistent technical change there is an increase 
in the rate of return to formal schooling and literacy and a decline in 
the value of experience. These changes may lead to new family rela 
tionships, not only because of the reduced value of specific experience 
but also because the increase in incomes reduces the need for alterna 
tive mechanisms for coping with the vagaries of weather. Farmers are 
better able to self-insure, and perhaps are less averse to risk, when 
average incomes are higher. However, informal insurance arrange 
ments involving transfers across households would appear to be inher 
ently fragile. One reason is that beliefs about each farmer's future 
willingness to participate in the income-pooling arrangement are criti 
cal for arrangements undertaken by households that transfer resources 
to those experiencing negative earnings shocks from those with posi 
tive shocks (Foster 1988; Coate and Ravallion 1993). Each participant 
must believe that other participants will not renege from commitments 
in the future. These considerations suggest that economic development 
may have an important effect on the ability and willingness of house 
holds to engage in these arrangements.
There are three ways in which economic development, in particular 
increases in farm earnings brought about by agricultural technological 
change, may reduce the role of insurance-like transfers and thus the 
insurance premium attached to marriage. First, technological change 
may increase mobility; established households will be less likely to 
remain on the same land due to the erosion of plot-specific experiential 
returns. As shown by Coate and Ravallion, the prospects of increased 
mobility of any household participating in the income-pooling scheme 
increase the divergence between first-best and optimal-constrained 
transfer arrangements, as the likelihood increases that the future bene 
fits from such a scheme will not be forthcoming to all participants.
A second reason that technical change may reduce the insurance 
value of marital ties is that increases in earnings, given declining risk
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aversion and/or improved abilities to accumulate assets, reduce the 
demand for such insurance. Note that with forward-looking house 
holds, it is only necessary that one of the partners believe that future 
earnings growth will reduce the likelihood of participation for the 
arrangements to be broken off in the current period. Thus, even farmers 
who experience earnings growth but who wish to continue such 
arrangements may not be able to if their partners are less motivated to 
do so.
Finally, all of the parameters in the risk-sharing decision rules 
reflect the bargaining parties' mutual assessment of risk and their 
knowledge of the technology of production. Changes in technology 
necessitate new arrangements, at least initially, by changing risks and 
making risk assessment more difficult. This may decrease the ability to 
risk pool and thus make farmers more reliant on alternative mecha 
nisms to smooth consumption.
In the new environment of technical change and growth, then, the 
incentives for larger, and vertically extended families with little 
schooling are reduced. The reduction in returns to experience attenu 
ates the costs of mobility by loosening the ties of generations of kin to 
the family land, and the decline in the value of family arrangements 
involving spatial diversification lowers the demand for larger families. 
Moreover, if the returns to schooling also rise, then in order to mitigate 
the costs of such schooling, families will reduce the number of chil 
dren they will have, as elaborated in Becker and Lewis (1973).
The Data and Empirical Features of the Rural Indian Economy
In order to ascertain if the relationships between family arrange 
ments, human capital, and growth elaborated above are useful depic 
tions of reality, it is important to have data that describe household 
structures in settings with and without technical change. There are two 
data sets describing rural India that are quite useful for this purpose. 
One of these, the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi- 
Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) Village Studies survey data, provides infor 
mation on income, expenditures, production resources, assets, and 
family membership for thirty farmers in ten villages in the semi-arid
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tropics of India, many of whom were surveyed for as many as ten 
years. This survey was begun in 1975 in six villages in three agrocli- 
matic regions. In three of those villages, the farmers (and ten house 
holds not owning land in each village) were surveyed for ten years, in 
three others for seven years. In addition, a retrospective questionnaire 
administered in 1984 elicited retrospective information on marriages, 
farming experience, and land ownership, which is particularly relevant 
to the study of the family.
There are two other important features of this data set for an inquiry 
into the determinants of family-human capital interactions. First, 
although the data were collected after the green revolution was well 
under way in India, the semi-arid tropical areas were not directly 
affected, as the low levels and erratic nature of the rainfall in such 
areas preclude the use of the new seed varieties of wheat or rice. Thus, 
the data describe a setting in which there is little technical progress. A 
second important feature of the data is that there is time-series infor 
mation on daily rainfall, making it possible to measure an important 
source of risk and thus study how risk differentially shapes family rela 
tionships and the returns to human capital under a technologically stag 
nant regime.
The longitudinal nature of the ICRISAT data makes it useful for 
depicting the consumption-smoothing problem confronting farmers. 
Figure 1 displays the aggregate fluctuations in farm profits from crop 
production in the original villages for the period 1975-83. As can be 
seen, the fluctuations are large, and with the exception of two of the 
villages depicted by the solid lines where there were some improve 
ments in seed varieties (sorghum and cotton) in 1981, trendless. A 
computation of the intertemporal coefficient of variation (the intertem- 
poral standard deviation divided by the mean) for each of the farmers 
in these villages indicates that for the average farmer the standard devi 
ation in profits is 25 percent higher than mean profits. To benchmark 
this figure, I calculated the same statistic based on seven years of 
annual earnings using U.S. data on white males 25-29 years of age in 
1971. For this group, the average coefficient of variation was only 39; 
earnings variability was thus more than three times higher among 
farmers in the ICRISAT region than among white males in the United 
States.
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Another important feature indicated by figure 1 is the covariability 
in incomes. As noted, the villages are grouped into sets of two in three 
regions. This is depicted in the figure by the use of common line pat 
terns for the groups, and as can be seen the intertemporal movements 
in aggregate profits are quite closely correlated, particularly in the two 
solid-line villages, whose distance apart is only 20 kilometers. The 
data thus suggest that earnings fluctuations and the covariability in 
earnings are important characteristics of the agricultural environment. 3
Figure 1. Profits from Crop Production
Profits
The ICRISAT data cannot be used to assess directly the conse 
quences of technical change. As noted, and as indicated by the ICRI 
SAT data, an important feature of the Indian experience with respect to 
the introduction of the newer higher-yielding grain varieties in the 
early 1960s is the spatial variability in the degree to which the green 
revolution took hold, chiefly because of location-specific heterogeneity 
in soil and weather conditions. In recognition of the selective potential 
for the success of the new technologies, the government of India in 
1961 implemented a program, the Intensive Agricultural District Pro-
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gram (IADP), in one district in each state in India (two in the state of 
Kerala) in which it was expected that the improved grain varieties were 
likely to be particularly productive. The program's objective was to 
facilitate the adoption of the new inputs and the implementation of new 
agricultural practices associated with the new inputs an early exam 
ple of a governmental program attempting to "pick winners"!
To assess the income distribution consequences of the new grain 
varieties, the National Council of Applied Economic Research 
(NCAER) undertook a national survey of rural households in 250 vil 
lages in 1968, the Additional Rural Income Survey (ARIS), based on a 
stratified random sample in which one of the sampling strata was 
defined by the presence of the IADP program in the district. One-third 
of the sample thus included households from each of the IADP districts 
(National Council of Applied Economic Research 1975). Households 
were interviewed three times annually from the crop year 1968-69 
through the crop year 1970-71 resulting in three years of information 
on a sample of 4,118 households, approximately two-thirds of which 
were fanning households. The sampling scheme of the ARIS survey 
enables both a more generalizable view of Indian households and 
behavior and an assessment of the effects of technical change. With the 
information provided on production, household demography, and 
income sources taken in the early stages of the green revolution for a 
national probability sample of rural households, we can assess how 
typical the six to ten villages in the ICRISAT sample are as well as the 
consequences, at least initially, of the introduction of continuing agri 
cultural technical progress.
Both data sets reveal a consistent picture of household structure and 
stability. The NCAER-ARIS data indicate that 62 percent of farm fam 
ilies are characterized by vertical extension (two adult generations of 
co-resident kin), with only 7.5 percent characterized by horizontal 
extension (adult siblings co-residing without their parents). The ICRI 
SAT data are similar; they show 70 percent of the farm households ver 
tically extended and only 3 percent horizontally extended. The 
ICRISAT retrospective data also indicate that households are stable 
and immobile, with less than 7 percent of household heads born out 
side of the village in which they were currently living. This stability is 
also reflected in the rarity of land sales indicated in the NCAER data, 
with less than 2 percent of farm households having sold any land in the
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last year of the survey (when this information was elicited). In contrast 
to the immobility of households and household heads, the women are 
mobile, as indicated by the ICRISAT retrospective data: 94 percent of 
the adult married women in the sample were born outside of the vil 
lage in which they were currently residing. These figures on the immo 
bility of men and the mobility of married women in rural areas in the 
ICRISAT data are echoed in the 1981 Population Census of India, 
which indicates that 80 percent of all lifetime migrants, persons not 
residing in the village where they were born, are women.
Returns to Experience in a Stationary Environment
The patterns of household structure and mobility (and immobility) 
are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that returns to experience 
are sufficiently important in stationary but risky agricultural settings to 
bind the household to the family land, particularly those members who 
specialize in production. But is the basic assumption correct, that expe 
rience has a high return related to coping with the consequences of 
adverse weather in a stationary economy? To have some confidence in 
the experience-household structure association, which has important 
implications for the consequences to families of economic growth, it 
would be desirable to estimate the returns to experience.
Both the NCAER-ARIS and ICRISAT data sets permit estimation of 
the returns to farming experience. The NCAER data identify for each 
of the three years of the survey whether or not there was adverse 
weather in the village in which the household resides. It is thus possi 
ble to estimate the effects of bad weather on farm profits and the way 
these effects are mitigated, if at all, by farmer experience. Based on 
regression estimates, figure 2 shows how profits earned under adverse 
weather conditions are related to the age structure and other character 
istics of households, given their average profitability in the years in 
which weather conditions were normal.4 Each bar represents the per 
centage fall in profits from normal or good weather profits resulting 
from bad weather for households with different characteristics. The 
first bar on the left represents the percentage shortfall from normal 
profits (39.7 percent) for households in which the eldest person is less
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than forty years old and in which there is no extension aid. The next 
bar represents the profit shortfall in an otherwise identical household in 
which the eldest person is as old as fifty-nine the effect of adding a 
person in the forty to fifty-nine age range to a household in which the 
eldest is less than forty. The effect is to decrease the shortfall by 10 
percentage points. When the eldest is sixty or over, the shortfall 
declines by an additional 15 percentage points to 15.3 percent (third 
bar). Thus the presence of an elder over fifty-nine years of age halves 
the adverse effect of bad weather compared to a household in which 
the eldest person is less than sixty.




Eldest<40 Eldest<40 and 
and extension electricity
As a benchmark with which to compare the age structure effects, the 
next bars in the figure represent the profit shortfalls in households like 
the first, with no elders over forty, but with extension aid and electrifi 
cation, respectively. These figures indicate that the provision of exten 
sion services has a comparable effect on the mitigation of adverse 
weather to adding an elder between the ages of forty and fifty-nine to
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the "young" household (the percentage shortfall declines from 39.7 to 
31.5 as compared to 30.4), but is only half as effective as adding an 
elder who is sixty or more years of age. The effect of electrification, 
which permits irrigation and thus better water control, is similar to the 
extension service (a fall of 31.0 percent compared to 31.5), and evi 
dently less valuable for limiting the consequences of bad weather than 
having an individual in the family with forty or more years of farming 
experience.
The results in figure 2 suggest the importance of farming experience 
in a stationary environment characterized by erratic rainfall. However, 
they are not fully satisfactory because (1) age and experience on the 
family's land are not necessarily the same, although the dearth of land 
sales suggests that they are highly correlated; and (2) the association 
between age structure and profits is not necessarily indicative of the 
effects of age structure, but may instead mean that higher profits in bad 
weather affect household age structure. Specifically, vertical extension 
may be a "normal" good households with higher profits in bad 
weather may simply prefer to have elders co-reside compared to less 
fortunate households. Or, for households in which bad weather some 
how does not strongly affect profits, the elderly are more likely to sur 
vive.
The ICRISAT data permit, in contrast to the NCAER data, a more 
exact reconstruction of each farmer's experience on the family's land, 
based on the retrospective questionnaire providing a complete plot- 
specific history for all owned plots of land for all heads of households. 
Moreover, the extended number of years over which the fanners are 
observed permits better controls for unobserved factors that may affect 
profits and thus the family age structure. Based on the restrospective 
questionnaire on plot ownership and cultivation administered to all 
sample households, the total experience of each household head on all 
owned plots of land, differentiated by whether the land was irrigated or 
not, was computed for each of the ten years of the sample survey. For 
each household in each year, cumulative experience on owned plots for 
each type of land (dry or irrigated) was computed as the weighted aver 
age, by plot size, of the total years that each plot (whether owned or 
not) had been cultivated by the household head. One can then examine 
how the change in the real value of net profits from cultivation is
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related to the changes in (1) total experience on each type of land, (2) 
total holdings of each land type, (3) rainfall in the year (rain per day in 
three of the most critical months during the rainy season, July, August, 
and September), and (4) rainfall interacted with both land owned and 
experience. By looking at the association between the change in profits 
and the changes in the determinants of profits, the influence on profits 
of permanent but unmeasured characteristics of the farm households, 
such as ability or healthiness, which may also affect the number of 
accumulated years of cultivation, are eliminated.
Figure 3 reports in graphical form the relationships between farm 
profits and rainfall for the farmers surveyed by ICRISAT classified into 
three experience groups: those with ten, twenty, and thirty years of 
farmer experience on their own plots of land. 5 The figures show that, 
among farmers with the same schooling, with the same irrigated and 
dry landholdings, and who are the same age, increases in specific expe 
rience contribute significantly to increased agricultural profits. 6 At the 
sample mean rainfall (5 mm per day), it can be seen that farmers with 
thirty years of specific experience (3,963 rupees) have significantly 
higher profits than those with twenty years of experience (2,596 
rupees) and ten years (1,459 rupees). Moreover, and consistent with 
the results from the NCAER-ARIS sample, the sensitivity of profits to 
rainfall is also less for the more experienced farmers the relationship 
between profits and rainfall is less steep for the more experienced 
farmers compared to those farmers with less experience. Indeed, at the 
lowest level of rainfall, 2 mm, the ratio of profits for the most experi 
enced farmers to those with the least experience is 4.5 to 1, while at the 
highest levels of rainfall the ratio is only 1.8 to 1 as a consequence of 
the differential sensitivities of profitability to rainfall across the experi 
ence groups.
The results reported in figure 3 thus indicate that there are signifi 
cant gains from the experience accumulated by farmers from the con 
tinuous cultivation of land in the environment of the ICRISAT villages 
where technical change is not a significant factor. The magnitudes of 
the effects are such as to make it profitable for families to try to hold on 
to their landholdings, and for cultivating members of the household to 
stay on the family land. Moreover, the data also indicate, although 
these results are not shown, that the schooling level of the farmers 
played no role in either altering the effects of rainfall on profits or in
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determining the level of profits. Where there are few or no innovations 
to learn about, the skills provided by formal schooling are evidently 
not profitable.
Figure 3. Relationship of Farm Profits to Rainfall, by Farmer Experience
o 10 Years of Farmer Experience 
a 30 Years of Farmer Experience









Rain per Day (mm)
Risk-Diversification Gains from Marital Mobility
While figures 2 and 3 suggest that specific experience in farming 
can alleviate some of the adverse consequences for earnings due to 
shortfalls in rainfall, they also indicate that farm profits are sensitive to 
rainfall variability even among the most experienced farmers. Farm 
households thus still need mechanisms to smooth their consumption in 
the face of ex post earnings fluctuations. As discussed earlier, having 
family members who reside some distance from the household can 
potentially contribute to consumption-smoothing by pooling earnings 
from spatially diversified income sources. If there is such pooling, then
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transfers of income should be observed to originate from outside the 
villages of the households and not from nearby neighbors and in partic 
ular from the destination households of married daughters and the ori 
gin households of the wives of the men in the household. The ICRISAT 
data provide information on the approximate location of transaction 
partners for many of the transactions undertaken by the surveyed 
households, which can be used to ascertain if transfers are locally 
based.
Table 1 compares the origin, by location, for three types of income 
for the three ICRISAT villages with the longest time-series of informa 
tion on transactions (ten years). These numbers indicate that the likeli 
hood of a transaction originating outside of the village is three times 
higher for a transfer than for crop sale and a transfer is four times more 
likely to originate outside the village than is the sale of labor services. 
Moreover, among transactions with partners residing outside the vil 
lage, income transfers originate the farthest from the village three 
times farther than the external purchasers of crops and almost four 
times farther than the employers of labor.























Although there is no information in the ICRISAT data on the iden 
tity of transaction partners, the issue can be addressed indirectly. One 
way to do this is to ask whether households who are more successful in 
smoothing consumption are those with a greater number of marital 
"connections," as indicated by the number of married women in the 
household. If such marriage-based income-pooling schemes are impor 
tant, then one should observe that adding married women to the house 
hold reduces consumption variability. Information on annual 
consumption is available for each household and can be used to com-
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pute, over a ten-year period, the variability in consumption for each 
household. Similarly, based on annual profit information, a measure of 
household-specific profit variability can also be constructed.
If households can perfectly smooth their consumption, then there 
should be no relationship between the variability in earnings or profits 
that they experience and the variability in their consumption. On the 
other hand, if households cannot smooth at all, consumption variability 
will be identical to earnings variability. Figure 4 charts the extent to 
which actual consumption variability deviates from perfect consump 
tion-smoothing (no variability) for households classified by the num 
ber of married women in them and by their inherited wealth. 7 The 
figure shows that households least successful in smoothing consump 
tion ex post have the highest deviations and the tallest bars.






















The first bar on the left depicts the shortfall from perfect ex post 
consumption-smoothing for a household with no married women and 
no inherited wealth; for this household, approximately 68 percent of 
profit variability is carried over into consumption variability so that the 
household's consumption variance deviates from perfect consumption-
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smoothing by 32 percent. The next two bars represent the extent of 
consumption-smoothing for otherwise identical households, in terms 
of landholdings, total number of adult males and females, and levels of 
schooling, but with one and two (resident) married women who came 
from a household located in the village, respectively. These house 
holds, as can be seen, experience less consumption variability than the 
first household with no married women, by about 7 percentage points 
for the household with two married women.
The next two bars show what would happen in a household with two 
married women if the average distance of the origin household from 
the village of the respondent household was to increase to 30 and 60 
kilometers, respectively. As can be seen, increasing the distance 
between households does also reduce consumption variability, 
although the effects are smaller than the creation of household ties via 
marriage as represented by the presence of married women.
Finally, the last bar shows the extent to which the addition of capital 
to a household with no married women also reduces the impact of 
earnings variability on consumption variability. In this case, it is the 
effect of providing the sample mean inheritance of 79,000 (1984) 
rupees, or about $4,000, to the household with neither wealth nor mar 
ried women. The height of this bar indicates that this amount of wealth, 
coincidentally, has almost the exact same impact of the degree of ex 
post consumption-smoothing as does having two married women in 
the household with origin families located 60 kilometers away. In 
terms of improving a household's ability to smooth consumption in the 
face of earnings variability, these married women are equivalent in 
value to having an inheritance of 79,00 rupees! This last "experiment" 
also demonstrates that increased wealth, which is one consequence of 
economic growth, is a substitute for the informal risk-pooling scheme 
associated with marriage.
Consequences of Agricultural Technical Change 
for Schooling Investments and Household Stability
I turn now to the evidence on how technical change affects the 
returns to schooling and family stability exploiting the geographically
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selective nature of the green revolution in India and, in particular, the 
identification by the Indian government of specific districts in which 
such technology would yield the greatest productivity gains, the IADP 
districts. How successful was the Indian government in identifying 
where growth would be most rapid? In this case, the areas selected do 
appear to have grown more rapidly than did other areas as a whole. 
Figure 5 plots the ratios of indices of aggregate output to 1960 levels in 
IADP and non-IADP areas from 1960 up to the survey date. 8 As can be 
seen prior to 1967, output movements in both IADP and non-IADP 
districts were similarly affected by weather variation and did not 
exhibit growth. After 1966, however, output grew at a higher rate in the 
IADP areas and the similarity in movements is attenuated, reflecting in 
part the different agricultural technologies being used. Moreover, 
adoption rates of the new high-yielding grain varieties in IADP areas 
were significantly higher than elsewhere as of 1970-71 and real agri 
cultural wage rates in the decade between 1961 and 1971 rose by 24 
percent in IADP areas compared to 6.4 percent in non-IADP areas 
(Rosenzweig 1990). Thus, the IADP areas were, at least up to the time 
of the survey, experiencing higher rates of growth in earnings after the 
onset of the green revolution.
Figure 5. Ratio of Aggregate Output to 1960 Output in IADP and 
Non-IADP Districts
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It is, of course, not possible to know on the basis of the 1968-71 
NCAER-ARIS data, collected approximately eight years after the 
introduction of higher-yielding seeds, whether the returns to schooling 
rose more in districts where farmers directly benefited from the new 
technologies, because we only have cross-sectional evidence. The evi 
dence does suggest that rates of return to primary schooling in 1970- 
71 were higher in the IADP areas, but they may also have been higher 
in 1950 or 1960 as well (Rosenzweig 1990).
On the basis of school enrollment data for children and schooling 
attainment information for adults in the 1970-71 survey, however, a 
retrospective history of schooling investments can be reconstructed. It 
is thus possible to ascertain if schooling investments rose more in the 
IADP districts since the onset of the green revolution compared to 
non-IADP districts. By comparing the pre- and post-green revolution 
schooling investment rates in the IADP and non-IADP districts, aggre 
gate trends in schooling over the 1961-71 period are effectively "con 
trolled for." This intertemporal comparison from the cross-sectional 
survey data can be accomplished based on the fact that members of 
households aged twenty-five and above in 1971 who attended primary 
school would have completed their primary schooling prior to the 
introduction of the new high-yielding grain varieties, while those per 
sons aged ten to fourteen in 1971 who attended primary school would 
have completed their primary school education after the green revolu 
tion began.
Figure 6 shows the changes in the percentage of male illiteracy in 
farm households in the non-IADP areas and in the IADP districts 
before and after the beginning of the green revolution. The figure 
shows that male illiteracy was lower in the IADP districts before the 
new technologies were introduced. This pre-1961 difference in literacy 
could not therefore have been caused by the growth induced by the 
subsequent availability of the new grain varieties. However, the figure 
also reveals that the proportion of men who were illiterate fell more 
after the new technologies were first introduced in the IADP areas 
compared to the non-IADP areas, which experienced considerably less 
growth: the proportion of men who were illiterate in farm households 
decreased by 14.5 percentage points, a 56 percent drop, in IADP dis 
tricts, and by 12.1 percentage points, a 30 percent drop, in non-IADP 
districts. The cohort data thus indicate that increases in the pace of
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development, fueled by exogenous technical change, lead to increases 
in human capital investment, consistent with the hypothesis that tech 
nology growth raises the returns to schooling.












It is also possible to compare the pre- and post-green revolution 
cumulative fertility experiences of comparably aged women in the
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IADP and non-IADP districts using a similar cohort analysis based on 
the retrospective fertility rosters of the married women in 1970-71 to 
see if families were getting smaller as a consequence of technical 
change. The children born to women aged twenty-five to thirty-four in 
1971 in IADP districts should almost wholly reflect the green revolu 
tion experience, while the cumulative fertility of women aged twenty- 
five to thirty-four residing in IADP districts in 1961 and that of women 
aged twenty-five to thirty-four residing in non-IADP districts in either 
1961 or 1971 should not have been directly influenced by the new 
technologies. Figure 7 plots the cumulative fertility (children ever 
born) of women aged twenty-five to thirty-four in the IADP and non- 
IADP districts for the years 1961 and 1971. The figure suggests that 
there were substantial effects on fertility associated with the introduc 
tion of technical change. While cumulative fertility was higher by 
almost one-third of a child in the IADP districts compared to the non- 
IADP areas in 1961, the cumulative fertility rates fell by much more 
over the subsequent decade in the IADP districts from 3.44 children 
to 3.04 children in the IADP districts compared to a fall from 3.11 to 
3.03 children in the rest of India. By the end of the 1960s, fertility in 
the IADP and non-IADP areas was virtually the same.
Figure 7. 1961-71 Change in Fertility: Women 25-34 in IADP 
and Non-IADP Areas
o IADP Districts Non-IADP Districts
71
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Do the declines in fertility reflect the reduced return to larger fami 
lies from risk-spreading and the reduced stability of households? The 
evidence based on the 1968-71 NCAER-ARIS data suggests that 
households in the IADP districts were significantly less likely to 
receive a financial transfer than households in non-IADP districts 
experiencing the same shortfalls in income and with the same house 
hold structure. However, again, the lower efficacy of income-pooling 
in the IADP districts observed in 1968-71 may have existed before the 
onset of the green revolution; before and after evidence is needed.
Two new findings on the change in the stability of landholdings and 
in family structure are associated with the introduction of new grain 
varieties. First, as noted, new varieties of two principal crops, sorghum 
and cotton, were introduced in two of the ICRISAT villages in 1981. 
Prior to that year, over the 1975-1980 period, 4.8 percent of house 
holds sold land in a typical year. After 1981, based on information in 
the years 1982-84, 6.3 percent of households sold their holdings. This 
increase in land divestment is consistent with the erosion of the returns 
from specific experience associated with new technologies.
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A second and more important piece of evidence is from a prelimi 
nary look at newly available data from a 1982 follow-up survey under 
taken by NCAER, which reinterviewed a subset of the original 1970- 
71 NCAER-ARIS households. By matching the two surveys for 
households in which the head was still alive in 1982, it is possible to 
discern which households split over the 1971-82 period, where a 
"split" household is defined as one in which an adult male has left per 
manently. The results of this preliminary matching, performed jointly 
with Prem Vashishtha of NCAER, are shown in figure 8. It indicates 
that in the non-IADP districts, the proportion of households that split 
was 29 percent less than the proportion who split in the IADP districts 
subsequent to the initial survey in 1970-71  16.8 percent of house 
holds split by 1982 in the non-IADP districts compared to 21.6 in the 
IADP districts. These differences in the probability of break-up were 
not due to either differences in initial wealth across the two areas, as 
indicated by landholdings in 1970-71, or to differences in the school 
ing attainment of heads in 1970-71, as the results are unaffected by 
controlling for these household characteristics.
Conclusion
In this essay I have briefly discussed some of the connections 
between economic development, the family, and the returns to human 
capital. The evidence from the Indian experience, in which economic 
growth in the rural sector was propelled by exogenous technical 
change starting in the mid-1960s, appears to suggest that a fuller 
understanding of changing family arrangements and family values 
cannot be achieved without attention to the economic problem of 
security facing households and to the effects of economic growth on 
the relative rates of return to formal schooling and experience. An 
examination of Indian data soon after the beginning of the revolution 
ary transformation of agriculture, from a relatively stable, tradition- 
based regime to one which is dynamic, suggests that technical change 
can have important destabilizing effects on basic institutions such as 
the the family by reducing the returns to experience and by making
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risk-spreading arrangements among family members more difficult in 
an environment of increased uncertainty.
There are some general implications for policy from these findings. 
First, it is notable that the significant decline in fertility in the growth 
areas relative to the rest of India occurred without direct governmental 
intervention. Public family planning efforts were not targeted to those 
areas. When lower fertility is a public goal, such efforts are not always 
necessary if economic growth is significant. On the other hand, the 
demand for services that a family planning program would provide 
was evidently higher in the high-growth areas. Moreover, the less sub 
stantial relative increase in schooling may in part reflect a lack of 
response in terms of school facilities. Given the Indian government's 
prescience in selecting areas of potential growth, it would appear that 
an anticipatory reallocation of public resources aimed at facilitating 
schooling, fertility reduction, and, perhaps, increasing income security 
would have been desirable. Indeed, it is hoped that the further study of 
the consequences of economic growth for family relationships and for 
human capital investments will provide a more effective basis for for 
mulating policies that will mitigate some of the problems associated 
with adapting to the new, and less stable, circumstances a high-growth 
regime entails.
NOTES
1. See Rosenzweig and Bmswanger (1993) and Rosenzweig and Wolpm (1993) for studies of 
how weather risk alters the allocation of productive durables in Indian farming and the conse 
quences of different production portfolios
2. The mtergenerational gams from specific experience are more formally modeled in Rosenz 
weig and Wolpm (1985).
3. The relationships between the distance between the ICRISAT villages and the mtervillage 
correlations in rainfall and farm profits are positive and statistically significant (Rosenzweig 
1988b).
4 Only households experiencing at least one good-weather year were selected for this analy 
sis In the crop year 1968-69, 59 percent of households were in a village that experienced adverse 
weather; the percentages for the subsequent two crop years were 27 and 14 percent, respectively 
For details, see Rosenzweig and Wolpm (1985).
5. For details on the estimates underlying the figure, see Rosenzweig (1988a).
6. The figures are computed for farmers at age fifty, with otherwise average schooling and 
landholdings in the sample
7 The estimation procedures used to obtain the results in the figure are described in Rosenz 
weig and Stark (1989)
8 The construction of the output series for the districts included in the NCAER-ARIS survey 
is described in Bmswanger, Khandker, and Rosenzweig (1993)
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Can the U.S. System
of Workplace Training
Survive Global Competition?
Peter B. Doeringer 
Boston University
One of the most well-documented facts of modern labor economics 
is that education and training, or what economists call human capital 
investments, have high payoff in terms of income and productivity 
(Denison 1985). In a country like the United States with a large public 
education system and high levels of college attendance, estimates are 
that investments in schooling yield a rate of return in excess of 10 per 
cent and that over half of all national wealth is in the form of the edu 
cation and skills of the labor force (U.S. Congress 1973).
Increases in human capital have traditionally translated into rising 
productivity and growth in earnings (Denison 1985; Jorgenson 1988). 
During the postwar period, the American economy could regularly 
count on productivity increases of around 3 percent a year. After the 
OPEC oil shock of 1973, however, this rate plummeted to nine-tenths 
of a percent.
Many explanations have been offered to explain this decline fall 
ing R&D expenditures, low rates of savings and investment, increased 
governmental regulation, and even the bureaucratic and myopic behav 
ior of managers (Griliches 1988; Jorgenson 1988; Olson 1988). How 
ever, a series of blue-ribbon competitiveness commissions advanced 
the thesis that the accumulating weaknesses of American schools were 
also a significant drag on productivity growth.
The Commission on Workforce Quality and Labor Market Effi 
ciency (1989) reported that "vast numbers of American students cannot 
meet the educational requirements of today's workplace, much less 
those of the next century...." A study by the American Society of 
Training Directors (1989) concluded that the problem of "deficiencies 
in basic workplace skills is a growing one... [which is] driving the
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nation toward a human capital deficit...that threatens the competitive 
ness of economic institutions...." A Business Week (1988) cover story 
on human capital reported that "the U.S. has lost much ground to com 
petitors, and investing in people looks like the way to retake it." The 
general conclusion of this wave of reports was that educational reform 
and new partnerships between education and business were needed to 
restore productivity growth and to make American industry competi 
tive.
The U.S. System of Workplace Training and Productivity
While not wishing to diminish the importance of education reform, I 
would argue that the crux of the nation's human capital deficiencies 
does not lie exclusively in its schools, and that improvements in educa 
tion are not as central to solving the nation's productivity and human 
capital problems as many have argued. Even if schooling could be a 
critical part of the long-term solution to the nation's competitiveness 
problems, it could do little to rebuild the productive capacity of today's 
workers who are already out of school and who will account for two- 
thirds of the next decade's labor force. Instead, the problem is rooted in 
the weakening of America's workplace system for building labor pro 
ductivity where I define productivity to include effort, commitment, 
and problem-solving capacity, as well as job skills.
Schools in this country have never contributed much to this broad 
conception of productivity and are unlikely ever to play a major role, 
given the organization of work in American industry. The K-12 school 
system, and even vocational and technical schools and higher educa 
tion, are largely intended to provide a once-in-a-lifetime foundation of 
basic skills for young workers who are entering the labor market. No 
matter how high the quality, common denominator training in founda 
tion skills for entry-level jobs cannot prepare workers to operate spe 
cific technologies, to accommodate quickly to changing products and 
materials, to meet rising standards of quality, or to solve day-to-day 
production problems. Nor can it prepare workers for the inevitable 
changes in skills that will occur during their working lives.
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Lifetime skills of this sort can only be learned through experience 
gained on-the-job by working on the shop floor or in other work set 
tings. A sense of the importance of such workplace training can be 
obtained by comparing the earnings of recent school graduates who 
have little or no work experience with those of workers whose produc 
tivity has been increased through experiential learning. The earnings of 
full-time, male high school graduates, for example, will about double 
after thirty years of work experience and a similar amount of work 
experience will more than double the earnings of college graduates.
If I have persuaded you that the "workplace training system" is wor 
thy of attention as a source of improved earnings and productivity, then 
it is important to understand how this system works and what has been 
happening to it in recent years. I will use the example of production 
workers in manufacturing as an illustration, but many of the same prin 
ciples apply more generally to other occupations and other sectors.
Recent Trends in the Workplace Training System
The United States actually has two systems of workplace training. 
One is what my radical colleagues call the "Taylorist" or "Fordist" sys 
tem that originated in mass production manufacturing in the early part 
of the twentieth century; the second is a newer "high-commitment" 
system that was initially introduced in nonunion, high-technology 
manufacturing after World War II.
The Fordist System
Under the Fordist system, workers are hired into entry-level jobs 
that require little or no skill. Those who pass a probationary period of 
employment are gradually promoted up the rungs of a job ladder to 
positions of increasing skill, responsibility, and pay. Promotion gener 
ally follows seniority, and each promotion requires additional on-the- 
job training to bring employees up to full productive capacity.
Many of the skills acquired in this way are unique to a particular 
company's technology and work organization, and workers therefore 
acquire human capital that is valuable only in a specific employment
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situation. The cost to the firm of providing such skills gives employers 
an incentive to retain trained workers.
At the same time, the lack of transferable skills and the importance 
of seniority in job ladder promotions mean that if workers quit their 
jobs to work for another employer, they are likely to lose income 
because they will have to start again at the bottom of the job ladder. 
Since changing jobs is costly to both employers and workers, one of 
the benefits of working under the Fordist system is that senior workers 
who have acquired the greatest training and experience tend to accu 
mulate the most job security and are the least likely to quit.
The Fordist system, however, is about more than building workforce 
productivity through on-the-job training and experience. It also 
involves raising productivity through "effort bargains," often reached 
collectively between labor and management. Collective bargaining 
agreements can be seen as "grand" effort bargains that commit workers 
to a certain work pace in exchange for agreed-upon rates of pay and 
other conditions of employment. These "grand bargains" are further 
elaborated through numerous informal "shop floor effort bargains" in 
which workers supply the extra effort and assistance needed to resolve 
unanticipated production problems in exchange for time off or other 
considerations that can be granted by foremen (Kaboolian 1990).
Such collective effort bargains provide a means of ensuring that pro 
ductivity increases do not unduly threaten job security and that gains in 
output are shared between labor and management. At the same time, 
they secure worker consent to providing the regular increases in effi 
ciency that are needed to sustain economic gains and job security over 
the longer term.
The High-Commitment System
The high-commitment system shares many of the underlying 
sources of productivity found in the Fordist model. Workers are hired 
into entry-level jobs and are then promoted to positions of increasing 
skill, responsibility, and pay.
Where these two systems part company, however, is in the nature of 
their effort bargains. The high-commitment systems emphasizes indi 
vidual, rather than collective, effort bargains. In contrast to the Fordist 
model which relies on collective bargaining processes to set and
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enforce the rate of productivity growth, the high-commitment model 
relies on a complex set of psychological and sociological management 
techniques to encourage individual workers to internalize the goals and 
objectives of the company and to act so as to achieve these goals.
Under these individual effort bargains, workers are asked to adopt 
performance goals and are trained to self-monitor and self-discipline 
their performance. As soon as a given performance goal is achieved, 
workers are encouraged to adopt a new effort bargain that incorporates 
higher production targets.
The quid pro quo for these high-commitment effort bargains is the 
pledge by the company to provide intensive career training and devel 
opment within the company, fair levels of compensation, and often an 
implicit guarantee of lifetime employment. The result is continuous 
improvement in both productivity and career earnings.
Comparing the Models
Both the Fordist and high-commitment systems have in common the 
ability to enhance labor productivity through workplace training and 
through the setting of workplace norms that control effort. However, 
these systems gain productivity at the cost of both high wages and a 
certain amount of inflexibility that comes from routine adherence to 
job ladder assignments and from the provision of long-term employ 
ment security.
Fordist firms, for example, tend to pay high wages as part of their 
collective effort bargains, while high-commitment firms typically 
match or exceed Fordist wage rates as a way of underscoring the fair 
ness of the terms of their effort bargains with individual workers. 
These high performance pay premiums are not trivial. In high-perfor 
mance industries such as chemicals and petroleum, nonelectrical 
machinery (including computers), and primary metals, they range from 
16 percent to 29 percent above economy wide averages for comparable 
skills (Katz and Summers 1989).
In economics terms, these productivity-enhancing practices corre 
spond to a concept know as "efficiency wage theory." Efficiency wage 
theory is a metaphor about how employment relationships can suffer 
from what economists call "principal-agent" problems because 
employers (who are the principals) and workers (who are the agents of
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the employer) have somewhat divergent and adversarial interests that 
can lead to low labor productivity unless workers' abilities can be pre 
cisely measured and workers' productivity closely supervised. Main 
stream labor economics has focused on high wage premiums as the 
motivating force for ensuring that productivity will be maintained, but 
it has not fully appreciated that wages are only a part of more complex 
workplace systems that raise productivity through various types of 
effort bargaining.
Employment-At-Will and the Secondary Labor Market
High-performance, efficiency wage systems contrast sharply with a 
third, and very different, workplace system that I refer to as "employ- 
ment-at-will." The employment-at-will system resembles a "spot" 
market for labor, in which wages and employment are determined by 
the invisible hand of competition. In the employment-at-will system, 
jobs are dead end; employers provide little or no training and advance 
ment opportunity; there are no effort bargains or incentive wage premi 
ums above market levels; and employment is impermanent.
Collectively, these jobs belong to the secondary labor market of 
marginal firms and marginal industries such as clothing and textiles. 
During much of the postwar period, economists assumed that these 
low-wage, low-performance industries would gradually be replaced by 
Fordist and high-commitment industries, thereby further aiding growth 
in productivity and earnings.
The Collapse of High-Performance Employment Systems
This assumption has been shattered by sharp declines in the fortunes 
of high-performance manufacturing plants since the mid-1970s. Profits 
fell during the 1970s and early 1980s by about one-third from the lev 
els of the 1960s under the pressures of deregulation and loss of market 
share to international competitors. These pressures rippled through the 
labor market as over three-fourths of all large manufacturing compa 
nies closed or significantly downsized a facility (Berenbeim 1986),
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causing as many as two million workers a year to be displaced from 
their jobs.
Employment losses were most severe in import-sensitive industries 
such as steel and apparel. Employment in basic steel has fallen by 58 
percent since 1973, and other mature industries have experienced sub 
stantial job cuts textile employment has fallen by 32 percent and 
apparel by 29 percent, while the auto industry has lost 16 percent of its 
jobs. As many as one in five of today's unemployed workers have now 
permanently lost their jobs (Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 3).
While some workers have found replacement jobs quickly, displace 
ment for most means being out of work for an average of nine months 
to a year. Not only are replacement jobs harder to find, but they are also 
likely to be less permanent and to pay less than the career jobs that they 
replace (Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 3).
Reemployment has meant wage losses of 25 percent or more for a 
quarter to a third of all displaced workers. The biggest losers have been 
high-seniority workers who have held jobs in high-performance firms 
(Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 3). These jobs are also less secure because 
newly hired workers have the least seniority and because the mix of 
available jobs is becoming less stable. For example, involuntary part- 
time employment rose by almost three-fourths between 1973 and 1991 
(Mishel and Bernstein 1993, table 4.10), and employment in the tem 
porary help industry exploded during this period (Mishel and Bernstein 
1993, tables 4.21 and 4.22; Christensen 1989). These impermanent 
jobs do not offer the kinds of training opportunities or effort bargains 
that are available to permanent workers in high-performance firms.
The real earnings of those who remain employed in manufacturing 
have experienced a similar shock. Prior to the 1970s, real hourly earn 
ings in manufacturing rose at an annual rate of about 1.5 percent. 
Between 1973 and 1979, however, real hourly earnings in manufactur 
ing rose at about half that rate and actually fell between 1980 and 
1988. Overall, real earnings in manufacturing have fallen by over 9 
percent since 1979.
Young workers have been hardest hit by these changes. Prior to the 
1970s, young males could expect strong gains in real earnings during 
their twenties as they moved from relatively short-term "youth" jobs to 
higher-paying and more stable "career" jobs. The restructuring of man 
ufacturing has changed this pattern, leaving a generation of young
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adults increasingly stranded in low-wage, dead-end, and often part- 
time service jobs. As a result, the real incomes of young male high 
school graduates fell by 24 percent between 1973 and 1986, and by 37 
percent for high school dropouts (Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 2).
For those at mid-career, job attachment is becoming less secure as 
the risk of displacement rises, and even older workers are finding that 
their once secure career jobs are ending prematurely. Rather than hold 
ing a career job until retirement, one in three male workers over fifty- 
five are moving from career jobs to lower-paid "bridge" jobs. One- 
fourth of these bridge jobs involve a change of both occupation and 
industry and half result in a drop in earnings of 25 percent or more 
(Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 3; Ruhm 1992).
The degree and persistence of job and earnings losses is unprece 
dented since the Great Depression of the 1930s; all workers are now at 
risk of job loss at some point in their careers. While the effects of busi 
ness restructuring have been most acute for minorities and those with 
educational disadvantages, even college graduates have been affected. 
Estimates are that one in five college graduates are now underutilized 
because they are working in jobs that do not require college degrees  
a rate that has almost doubled since 1970 (Hecker 1992).
To some economists, these developments are not a major source of 
concern. They see such adjustments as evidence that labor in the U.S. 
economy had become overpriced, overeducated, and inefficiently uti 
lized by world standards. Trimming employment and cutting real 
wages are the recommended prescriptions for such a situation, and 
these steps should help to restore the economy to its long-term growth 
path.
Such an assessment, however, ignores the way in which the nation's 
workplace training and productivity capacity is also being eroded by 
industrial restructuring. Much of the reduction in employment and 
earnings in manufacturing is, in fact, symptomatic of the reconfigura 
tion that is occurring in workplace training systems, and these changes 
may adversely affect the long-term patterns of productivity and growth 
in the American economy.
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Breaking Effort Bargains
Employment reductions in large enterprises have obviously dimin 
ished the number of workers receiving training and premium pay in 
high-performance workplaces. However, an even more significant con 
sequence of restructuring is that companies are being forced to recon 
sider the collective and individual effort bargains that have been one of 
the lynchpins of productivity improvement in the postwar period.
Cutting Wages
In Fordist workplaces, the grand effort bargains are being changed 
through wage rollbacks and concessions in other wage entitlements 
such as cost-of-living allowances (Bell 1989). Shop floor effort bar 
gains are also being broken as centralized bargaining in industries such 
as steel and autos is being replaced by decentralized and fragmented 
bargaining that allows for additional local wage reductions (Katz 
1992). At the same time, effort bargains are also becoming more uncer 
tain through the introduction of two-tier wage systems, lump-sum and 
bonus payments, and profit-sharing schemes (Bell 1989).
There has been a similar reneging on effort bargains in high-com 
mitment firms. Pay increases and career advancement have become 
much less certain, and the implicit guarantees of lifetime employment 
are being routinely broken by waves of layoffs, sometimes thinly dis 
guised as early retirement programs. Even IBM the leading propo 
nent of high-commitment effort bargains has been forced to abandon 
its long tradition of virtual job guarantees and has begun to rely on lay 
offs to trim its workforce.
Getting More Productivity
Both Fordist and high-commitment firms are also trying to increase 
the productivity side of effort bargains. Quality circles and other forms 
of employee involvement have been adopted to improve productivity, 
solve quality problems, and more generally to motivate employees to 
contribute more to business performance (Cole 1989; Kochan, Katz, 
and McKersie 1986). Concerns with lagging productivity in steel in the 
1970s, for example, led to the establishment of plant-level labor-man-
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agement committees to find ways to increase productivity. More 
recently, shop floor labor-management committees have been used to 
address similar problems in autos.
Inflexible work rules and job assignment practices are often identi 
fied by management as a major source of labor inefficiency (Kochan, 
Katz, and McKersie 1986). Such inflexibility is now being combated 
by consolidating job classifications and by deploying workers more 
widely within the enterprise. Flexibility in work assignments has also 
been used to increase the skill and responsibility of production jobs by 
blurring the dividing line between supervisory and production work.
Decentralization of personnel and labor relations decisions is also 
seen as a move that will increase labor efficiency by making it easier to 
change local effort bargains. For example, in a significant break with 
past practice, individual auto plants and union locals have been 
allowed to negotiate explicit labor cost reductions to forestall subcon 
tracting and have sometimes bid for work that the auto companies had 
intended to subcontract (Katz 1992).
The Threat From Employment-At-Will
As high-performance firms try to rewrite their effort bargains in 
response to global competition, they also face unanticipated, head-to- 
head competition from a new breed of domestic employment-at-will 
firms. Part of this shift to employment-at-will production is occurring 
through increased subcontracting, but much of it is coming from large 
and well-established firms that are switching from high-performance to 
employment-at-will practices.
The new employment-at-will firms do not pay the wage premiums 
of Fordist or high-commitment firms, preferring instead to keep wages 
as low as market competition will allow. Jobs with these firms are of 
indefinite duration and employment is quickly adjusted in response to 
changing demand. Management retains unrestricted prerogatives over 
work rules and the assignment of workers; no expectation of job secu 
rity is offered; and no commitment from employees is expected.
Employment-at-will firms do relatively little human resources 
development and do not depend on effort bargains to motivate labor 
productivity. Instead, they rely on market incentives to motivate train 
ing investments and effort. Ironically, relying on market forces for a
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supply of skills has been made easier by the pool of surplus skilled and 
experienced labor released by downsizings and plant closings in the 
high-performance sector.
High-performance firms fear that their current attempts to develop 
more competitive effort bargains may fail, leaving them saddled with 
high wage and employment costs that are not being offset by produc 
tivity gains. In that event, they too are likely to switch to employment- 
at-will practices.
The Turnaround in Unit Labor Costs
Broad-based measures of productivity and labor costs suggest that 
the competitive position of the American economy has been improving 
during this period of restructuring of the workplace training system. 
For example, productivity increases in manufacturing rebounded after 
1980 as more aggressive productivity-improvement strategies came 
into play, almost doubling the annual increases of 1.8 percent a year 
during the period 1975-1980 when employment cost-cutting strategies 
were first introduced.
Unit labor costs, a summary indicator that includes the effects of 
both cost-cutting and productivity-improvement strategies, show a 
similar pattern. Between 1973 and 1979, unit labor costs climbed at an 
average annual rate of 6.1 percent before subsiding to an average of 1.1 
percent a year during the decade of the 1980s. The decline in unit labor 
costs is especially remarkable in a number of mature industries. In 
nonelectrical machinery, unit labor costs in the 1980s fell at an annual 
rate of 5.2 percent, and there were also declines in women's apparel of 
4.3 percent per year and in autos of two-tenths of a percent a year.
What cannot be determined, however, is the extent to which these 
improvements in cost competitiveness are the result of structural 
changes in high-performance workplaces that have enhanced labor 
productivity. The results could equally reflect cost-cutting reductions 
in effort bargains, the effects of closures of inefficient plants as markets 
declined, and a shift in the composition of production from high-wage, 
high-performance firms to lower-wage, employment-at-will firms.
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Can Public Policy Help?
While most of the changes affecting labor productivity have been 
the result of private actions taken by companies and unions, their con 
sequences are a matter of deep public concern. For example, a recent 
study by the Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce 
(1990), a group that is reported to reflect the Clinton administration's 
thinking on workforce issues, concluded that raising productivity and 
restoring American living standards will depend on expanding high- 
performance employment. Three policy recommendations were identi 
fied as central to accomplishing this goal: (1) establishing a common 
threshold level of foundation skills for entry jobs; (2) creating a public 
system of skill training that would combine schooling with work expe 
rience; and (3) supporting increased workplace training and work reor 
ganization through a 1 percent "play or pay" payroll tax.
In my view, however, such policies will not be sufficient to shift the 
balance in favor of high-performance firms. Raising foundation skills 
is a much overrated solution to the kinds of productivity problems fac 
ing high-performance firms. The foundations of productivity that are 
valued by such firms are not those of knowledge and skills, but involve 
workforce qualities such as flexibility, adaptability, teamwork, and 
problem-solving capacity. These are not the qualities that schools are 
used to training for, nor do they lend themselves to the setting of 
national standards for achievement.
Expanding public skill-training programs is also unlikely to foster 
an increase in the high-performance sector. Fordist and high-commit 
ment firms have little difficulty recruiting the basic skills they need, 
and they often prefer to provide their own job training as part of effort 
bargains with their employees.
Where skill-training programs can make a difference, however, is in 
supplying trained labor to the employment-at-will sector. Employ- 
ment-at-will firms want to hire workers who are job-ready, and they 
deliberately place the burden of human capital formation on workers 
and schools. As the employment-at-will sector expands, these training 
needs will grow.
Unfortunately, we lack the kinds of public sector skill-building insti 
tutions that can substitute for the lack of workplace training in the
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employment-at-will sector. With the exception of long-term residential 
programs such as the Jobs Corps, most government skill-training pro 
grams have yielded relatively little upgrading of skills, and the 
improvement in earnings has been correspondingly low (Taggart 1981; 
Bloom 1984; JTPA Advisory Committee 1989). Even the relatively 
well-financed programs for displaced workers have only been mini 
mally effective (Podgursky and Swaim 1989; Seitchik and Zornitsky 
1989).
A much talked-about new approach to skill training is the German 
model of apprenticeship training. The German "dual system," as it is 
called, blends technical and vocational schooling with on-the-job expe 
rience at a designated workplace. This system has been an effective 
source of skill training for young high school graduates in Germany, 
and there is a similar program for upgrading adult skills (Osterman 
1991).
This German model, however, is unlikely to succeed in the United 
States, even if coupled with strong partnerships between schools and 
employers. An effective apprenticeship training program for the 
employment-at-will sector needs to be able to link training to the high 
est common denominator needs of specific groups of employers so that 
workers can easily transfer from one firm to another as employment 
shifts.
In contrast, school-based apprenticeships and other types of work 
and education partnerships in the United States have more typically 
gravitated towards the lowest common denominator training for entry 
jobs. Programs that have had more ambitious goals have usually been 
tailored to serve the needs of a single large employer. Rarely have 
these programs had any mechanism for ensuring high-productivity 
training for a pool of potential employers, and none have sought to 
facilitate labor mobility among such employers.
A more suitable model is apprenticeship programs that are jointly 
operated by unions and employer associations, such as those for craft 
workers in the building trades. Because craft unions represent the 
human capital interests of their members and have hiring commitments 
from a pool of employers, they can operate apprenticeship programs 
that meet the highest common denominator skill needs in their indus 
try. Furthermore, because such programs involve groups of employers, 
they are well-suited to operate in the unstable and shifting markets of
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the employment-at-will sector. In principle, these programs could also 
meet the neglected training needs of small employers, who account for 
about one in five jobs in manufacturing.
The carrot and stick of a modest payroll tax, however, is unlikely to 
make much difference to the future of this type of apprenticeship pro 
grams. The track record of similar subsidies for workplace training 
suggests that such incentives are insufficient to leverage substantial 
changes in employment practices, let alone overcome employer resis 
tance in the employment-at-will sector to participation in training pro 
grams that involve unions (Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 1).
A more effective policy direction might be to encourage union orga 
nization in the employment-at-will sector. Training funds could then be 
used to subsidize both workplace training and school-based classroom 
training conducted under union-management apprenticeship programs. 
If desired, threshold competency standards for these programs could be 
set by the employers and workers who will be using the training. While 
such a proposal runs counter to much of the thrust of government pol 
icy towards unions over the past decade or so, it may be timely to 
rethink this entire policy area.
The idea that productivity growth can be achieved through partner 
ships among business, government, and labor is relevant to the high- 
performance sector as well, particularly in Fordist firms that rely on 
negotiations with unions to define productivity levels. Governments 
can contribute in important ways to the climate in which effort bar 
gains are negotiated by encouraging the substitution of high-perfor 
mance labor relations in place of adversarial collective bargaining.
An example of this approach is found in the experience of 
Jamestown, New York, where frequent strikes and outmoded union 
work rules were accelerating the decline of the city's industrial base. 
Through the mediation efforts of the city government, areawide labor- 
management committees were established to improve the labor-rela 
tions climate. These efforts in turn led to the creation of in-plant labor- 
management committees, which are reported to have successfully 
slowed the loss of manufacturing jobs during the 1970s by reducing 
strikes, improving productivity, and changing the image of the city as a 
"bad labor town" (Gittell 1992).
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Future Directions for Workplace Training and Productivity
The American workplace is at a critical juncture in terms of its con 
tribution to labor productivity. Cost-cutting, restructuring, and produc 
tivity improvements are restoring competitiveness in production to 
many industries, but it is not clear what types of jobs and workplace 
training systems will survive.
Companies and unions across the country are now debating which 
workplace training system should guide productivity and wage deter 
mination into the next century. Will it be some version of the Fordist 
model that is evolving in autos and steel; will it be a high-commitment 
model with high wages, intensive human resources development, and 
some form of employment guarantee; will it involve a greater use of 
craft and apprenticeship training arrangements; or will it be the low- 
wage, low-productivity employment-at-will model?
Each of these systems implies a different type of commitment to 
human resources development and a different approach to generating 
productivity growth. Each places a distinct imprint on the adjustment 
process in terms of who is affected, how the costs of adjustment are 
divided between employers and workers, and the rate at which plant- 
level productivity will grow. Ultimately, these are choices between 
high- and low-productivity strategies at the workplace, which, in the 
aggregate, will translate into long-term choices between a high-growth 
path and a low-growth path for productivity and income in the national 
economy.
At present, high-performance models of all kinds are imperiled by 
continued downsizing, broken effort bargains, and competition from 
employment-at-will production. Despite widespread management and 
union interest in improving labor productivity and successful instances 
where workplace restructuring has raised labor efficiency (Katz, 
Kochan, and Gobeille 1983; Katz 1985; Cooke 1989), a recent survey 
of medium- and large-size companies found that only two in five were 
using high-performance workplace practices, and in only a quarter of 
these firms did high-performance practices apply to more than half of 
the workforce (Osterman 1993).
It therefore remains to be seen whether the high-performance work 
place can survive long enough to gain a majority share in the U.S. 
labor market, or if the low-performance, employment-at-will model 
will prevail.
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in the United States
Is It Underproduced?
Ann P. B artel 
Columbia University
Economists have long been interested in investigating the determi 
nants and outcomes of investments in job training. Starting with the 
pathbreaking work by Jacob Mincer (1962), researchers have gone on 
to document how job training affects the careers of individuals through 
its impact on wage growth, turnover behavior, and unemployment 
experiences. Studies have also focused on the way in which job train 
ing improves the productivity of business organizations (Bartel, forth 
coming; Holzer et al. 1993) as well as the competitiveness of nations 
(U.S. Congress 1990).
During the last few years, a perception has grown that American 
workers do not receive sufficient on-the-job training. Many have 
argued that government must take a more active role in the market for 
training. Indeed, much of the campaigning in the last presidential elec 
tion focused on this issue. In this paper, I attempt to answer the ques 
tion posed in the title. The plan of attack is as follows. I first review the 
data available from various sources on the amount of training that 
American workers receive and then analyze and compare workplace 
training in other countries to the American experience. The next sec 
tion shows how data on rates of return to investments in job training 
can be used to determine if underinvestment exists, followed by analy 
sis of the likely causes of underinvestment and evaluation of the vari 
ous proposals that have been suggested as cures for the 
underinvestment problem. I then discuss my recent research on the 
relationship between technological change and training and show the 
implications of these research findings for the question posed in the 
title of this paper.
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What Do We Know About Workplace Training 
in the United States?
Our knowledge about the amount of workplace training in the 
United States is only as good as the quality of the available data on 
training. Two types of data sources can be consulted: surveys of indi 
vidual workers and employer surveys. Training questions are included 
in the following surveys of individuals: the Current Population Survey, 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the National Longitudinal 
Surveys of Mature Men, Young Men, Young Women, and Youth. The 
latter survey, the NLSY, is unique in the comprehensiveness of the 
training data reported. Data on a maximum of seven different training 
programs taken at any time since the last interview are included. 
Beginning with the 1988 survey, data on the following items are avail 
able for each of the seven training programs: when the respondent 
began and ended the training programs; what type of program it was, 
e.g., apprenticeships, company training, technical/vocational training 
off the job (such as business college, nurses programs, vocational and 
technical institutes, barber or beauty school, a correspondence course) 
and government training; and how many hours the respondent usually 
devoted per week to this program.' In the other surveys of individuals 
it is not possible to observe when the training actually took place or to 
measure the duration of the training. 2 Hence, the NLSY is the best 
employee-based source for measuring workplace training.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics from the NLSY. The 
table shows that in 1990, approximately 13 percent of the individuals 
in the sample received company training each year, and the duration of 
this training was 250 hours. The individuals in this sample are young, 
between the ages of 25 and 32 (in 1990), when most workplace train 
ing takes place. A comparable survey of older individuals would pre 
sumably find a much lower incidence of training. Table 1 also shows 
that education level is an important determinant of receipt of training. 
Only 7.4 percent of individuals with less than a high school education 
received company training, compared to 24.6 percent of college gradu 
ates. Individuals who work in large firms are more likely to receive 
company training compared to those in small firms; 21 percent of indi 
viduals employed by firms with at least 1,000 employees received
Table 1. Incidence and Duration of Company Training by Education and Size of Firm, 1990 










































NOTE: Large firms are defined as firms with at least 1,000 employees
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training compared to 9.5 percent of individuals in smaller firms. The 
picture painted by the data in table 1 is that company training is rela 
tively uncommon; only 13 percent of individuals in the prime training 
years receive it, and it is concentrated among the highly educated 
working in large firms.
The second source of data, employer surveys, also paints a similar 
picture of small amounts of training. Lakewood Publications, the pub 
lishers of Training Magazine, reported that, based on a survey of 2,400 
businesses, the aggregate expenditure on formal training was $45 bil 
lion in calendar year 1989. Averaged across the employed workforce, 
this implies an expenditure of $385 per worker. An alternative bench 
mark is that this expenditure equals 1.8 percent of total compensation 
in the United States. 3
A major disadvantage of employer-based surveys is the low 
response rates on questions relating to the cost of employee training. 
Several years ago, Columbia Business School conducted a survey of 
human resource management practices in American businesses 
(Delaney, Ichniowski, and Lewin 1989). One part of the survey dealt 
with employee training and development, and businesses were asked 
whether they had a formal training program, and, if so, the annual cost 
per employee. Only 40 percent of the businesses that had formal train 
ing programs reported their annual cost. The probability of reporting 
the cost data was unrelated to the size of the business, return-on-assets, 
industry, capital/labor ratio, or the length of time the training program 
had been in operation (Bartel 1991). The problem seems to be that 
many businesses are not sure what costs should be included and/or 
they are unable to readily locate a cost measure for their organization. 
Aggregate cost data on employee training may, therefore, be an unreli 
able measure of the existence of underinvestment.
Workers in the United States receive training from sources other 
than formal company training programs, but the extent of participation 
is low. In the NLSY, 4.2 percent of the individuals reported receiving 
training in 1990 from one of the following sources: a business college, 
a vocational or technical institute, a barber or beauty school, or a corre 
spondence course. Apprenticeships in this sample of individuals were 
relatively rare. In 1990, only 1 percent of the individuals in the NLSY 
reported receiving training through an apprenticeship program. This 
finding is not atypical of other data sources on apprenticeships in the
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United States. For example, the U.S. Congress (1990) reports that, 
between 1970 and 1987, apprentices in federally registered programs 
fell from 0.3 percent of the United States civilian workforce to only 
0.16 percent.
Informal on-the-job training, on the other hand, appears to be quite 
important for American workers. In the January 1991 Current Popula 
tion Survey (U.S. Department of Labor 1992), 38 percent of the indi 
viduals who reported receiving skill improvement training on their 
current job indicated that the source of that training was informal on- 
the-job training. Formal company training was reported as the source 
of skill improvement training for another 38 percent of the individuals. 
The remaining 24 percent reported school or miscellaneous sources. 
Hence, according to this survey, participation in informal on-the-job 
training occurs with the same frequency as participation in formal 
company training programs.
When training is measured by hours rather than by incidence, there 
is some evidence that informal on-the-job training is more important 
than formal company training programs. A 1989 Columbia Business 
School survey of two hundred businesses found that, during their first 
three months on the job, employees in these businesses spent three 
times as many hours in informal training as they did in formal training 
(Bartel 1991). Using data from the 1982 Employment Opportunity 
Pilot Project, Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1989) also found that, 
during the first three months of employment, time spent in informal 
training exceeded time spent in formal training.
How Does the United States Compare to Other Countries?
One way of judging whether workplace training is adequately pro 
vided in the United States is to compare the experience of a typical 
American worker with that of a worker living in another country. In 
this section, I describe the provision of training in Germany, France, 
and Japan and show how training in these countries differs from the 
United States.
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Germany
At age 16 or the completion of grade 10, German students select a 
"career track." Approximately 60 percent of the students choose to end 
their schooling at this point and enter an apprenticeship program. The 
remaining 40 percent go on to universities or to careers in skilled 
white-collar occupations that require attendance at vocational colleges. 
There are 380 officially recognized occupations for which apprentice 
positions exist (Dowling and Albrecht 1991). Eighty percent of all 
German firms with at least twenty employees participate in apprentice 
ship programs (U.S. Congress 1990).
The apprenticeship contract signed by the company and the appren 
tice states that the company must train the worker in subject areas that 
are determined by the regulations governing a particular occupation. 
The federal government works with trade associations and unions to 
define uniform national curricula and examinations. The contract sets 
out the length of the initial trial period of the apprentice (during which 
either party can opt out of the contract) and his or her wages. The 
apprenticeship period usually lasts between two and three years and is 
split equally between practical training in the firm and vocational edu 
cation at a vocational school run by the government. At the end of the 
apprenticeship period, the student must pass a final exam consisting of 
theoretical and practical parts, which then certifies the student to pur 
sue the occupation. Ninety percent of the apprentices are employed by 
the firm that trained them.
In sum, apprenticeships are a formalized part of the German training 
system. If apprenticeships were to serve as an indicator of the extent of 
job training, we would conclude that the American worker is under- 
trained relative to the German worker. But, as we have already indi 
cated, training is multidimensional, and it is impossible to conclude, 
based on available data, that German workers do indeed receive more 
training overall than American workers.4
France
Unlike the German system of training which relies on apprentice 
ships, the French system has as its central component a mandated 
training tax. Since July 1971, employers with ten or more employees
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have been obligated to spend a certain percentage of their wage bill on 
continuing education and training of employees or pay a tax equal to 
the difference between the obligated and actual training expenditures. 
In 1971, this tax was 0.8 percent of the wage bill; as of January 1993, it 
is 1.4 percent. Unlike the situation in the United States, participation in 
formal company training is quite common in France. In 1990, 32 per 
cent of all French employees received some formal company training 
(Bishop 1993). The incidence of training among young employees is 
likely to be higher than this number. Recall that in the United States, 
only 13 percent of individuals between the ages of 25 and 32 received 
formal company training in 1990. Although participation is much more 
extensive in France, formal training is of much shorter duration. In 
1990, the average time spent in training by a trainee was only 46 
hours! (The comparable figure for the United States is 250 hours.) 
There are some similarities between the American and French experi 
ences. As in the United States, large French firms are more likely to 
provide formal training. In 1990, 53 percent of the employees in firms 
with at least 2,000 workers received training, compared to 8 percent of 
the employees in firms with 10-19 employees (Bishop 1993). There is 
also a positive relationship between skill level (education) and receipt 
of training. Whereas 50 percent of managers and professionals in 
French firms received formal company training in 1990, only 13 per 
cent of unskilled operatives received it.
Hence, these data do not support the conclusion that French workers 
receive more training than American workers. While incidence of 
training is higher in France, duration is considerably smaller.
Japan
The Japanese approach to training differs substantially from the 
German approach. In Japan, training is for a firm, not a trade. Large 
firms provide extensive workplace training, and there is minimal gov 
ernment involvement or assistance. The policy of providing continuous 
training for employees is largely grounded in the Japanese system of 
"lifetime employment" in large firms. A case study of American and 
Japanese autoworkers showed that autoworkers in Japanese plants 
receive three times as much training each year as workers in U.S. 
plants (U.S. Congress 1990).
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While large firms in Japan provide extensive on-the-job training to 
their employees, only one-third of the Japanese labor force is 
employed by such firms. The remaining two-thirds work in small firms 
where lifetime employment is not guaranteed and training is not exten 
sive.
Rates of Return as Measures of Underinvestment 
in Training
As demonstrated above, a comparison of the U.S. training system 
with the systems used in other countries does not lead to an unambigu 
ous conclusion that American workers are undertrained relative to their 
foreign counterparts. Here I approach the underinvestment question in 
a different way. In particular, I present data on the rates of return to job 
training for different groups of workers and consider whether the 
observed rates are too high. A rate of return above the rates on invest 
ments of comparable risk levels would enable us to conclude that 
underinvestment in job training does exist.
The rate of return that an employer earns on investment in employee 
training can be calculated by utilizing data on the costs of the training 
program and the returns that the employer receives. In order to calcu 
late this accurately, the researcher would require information on the 
direct costs of the training program (i.e., instructors' salaries, materi 
als, books, etc.), the time spent by trainees in the programs and the 
value of their lost productivity during the training period, and the 
increase in productivity that occurs after the training is completed and 
that can be attributed to participation in the training program. This is a 
very stringent list of requirements and can only be fulfilled if the 
researcher has access to a company that keeps good records and is will 
ing to share the information.
I was fortunate to gain access to the personnel files and training 
database of a large manufacturing company. The direct costs of train 
ing were calculated from the company's records on the salaries of 
trainers, materials, and other expenses such as room and board for resi 
dential training programs. Indirect costs were calculated by multiply 
ing the number of days spent in training by the daily salary earned by
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the employee prior to participation in the training program. The returns 
that the company earned from the training program were calculated 
from a fixed effects model which estimated the effect of time spent in 
the training program on salary (Bartel 1992). 5 If workers are assumed 
to stay "forever" in this company, the rate of return equals the ratio of 
the annual return to training divided by the sum of the direct and indi 
rect costs of training. Table 2 shows that the calculated rate of return on 
training for this company is 21 percent. Of course, it is unrealistic to 
assume that workers stay forever at a company, and the rate of return 
needs to be adjusted to reflect the expected tenure at the company. 6 In 
this company, expected tenure is about ten years, and the adjusted rate 
of return equals 17 percent.
Table 2. Rates of Return on Investments in Job Training















a In this column, the rate of return is calculated by assuming that the payoff period for the 
investment equals the observed average length of tenure in the particular sample, 
b. Mincer (1991). 
c. Bartel (1992).
Admittedly these rates of return only pertain to one company and 
may not be generalizable to other companies in the United States. A 
more general estimate of the rate of return to job training in the United 
States can be calculated from national datasets on individuals. Unfortu 
nately, with these datasets the cost of training may not be precisely 
measured. Information on direct costs of training are, of necessity, 
unavailable in datasets on individuals. The indirect costs of training 
can be inferred from data on the average amount of time spent in train 
ing by individuals who reported receiving training during the last year. 
Table 2 shows that in the NLS Y sample, the calculated rate of return is
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32 percent if the individuals are assumed to stay with their employers 
"forever," but that the rate of return falls to 16 percent when it is 
adjusted for expected tenure. Since the individuals in this sample are 
young, their expected tenure is only three years; this produces a large 
drop in the adjusted rate of return. Mincer (1991) calculated the rates 
of return on training for the individuals in the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, and I report those rates as well in table 2. The unadjusted 
rate is 29 percent and the adjusted rate is 25 percent.
The adjusted rates in table 2 range from 16 percent to 25 percent. 
These rates seem high when compared to other investments. For exam 
ple, Bound and Johnson (1992) calculate that the private rate of return 
on a year of schooling is currently about 8.5 percent in the United 
States.7 Using this number as a benchmark would lead to a conclusion 
that there is underinvestment in job training. It is possible, however, 
that the estimated rates of return on training may be overestimates of 
the true rates. This could occur if the true cost of training is underesti 
mated or the returns on training are overestimated because of incom 
plete controls for unobserved heterogeneity or overly optimistic 
estimates of a worker's expected tenure.
What Can Account for Underinvestment in Training?
If we use the rates of return reported in the previous section as evi 
dence that workplace training in the United States is underproduced, 
we next need to consider why this underinvestment takes place. Armed 
with this analysis, we can then proceed to make informed policy rec 
ommendations to increase investment in training.
It has been argued (Bishop 1991) that American workers receive 
less training than their German and Japanese counterparts because the 
turnover rate is higher in the United States. The OECD (1984) reports 
that, for employees with less than one year of tenure, the probability of 
staying at the firm for at least twelve additional months is over 80 per 
cent in the United Kingdom, 76 percent in Japan but only 41 percent in 
the United States. In Germany, 95 percent of apprentices who complete 
the three-month probationary period stay with their employer for the 
full three-year apprenticeship period (Bishop 1991). The typical pat-
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tern of a young American worker is to engage in job shopping during 
the early years in the labor market. High rates of turnover will reduce 
the firm's incentive to invest in specific training. Bishop (1991) shows 
that employers also pay part of the costs of general training, and the 
expectation of high turnover will therefore also reduce the firm's 
incentive to provide general training.
Another factor contributing to less training in the United States is 
the difficulty that American employers have in assessing the quality of 
an applicant's general skills. In Germany, standardized curricula and 
national certification standards provide employers with reliable infor 
mation on a job applicant's skills. In the United States, employers do 
not give enough weight to an applicant's stock of general skills. The 
result is that American workers have less incentive to invest in general 
skills.
The constraint imposed by the minimum wage reduces the incentive 
for firms to invest in training workers whose value of marginal product 
is less than the legislated minimum wage. This happens because the 
workers are unable to offer to pay for general training by accepting a 
wage below the minimum wage. Leighton and Mincer (1981) provide 
evidence that the minimum wage leads to less on-the-job training for 
low-skilled young workers than would otherwise occur. While it is true 
that employers are now able to pay a subminimum training wage to 
employees under the age of 20 for the first six months of their employ 
ment, this does not address the problem faced by unskilled workers 
aged 20 and over. 8
A fourth reason for underinvestment is that young workers are 
unable to pay for the general skills that they need because they are 
liquidity-constrained. Since firms have no incentive to pay for general 
training (except, perhaps, because of the positive effect on their reputa 
tions), young workers must subsidize their own training and often have 
insufficient funds to do so.
Finally, it has been argued (U.S. Congress 1990) that American 
workers may receive less training than German and Japanese workers 
because they have poor basic skills. According to the Office of Tech 
nology Assessment, American companies find that, in their operations 
in Germany or Japan, workers have better reading and math skills than 
Americans in the United States. The absence of good basic skills
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makes the American worker less trainable, thereby reducing the per 
ceived return on the company's investment in training.
Policy Options to Increase Investment in Training
In this section I review and evaluate a number of policy recommen 
dations that have been suggested to increase employee and employer 
investments in on-the-job training. The first idea is that training should 
be provided by the government. The obvious criticism of this proposal 
is that the government will not have adequate information to know 
what types of skills businesses need in their employees.
A second approach is to adopt the French system whereby a payroll- 
based national training tax is imposed on all employers. Under this 
system, employers would either spend the mandated percentage 
amount on training or pay a tax equal to the difference between the 
obligated and actual training expenditures. While this approach is pref 
erable to direct provision of training by the government because it 
allows the firm to decide on the amount and type of training, it suffers 
from a number of problems. First, there is no incentive for firms to 
spend beyond the mandated level. Second, it favors large firms because 
of economies of scale in the provision of formal training. Third, it 
completely ignores informal training, and we have already seen that 
informal training is a significant component of total training. Firms 
that find it optimal to rely on informal training would be penalized 
under this system. Fourth, there would be significant measurement 
problems as firms and the government debate what types of activities 
qualify as training.
A third approach is for the federal government to provide subsidies 
to firms that engage in training. This is more appealing than the man 
date approach because it does not require firms to spend a stipulated 
amount; firms would enjoy more flexibility in making the optimal 
choice. The federal government's Job Training Partnership Act created 
a system to share the costs of training new employees with private 
firms. Unfortunately, recent reports (Business Week 1992) have docu 
mented misuse of JTPA funds. In particular, firms have been accused 
of using JTPA funds to cover the costs of "training" workers who were
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already trained, as well as unreasonably extending the length of a 
worker's training period.
A number of states have training subsidy programs, and the evi 
dence regarding the impact of these programs is, unlike the JTPA, gen 
erally positive. Creticos and Sheets (1990) studied the programs that 
exist in New York, Illinois, California, and Missouri and found that in 
twenty-four companies that received financial aid from the states, all of 
the companies showed improvements in business performance from 
the training. Holzer et al. (1993) have studied the training grant pro 
gram operated in Michigan during 1988 and 1989, called the Michigan 
Job Opportunity Bank-Upgrade Program. They found that firms that 
received training grants significantly increased the amount of training 
they provided their employees; in other words, the subsidies did not 
simply provide windfalls to those firms already engaging in training. 
But the experiences with JTPA indicate that a government subsidy pro 
gram will require careful monitoring to avoid abuse.
Another idea that has been suggested is that the government should 
subsidize the creation of employer training collectives (U.S. Congress 
1990). The purpose of these collectives would be for firms in an indus 
try to jointly provide the skills necessary for that industry. By sharing 
the costs and risks of providing training, firms would have an incentive 
to train more. The disadvantage of this approach is that firms in an 
industry may be concerned about sharing proprietary information. 
Also, free-riders outside the consortia could attempt to raid the newly 
trained workers.
Finally, there are some government programs that can be introduced 
to increase the incentive for the employee to invest in general training. 
Like the German government, the U.S. government can work with 
industry and trade groups to establish national certification standards 
for various trades and occupations. This will enable employers to 
assess the quality of the general skills an applicant possesses. In addi 
tion, the federal government could consider providing low-cost loans 
to individuals who wish to acquire general skills. Alternatively, a revi 
sion of the current tax law that pertains to the deductibility of an 
employee's own training expenses could be considered. At the present 
time, if an employee pays for his or her own training, the expenses can 
only be deducted if the sum of those expenses plus all other miscella-
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neous deductions exceeds 2 percent of an individual's adjusted gross 
income.
The Role of Technological Change
The programs discussed in the previous section are attempts to 
address perceived flaws in the U.S. market for training. Each of the 
suggested programs strives to increase training by either circumvent 
ing the market entirely, subsidizing the costs incurred by trainees or 
trainers, or improving the quality of information in the labor market.
It is possible, however, that the future for the U.S. training market is 
brighter than we currently think. The ratio of expenditures on com 
pany-sponsored R&D to net sales has been increasing in the United 
States in recent years (National Science Foundation 1989). Rates of 
productivity growth in the 1980s are far ahead of the rates observed in 
the late 1970s (U.S. Department of Labor 1992). All of this bodes well 
for the training of American workers because, in a world in which 
firms are updating or changing their production technologies, the 
opportunities for learning expand. When firms are introducing new 
technologies, they have an incentive to train their employees in order 
to reap the productivity gains from the technological change. A formal 
way of stating this argument is that the marginal cost of producing a 
unit of human capital investment decreases with technological change 
(Tan 1989).
Some people may take a more pessimistic view of the relationship 
between technological change and training. The basis for the pessimis 
tic view is that technological change increases the rate at which human 
capital depreciates. Within the Ben-Porath (1967) framework, higher 
rates of depreciation reduce the marginal return to investment and 
thereby lead to less investment in on-the-job training in each time 
period. The theoretical prediction about the impact of technological 
change on the amount of on-the-job training is ambiguous.
In my paper with Nachum Sicherman (Bartel and Sicherman 1993), 
I conducted an empirical analysis that resolves the theoretical ambigu 
ity. We used the 1979-1990 National Longitudinal Surveys of Labor 
Market Experience of Youth aged 14-21 in 1979 to analyze whether
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individuals who work in industries that are technologically progressive 
receive more training, ceteris paribus. Since our study covers both the 
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors, we measure an indus 
try's rate of technological change by its rate of productivity change as 
calculated by Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987). Ideally, one 
would prefer to use R&D intensity as the measure of technological 
change in the industry, but R&D data are only available for the manu 
facturing sector. Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984) have shown that for 
the time period 1959-1976 there was a significant relationship between 
an industry's intensity of private R&D expenditures and subsequent 
growth in productivity. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991) also found that 
this relationship existed at the company level in the 1970s and 1980s.
In our study, we estimated an equation in which the dependent vari 
able is the probability of receiving company training since the last sur 
vey (i.e., during the last year) and the independent variables are (1) the 
mean rate of technological change in the individual's industry during 
the ten years prior to the date of the interview, and (2) a vector of con 
trol variables that includes education, experience and its square, tenure 
and its square, size of plant in which the individual works, marital sta 
tus, race, union membership, and residence in an SMSA. We found 
that, in industries with higher rates of technological change, employees 
are significantly more likely to receive company training.
If rates of technological change continue to increase over the next 
decade as they have during the last five years, these findings would 
predict an increase in the amount of training that U.S. workers will 
receive. This will not require tampering with the U.S. training market 
by imposing targets for training, nor will it require an expenditure of 
government funds to subsidize the cost of training. Rather, an increase 
in employee training will be a simple by-product of increased rates of 
technological change and expenditures on R&D.
Summary and Conclusions
I began this paper by posing the question of whether or not work 
place training in the United States is underproduced. In order to answer 
this question, it was necessary to carefully review the data available on
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the extent of workplace training in the United States. Since company 
data are generally sparse, researchers must rely on surveys of individu 
als that include questions on workplace training. These data show that 
only 13 percent of individuals in the prime training years (ages 25-32) 
received formal company training in the United States in 1990, and 
that this training was concentrated among the highly educated working 
in large firms. Apprenticeships are rare in the United States. Informal 
on-the-job training appears to be at least as important as formal com 
pany training.
The training experience of the American worker is very different 
from that of workers in other countries. But, specific comparisons with 
Germany, France, and Japan do not enable us to unambiguously con 
clude that American workers, in general, receive less training than their 
counterparts in those countries. An alternative approach to the underin 
vestment question is to consider whether the observed rates of return 
on investments in job training are too high. We found that rates are 
indeed high when compared to rates of return to education in the 
United States. Underinvestment in job training could be due to high 
turnover, the absence of standardized curricula and national certifica 
tion standards for occupations, minimum wage constraints, liquidity 
constraints, and/or weak basic skills of American workers. Each of 
these causes suggests a proposed solution, and we reviewed and cri 
tiqued a number of these: (1) direct provision of training by the gov 
ernment, (2) a payroll-based national training tax similar to the system 
used in France, (3) government subsidies to firms that train their work 
ers, (4) employer training collectives, and (5) low-cost loans and tax 
breaks for individuals who pay for their own training.
While the high rates of return to training may be consistent with a 
yes answer to the question posed in the title, I ended with an optimistic 
forecast for the future of the training market. Research evidence has 
shown that technological change increases the incentives for invest 
ment in training. If the recent upward trends in R&D expenditures and 
productivity growth rates in the U.S. continue, we can predict that 
opportunities for training will increase. The attractiveness of this sce 
nario is that the increase in training will not require government inter 
ference with the training market.
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NOTES
1. Prior to 1988, detailed information on type of private sector training, as well as the weeks 
and hours per week spent in training, were only recorded if the training spell lasted at least four 
weeks
2. In the National Longitudinal Surveys of Young and Older Men and Young Women, the sur 
vey asks, "What was the longest type of training you have had since the last interview 7" In the 
Current Population Survey, the question is, "What training was needed to get the current or last 
job and what training is needed to improve skills on the current job?"
3 In France, expenditures on formal company training equal 3 percent of total compensation.
4. In the report prepared by the U S Congress (1990), evidence is presented that workers in 
German metalworking firms receive more training than comparable workers in British metal- 
working firms. No evidence is presented, however, that beyond the apprenticeship period, Ger 
man workers receive more training than Amencan workers
5 The profitability of training is actually the increase in productivity less the increase in 
wages. Barren, Black, and Loewenstem (1989) and Blakemore and Hoffman (1988) show that 
productivity doubles compared to wages in the datasets that they analyze. This implies that the 
wage increase attributable to training is a good proxy for the productivity increase produced by 
training
6 Mincer (1991) shows that adjusted rate of return is calculated by the following formula 
r = r'(l - (1/1+r)7 ) where T= expected tenure and r is the adjusted rate of return
7 This does not include the consumption returns to schooling If these were added in, the rate 
of return on schooling would increase, and may approach the rate of return on training
8. In an analysis of the fast food industry, Katz and Krueger (1992) provide evidence that the 
submimmum training wage is rarely used
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University of Maryland
This article is my first attempt to state a general theory of human 
progress in connection with the concept of population numbers and 
human capital. The theory is presented with only a sketchy formal 
framework and with little supporting data; those elements must await a 
longer presentation.
The question addressed here is: What is the rock bottom cause of so 
many of the world's population now being long-lived and endowed 
with much wealth and a high standard of living, with an even larger 
proportion likely to enjoy these benefits in the coming decades, 
whereas people did not have those advantages 10,000, 2,000, 1,000, or 
even 200 years ago? The obvious answer almost a definition is that 
current technology A 1993 is a sum of increments to knowledge dA in 
the past. And these dA were produced by people and therefore must 
have been influenced by human numbers. One may add that the cul 
tural, political, economic, and social systems of the past were also a 
factor, and perhaps a more important factor than numbers. I shall 
argue, however, that those systems were themselves a function of 
human numbers together with the economic levels of past societies; 
this is one of the main points of the paper.
Why did the rapid progress of the past two centuries not begin cen 
turies or millennia earlier, or not begin until sometime in the future? 
Was there something extraordinary about the human numbers P or the 
level of technology A in the year 1700 or so? Probably not. But we 
must notice one crucial correlation: Both P and A as well as the income 
Y all began to rise rapidly about that time. That rise represented an 
unprecedented tripling or more within a century or two and was the 
first such event in all the thousands of years of human history.
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The answer I offer is that the size of the human population, as mea 
sured by both population density P/lnd and P together with the tech 
nology these people produced, is the root cause of the speed of 
progress. More operationally, if the world's population had not grown 
at all since, say, 10,000 years ago, or if population had not grown as 
fast as it did over the millennia, the material condition of humanity 
could not have progressed to its present state. To put it differently, if 
the rate of population growth had been different (and had resulted in 
different total populations at various times) than actually was the case, 
the extraordinary period of the past two hundred years of falling mor 
tality and increasing income would have happened either much later or 
much earlier. Furthermore, one cannot say this of any other variable 
unless it would primarily alter human numbers as, for example, a cli 
matic change would have affected food production, or the quantity of 
energy easily available would have improved survival probabilities. If 
there were not an effect on human numbers, such a change would have 
affected the amount of leisure and perhaps the mode of getting a living, 
for example, herding versus hunting, but would not have affected the 
speed of economic progress.
Even bestowing a library of today's knowledge upon a small popu 
lation in the past probably would not have led to rapid progress. 
Indeed, we know from the experience of India and China and other 
poor countries until recently that the existence of such knowledge can 
coexist with continuing backwardness. This leads to the question of 
whether that fact does not contradict the basic thesis of this paper. I 
think it does not, because we already see the inexorable process of 
rapid modernization in these countries, despite having economic-polit 
ical-social systems not well designed for such progress, systems that 
kept the modernization from happening earlier (as it happened earlier 
in Japan). And in turn, the combination of numbers and the existence 
of knowledge, together with the demand for the fruits that knowledge 
brings about, are inducing huge changes in the economic systems so as 
to accommodate more rapid progress, as the thesis in this paper sug 
gests; this has been the case most vividly for 700 million rural Chinese 
whose agriculture was essentially privatized starting in 1979. So, taken 
altogether the evidence available as of 1993 concerning the poor 
though well-populated countries is not inconsistent with the thesis 
offered here.
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Two lines of evidence are adduced to support the basic proposition: 
(1) correlations of population size P and density P/\nd with the rate of 
knowledge production dA, and (2) evidence that other relevant vari 
ables are a function of P and Y. I also present some scrappy evidence to 
show that population is not only correlated with knowledge production 
but also is a causal variable. And I present theory and data to disprove 
the proposition that the "natural" availability of natural resources has 
been a crucial force.
I will argue (in connection with the causal concept used here) that 
there is no nonbiological variable "deeper" than human numbers that 
one can point to as being responsible for the population growth that 
occurred, as one can point to population growth as being responsible 
for the growth in income and the evolution of institutions and patterns 
of behavior that were necessary for the progress that occurred. That is, 
I will argue that unlike all other nonbiological variables, population 
growth is exogenous in the process.
Many laypersons would say (and I agree with them) that the propo 
sition stated here is entirely obvious: If there were no people, there 
would be no "human capital" to create the knowledge that leads to 
progress, and hence there would be no progress. But this answer is not 
at all obvious or agreed-to in the view of many scholars, when speak 
ing of long-run as well as of short-run progress. So the work required 
here is not the demolition of a strawman.
It is a crucial element of the model stated here that population 
growth and density affect the structure of law and tradition and politi 
cal institutions. If this were not so, structures that are incompatible 
with an improvement in technology and the long-run standard of living 
could have remained in place indefinitely, thereby preventing further 
progress. It is therefore an important part of this essay and perhaps 
its most important novelty to offer fine-structure evidence for this 
process of population-induced social change.
The complex web of relationships of endemic and epidemic disease, 
and knowledge of them, with population density and total numbers 
also is an important part of the analysis.
The strategy of the article will be as follows. The next section pre 
sents the theory offered here. I then review the skimpy time-series and 
cross-sectional evidence on the relationship of population to the rate of 
economic growth in the long run, and ask about the possibility that
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other variables could explain the observed long-run economic growth; 
at best, these data make aprimafacie but not a compelling case for the 
theory. Next I digress to explore one particular topic which has been at 
the root of thinking about population economics for three thousand 
years: the relationship of numbers of people to supplies of natural 
resources. I follow that with a presentation of evidence on the relation 
ship of population to structural factors that affect the rate of economic 
progress; this section is the heart of the paper; if given the space that 
the subject deserves, the section would take up most of the book which 
this subject properly requires (and which may yet come forth if luck 
holds).
Various sections draw heavily upon my earlier work on the subject 
of population growth; this article may be thought of as part of an evo 
lutionary process in knowledge development.
A Stylized Description of Human Progress
In order to set the scene before launching into more formal work, 
here is a stylized description of the long-run history of the process of 
human progress. The first hominids came into being without any body 
of knowledge that they themselves created, but instinctive knowledge 
of how to survive was programmed into their genes just as with every 
other species. And the early people may have learned some additional 
techniques by observing other animals that happened to live within 
their ken, such as techniques of building shelters and gathering food. 
Such imitations may have been the first sort of learning that is distinc 
tively human in its cumulative adaptation to the world about us. (I have 
recently read that there seems to be a similar process of imitation 
among apes, but it is questionable whether the knowledge can be 
handed down from one generation to the next.)
The hominids then increased their population, just as other new spe 
cies (if successful) increase their populations by spreading across new 
territory into niches that will sustain them. At some point whether 
population had stabilized by that time or not is unknown new discov 
eries were made. These discoveries might have included the knowl 
edge of fire and of stone implements the latter occurring at least two
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million years ago, according to Leakey (1981, p. 78). Each discovery 
improved the ability of our ancestors to survive and allowed numbers 
to increase faster than before the discovery; even simple stone tools 
must have had a large effect on the rate of population growth. (Fire and 
stone tools are "invention-pull" rather than "population-push" technol 
ogy, requiring no increase in labor and therefore being of immediate 
utility rather than waiting for further population growth to make them 
profitable.) But recent work with genetics suggests that about 65,000 
years ago the population was only about 100,000 and declined to about 
10,000 before expanding again ("Research News," Science, October 1, 
1993).
Why did rapid economic progress not occur much earlier say 
100,000 or a million years ago? Was it just an accident that rapid 
progress ever began, and could that accident just as easily have taken 
place many millennia earlier? I think not; I cannot imagine any single 
event that could have come along and made a big difference at an ear 
lier time. The early invention of nuclear power obviously is inconceiv 
able, but even had a nuclear reactor and full instructions been dropped 
on earth by Martians, it would have been less use than a meteorite. Uti 
lization of nuclear power had to wait for the accumulation of the nexus 
of human numbers and knowledge.
Only a biological or environmental difference that would have 
altered the nutrition and/or the rate of fertility and of subsequent sur 
vival either climate or the appearance of a remarkable new easy-to- 
obtain food source (or the opposite) or a change in the digestive sys 
tem, for example could have altered the speed of economic progress 
through the millennia. If numbers had been greater earlier on, there 
would have been more people to invent and develop new discoveries 
such as new ways of herding and cropping. Larger numbers also would 
have meant greater need for such improvements earlier on, which 
would have speeded up their adoption after invention in those cases 
where adoption is not immediately profitable (Boserupian population- 
push inventions).
Other kinds of differences could not have changed the rate of 
progress, I contend. The earliest hominids had elements of a social sys 
tem in their genetic programs, just as do apes; for example, incest was 
surely practiced only infrequently, as with other species of animals. 
But while there must have been some variations in social system from
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one band of hominids to another, it would not have been possible for 
them to live with a modern form of social system that is consistent with 
modern rates of rapid progress, such as democracy, over an area as 
large as hundreds or even tens of miles in each direction, even if some 
one had invented it; such modern systems could not be used until pop 
ulation and technology (and the standard of living) had increased many 
times over.
Would history have been very different if numbers had stayed at the 
level they were at the time of Athens' glory? I contend that we would 
not have reached the technology and the standard of living we now 
enjoy especially our unprecedented life expectancy, which began to 
lengthen rapidly only 250 years ago if our numbers had remained at 
the few hundreds of millions on earth at the peak of Rome and Greece.
This essay is an attempt to support with theory and data the thoughts 
sketched out in the above paragraphs.
The Theoretical Framework
My thesis is that (1) higher density and (2) larger total populations, 
in individual societies and on earth altogether, were necessary condi 
tions for progress. The extent to which they were (and are) also suffi 
cient conditions depended in the past upon the nature of the societies at 
the time. Particular societies certainly have been capable of retrogres 
sion in the face of population growth. The analysis suggests, though it 
cannot constitute more than a speculation on the matter, that conditions 
of twentieth century transportation and communications have rendered 
such long-term retrogression less and less likely, however.
The appropriate form for the inquiry is to ask: What would be the 
effect of a major change in some variable jc? For example, what effect 
would there have been if the Anglo-Saxon legal system had somehow 
been transmitted to North American natives in the year 1000? Would 
this have had a major effect on their economic and demographic 
growth? The theory points to variables that are the key conditions of 
readiness for growth the nexus of population numbers together with 
the stock of knowledge and the level of the standard of living.
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An alternative theory, which I believe to be less compelling than the 
theory stated above, is that the invention of new knowledge by itself 
would raise the standard of living. For example, if starting in, say, the 
year 1000 societies had somehow decided to educate a much larger 
number of people and then put them to work in knowledge-producing 
pursuits, would that have raised the rate of progress of the living stan 
dard? Surely there would have been some increase in progress, but 
how much? The work of Boserup (1965), together with my analysis of 
inventions into those that are and are not immediately adopted without 
appropriate demand conditions (Simon 1977, chapter 8; 1978; and 
1992, chapter 3), shows that some newly invented knowledge can 
remain dormant for a long time if demographic conditions are not 
appropriate for its adoption at the time.
A secondary and related thesis is that the income level of a society is 
the other most important determinant of significant material and tech 
nical variables such as health, knowledge, physical and social mobility, 
and communications. I will not develop this thesis here.
Conceptual Frameworks and the Time Horizon
The appropriate conceptual framework for the analysis of the effects 
of population depends upon the length of horizon and upon the level of 
economic development (which has the aggregate in the long-run corre 
late with the historical date). These are some of the relevant frame 
works.
1. For the very short run in a subsistence society, the framework of 
Malthus is appropriate; the coming of more mouths or a deterioration 
of natural conditions leads to diminishing returns in agriculture and 
causes there to be less to eat for the average person. For the very short 
run in a developed economy, the appropriate framework is a system of 
equations which may have hundreds of variables and thousands of con 
nections, as seen in the spaghetti-like large-scale multisector models 
used for forecasting by consultants to government and business. In 
these short-run models for both subsistence and developed economies, 
the stock of technology and the nature of institutions and sometimes 
even the size of the labor force are considered fixed.
2. Somewhat longer-term models consider physical and human cap 
ital to vary. The growth of technology usually is considered to occur at
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a constant rate. The structures of political institutions, law, work 
behavior, and tradition are considered to be fixed. The income level 
and the size of the labor force are important variables in such models.
3. An even longer-run model of a subsistence society allows for the 
nonconstant endogenous introduction of new technology. The alterna 
tive frameworks of the long-run Malthusian dynamics (quite different 
from the short-run Malthusian model mentioned above) and of the 
Boserup analysis for subsistence agriculture are complementary rather 
than opposing, as we shall see below. For developed economies, the 
recent crop of endogenous-growth models (including my own work on 
endogenous knowledge in connection with population growth) make 
technology endogenous, but do not include some of the variables 
included in the shorter-run models. These endogenous-growth models 
include only income, population, and knowledge as independent vari 
ables, and consider the structures of law and tradition only peripher 
ally, if at all. Population growth may or may not be endogenous in this 
sort of model.
4. The longest-run model, the heart of this paper, contains popula 
tion growth at the earliest date in the dynamic system as the sole exog 
enous variable; the structures of law, tradition, and other institutions 
are endogenous variables, along with the standard of living, technol 
ogy, and subsequent population growth. From such a model one can 
deduce the proposition that if biological or climatological elements had 
caused the rate of population growth to be faster than it actually was, 
humanity would have had greater numbers than actually existed at var 
ious times in the past; and each state in its development, including the 
present state of high material culture and low mortality, would there 
fore have reached centuries or millennia earlier.
Population and Knowledge
The most difficult analytic issue concerns the relationship between 
the causal roles of population and of knowledge. They are the only two 
variables about which one can reasonably say: If the stock of this vari 
able had been much lower than its actual stock in year t, the state of 
humanity would have been vastly poorer in the year t + x than it actu 
ally was. All other variables, such as the stocks of private physical cap-
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ital and prime farmland, are likely to be replaced rather quickly if there 
is a sudden catastrophic loss; not so with population and knowledge.
The rock bottom causal element of long-run human progress is the 
combination of population and knowledge. They are as much insepara 
ble parts of the same process as are the brain and the sexual organs. It 
makes as little sense to ask which is the "original" cause as about 
chicken and egg. Even the earliest humankind could not have survived 
and grown without such technology as cutting tools and fire; and in 
turn, the knowledge of these techniques came from human beings.
Indeed, the interpenetration of population and technology is shown 
by the fact that history consists of both the Boserupian "population- 
push" and the Malthusian "invention-pull" combinations of an inven 
tion and population growth, in which causation runs from one of these 
two forces in one case and to it in the other. (In Simon 1977, chapter 8; 
1978; and 1992, chapter 3, I provide geometric and arithmetic theory 
for these two processes, together with extensive historical examples.)
The key point is that no other element was as essential as the combi 
nation of knowledge and human numbers not institutions, law, physi 
cal capital, natural resources, or any other element. Humankind could 
live in a variety of settings of these variables and produce livable forms 
of them when they are completely absent; not so with knowledge and 
human numbers.
Evidence on the Long-Run Progress-Population Connection
This section reviews the available time-series and cross-sectional 
evidence on the relationship of population to the rate of economic 
growth in the long run. The purpose is to show that there is indeed a 
connection to be investigated; these data make a prima facie case for 
the theory, but it is only prima facie and not a compelling case; to 
make a persuasive case requires the later sections of the paper. Then 
there is discussion of the possibility that variables other than popula 
tion could explain the observed long-run economic growth.
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Population Size and the Standard of Living
Time-series evidence.
The first set of time-series evidence is stylized figures of crucial 
variables over the very long run. The purpose of the graphs is to show 
how all these variables moved in much the same general way, with 
population moving earlier than the others. The lack of any precise data 
and the consequent absence of ups and downs in the series prevents 
any explicit statistical exploration of causality.
For the longest period of the existence of human beings as a spe 
cies from, say, 20,000 years ago until 6,000 or 7,000 years ago  
population growth was very slow, and hence total population and pop 
ulation density were low. This growth might be described by a straight 
line if plotted on semilog paper, but such a plot would obscure the 
point of the graph, which is that the rate of early growth was infinitesi 
mal.
A slightly less broad view is shown in figure 1, whose logarithmic 
scale reveals the rapid increases in population starting with the onset of 
the agricultural, industrial, and postindustrial "revolutions."
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During most of the past millennia, economic progress undoubtedly 
was slow or nonexistent (which is proven by jobbing backwards; 
spreading total growth over such a long period of time implies a very 
low average rate), though it is very difficult to find meaningful indica 
tors. Perhaps the most meaningful measure of economic progress 
through the ages, both because of its intrinsic importance and because 
we have some reliable data, is life expectancy; it increased only slowly 
from the minimum level at which the species could be sustained rather 
than go extinct. The most striking aspect of the increase in life expect 
ancy for world populations at various dates over the past 10,000 years 
is the rapid recent increase in the richer countries since the eighteenth 
century, and in the poorer countries in the second half of the twentieth 
country; this is an absolutely unprecedented event, and the most 
important development in the history of humankind from the stand 
point of economics as well as noneconomic welfare.
Some evidence that one might consider as disconfirming the basic 
proposition of this paper is found in the long-run early history. The 
total number of human beings who ever lived before, say, 6000 years 
ago was not small; a reasonable estimate is that of the 77 billion human 
beings born from 600,000 BC to 1962 AD, 12 billion lived before 6000 
BC (with 42 billion from 6000 BC to 1650 AD, and 23 billion from 1650 
AD to 1962 AD), to be compared with the more than 5 billion who may 
be alive now. 1 Of course many of the people born in earlier years died 
at young ages. But even so, the number of years of human life lived on 
earth in the long-ago past was not small relative to any recent period. 
Are these numbers inconsistent with their total intellectual production 
in light of the thesis of this paper? Later I shall argue that because the 
production of knowledge depends upon the existing stock of knowl 
edge as well as the population size and density, the slow growth of 
knowledge in early millennia does not confute the basic thesis.
The tool-using and tool-making revolution kicked off the rapid rise 
in population around 1,000,000 BC The aid of various implements gave 
the food gatherer and hunter access to the widest range of environ 
ments. But when the productivity gains from the use of primitive tools 
had been largely exploited, the rate of population growth fell.
The next rapid jump in population started perhaps 10,000 years ago, 
when people began to keep herds and cultivate the earth rather than 
simply foraging for wild plants and game. Once again the rate of popu-
140 The Very-Long-Run Effect of Human Capital on Human Progress
lation growth abated after the initial productivity gains from the new 
technology had been exploited, and population size settled down to a 
near-plateau compared to the rapid growth experienced for a while. 
The known methods of making a living constituted a constraint to fur 
ther population growth once the world's population reached a certain 
size.
These two previous episodes of sharp rise and subsequent fall in the 
rate of population growth suggest that the present rapid growth  
which began perhaps 300 or 350 years ago, in the 1600s may settle 
down again when, or if, the gains from the new industrial and agricul 
tural knowledge that followed the "industrial revolution" begin to peter 
out. And population size may again reach a near-plateau and remain 
there until another "revolution" due to another major change in tech 
nology, society, or psychology. Of course the current knowledge revo 
lution may continue without foreseeable end, and population growth 
may or may not continue as long as the revolution does. Either way, in 
this long-term view population size adjusts to productive conditions 
rather than being an uncontrolled monster.
To return to the many humans who lived in early millennia but pro 
duced little new knowledge: If progress were a function of the number 
of human minds alone, the total medical progress during the long 
period before, say, 6000 BCE should have been as great as in the last 50 
years, during which life expectancy increased rapidly and hugely. But 
it was not so. Nor was the absence of rapid population growth as a 
stimulus a reasonable explanation; the presence of sickness and the 
danger of death certainly have been in all times a sufficiently powerful 
motivation for major efforts at innovation. So this immediately 
requires that a theory be more complex than the total number of per 
sons alive among whom the spark of invention and progress might 
somehow arise spontaneously.
The most reasonable additional explanatory variables are these: (1) 
Population density conduces to the production and transmission of new 
ideas, according to the theory of Simon Kuznets and the study by 
Kelley (1972) of Higgs's (1971) data on American inventiveness. (2) 
Production of new knowledge is influenced by the stock of existing 
knowledge; the more existing ideas that may be built upon, the greater 
the propensity to create new ideas. (This is demonstrated for the case
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of patents in England over many centuries by Simon and Sullivan 
1989.)
Evidence from the modern period demonstrating that economic 
growth in the developed countries has been faster in more recent 
decades than in more distant decades when population was smaller is 
found in the work of Maddison, Fellner, and Meguire (the latter finding 
that the U.S. data do not square with the other countries' data, though it 
is logically necessary that growth now be faster than, say, 200 years 
ago (see Simon, forthcoming, for a review of this evidence).
Cross-sectional evidence.
Cross-national comparison of the data for recent decades reveals 
that higher population density is correlated with a higher rate of eco 
nomic growth (Simon and Gobin 1980).
Population Growth and the Growth of Technology
The next evidence to be presented concerns the bivariate relation 
ships between population and such other variables as knowledge and 
productivity over the period for which at least some data exists to 
check for causality.
A long-run measure of the stock of the most important kind of 
knowledge agricultural technology is the number of persons that a 
single agricultural worker can feed. The complementary variable is the 
proportion of the labor force that works in agriculture; it was nearly the 
entire labor force throughout human history. But in about 1600 the pro 
portion began to fall in the richest countries, and it now has reached 
less than 2 percent in some affluent countries; the decline has unmis 
takably begun in the poor parts of the world, too. This also is the best 
long-term measure of the standard of living and of productivity.
A closely related measure of agricultural technology as indicated by 
agricultural productivity per person is the price in labor time of a given 
quantity of food. This price has fallen in the U.S. since 1800 by a factor 
of perhaps 20 (Simon 1992).
A measure of technology related to productivity per person is pro 
ductivity per unit of land the amount of land employed to feed an 
average person. The quantity of land needed to feed a person has 
declined extraordinarily over the years, in best practice by an astonish-
142 The Very-Long-Run Effect of Human Capital on Human Progress
ing factor of perhaps 25 million, compared with hunting and fishing 
and by almost as much in standard practice, indicating an extraordinary 
increase in productivity.
Shifting now to technology in metals production: Analogous to the 
decline in the price of food as measured by the amount of time required 
to produce it is the decline in the prices of metals an enormous fall 
with respect to the price of labor in rich countries and large even com 
pared with the consumer price index over the past two centuries 
(Simon 1981; forthcoming), continuing a trend observable for 4,000 
years. The supply of copper may be viewed in this context as a final 
good and a component measure of the standard of living; it may also be 
seen later as an element in the progress of productivity. The line of cau 
sation from population to price seems rather clear here; there is no 
other reasonable explanation of the increase in supply except an 
increase in demand and in the supply of minds to produce new ways to 
increase the supply and invent new substitutes.
The speed and cost of transportation is another good whose technol 
ogy has measurably improved. (Transport is a good in itself, as well as 
affecting the supply of food.) In just the past two centuries, speed has 
risen from the 3-mile-an-hour walking pace of a human or the some 
what faster pace of a horse or ship to hundreds of miles per hour on 
land and thousands of miles per hour in the air (not even counting 
space travel).
Long-run data on the increase in the stock of knowledge as mea 
sured by the number of scientific journals and patents in the past five 
centuries, and in human capital as measured by numbers of literate per 
sons and persons with given amounts of education (the absolute num 
bers are more relevant than the proportions, though the proportion is 
also of interest), are sufficiently well known as to not need further dis 
cussion here.
Some writers have suggested Greece and Rome as counterexamples. 
But their rates of discoveries of important new ideas were faster in 
their peak periods of population than before or after those periods (see 
Simon 1981).
Another long period whose data are relevant is the Dark Ages. Cur 
rently most commentators, such as Pirenne, agree that after population 
declined, the standard of living fell and progress ceased despite the 
increase in agricultural land per agriculturalist and the consequent drop
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in the price of land; this might have been caused by the decline in total 
population or the lack of growth or both. Much the same seems to have 
been true in the years after the Black Death. In contrast, the rapid 
increases in population starting around 1000 and 1500 were accompa 
nied by buoyant economic progress.
Simon and Sullivan (1989) show that in England from 1500 to 1800 
population and knowledge (as measured by patents) do not just grow 
together secularly, but there is a causal relationship between them 
when other variables are held constant.
Cross-sectional evidence.
A work tradition beginning with Rostas (1948) shows that when 
pairs of countries are compared, growth in productivity is higher in 
those industries in which production is relatively larger; in light of the 
association between higher production and higher population ceteris 
paribus, this suggests that higher population leads to higher increases 
in productivity.
Another relevant cross-sectional study is that of Glover and Simon 
(1975), which shows that road density is greater where population is 
more dense. And roads are a crucial element in the transmission of 
knowledge.
Natural Resources and Population
As North (1981) has written, natural resources have been a major 
element in discussions of population growth since the first such 
recorded discussions. The constraint of natural resources must there 
fore be considered before one can appreciate a theory of human 
progress in the past despite the perceived limits of natural resources  
progress that is without known bounds in the future as natural resource 
constraints lessen rather than tighten.
Astonishingly, the importance of land and other natural resources 
diminishes with every passing decade. Such was the great discovery of 
Schultz about land in 1951, and of Barnett and Morse (1963) about 
agricultural and mined resources. Their forecasts based on the histori 
cal record and theoretical analyses have been borne out perfectly by
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events since then, as food and all metals, indeed, all natural resources, 
have continued to get cheaper rather than more expensive.
Natural resources are the most dramatic examples of the fundamen 
tal process at work in the long course of economic progress: Increasing 
population or rising income raises demand for a commodity, which 
usually implies a higher price. The higher price represents opportu 
nity for businesses to make a profit and for inventors and institutions 
to realize their desires to make creative social contributions. Most pro 
spective discoverers fail to find solutions to the problem, and they pay 
the price themselves. One or more succeed in finding the needed solu 
tions. And usually the outcome, most unexpected though very impor 
tant, is that the solution leaves humanity better off than before the 
problem arose. That is, we end up with cheaper resources than before 
the problem of the rise in price first occurred.
The story of this process at work in the case of energy since about 
the fifteenth century in England from wood to coal to oil to nuclear 
power is told at length in my 1981 book, as is the story of copper 
during the 4000 years since Hammurabi.
A formal model of this process using the example of farmland may 
be found in Simon and Steinman (1991) or in Simon (1992, chapter 5). 
We simulate the model with meaningful parameters and analyze how 
the course of food prices and land availability will change over centu 
ries. We also analyze the steady-state properties of the system to show 
how it is consistent with long-run growth in the standard of living as 
human numbers increase.
Very-Long-Run Processes
It should help substantiate the exogeneity of growth to provide evi 
dence on the disaggregated sinews of the process; this is the task of the 
present section. This section contains the new substantive material 
conveyed by this article, material which provides the evidence for the 
propositions that (1) the rate of progress is a function of human num 
bers; and (2) in the very long run all social and economic dimensions 
are indeed a function of population size and density and constitute
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endogenous intermediate variables rather than independent causal vari 
ables.
The elements that this section will touch on include the develop 
ment of markets, social and economic organization, law, disease, and 
evolved cultural patterns. Here our time horizon is so long that the phe 
nomena that change over such a long period usually are not even men 
tioned in the context of population economics. These phenomena have 
been studied little, and because the ground is new the amount of data is 
small. Hopefully the paucity of data will not mislead the reader about 
the importance of these phenomena.
The Development of Markets
The size of the market depends upon both the number of people and 
the level of income. The number of persons multiplied by their average 
level of income measures aggregate income, and is perhaps the basic 
measure of the size of the market. (Of course the sizes of submarkets 
will be affected by the distribution of the total income among persons, 
but that can be left aside here.) There is a presumption, then, that more 
people imply bigger markets.
Increased population density also leads to better-organized markets. 
Hicks (1969) and North (1981) have shown the connection between 
these variables throughout history at the local and regional level. As 
noted earlier, this phenomenon was seen vividly after the depopulation 
of the Black Death. Despite higher wages and increased land availabil 
ity to cultivators, overall economic conditions apparently were less 
favorable. There was general economic depression as a result of the 
disappearance of markets that in turn was caused by lack of people and 
products to support markets.
A look at mircoeconomic theory with population and market growth 
in mind immediately suggests many avenues through which there is 
improved competition when population is larger rather than smaller, 
especially the effects of having more rather than fewer producers and 
sellers. In general, a larger number of competitors leads to a more 
responsive and more rapidly changing marketplace.
Cities, along with infrastructure, seem to have been a crucial pre 
condition of the industrial revolution in England, Holland, and else 
where. The existence of cities requires relatively dense populations in
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surrounding areas. Cities and markets are closely related phenomena. 
Pirenne's magisterial analysis (1925/1969) depends heavily on popula 
tion growth and size. Larger absolute numbers of people are the basis 
for increased trade and consequent growth in cities, which in turn 
strongly influenced the creation of an exchange economy in place of 
the subsistence economy of the manor.
According to Pirenne, growth in population causing cities to grow 
also reduced serfdom by offering serfs legal haven in the city, as 
memorialized in the saying "Town air makes free."
Disease
The evolution of the disease environment is another of the crucial 
evolutionary processes that population density and growth have influ 
enced. Density of population affects the virulence of disease; some 
times it makes disease spread faster, as in the case of epidemics, and 
sometimes it suppresses it, as in the case of malaria. And there are fur 
ther complications: Sometimes increased virulence leads later to 
immunities that check the spread of diseases. McNeill (1977) describes 
how the evolution of the disease environment has been greatly influ 
enced in complex ways by population density and therefore by popula 
tion growth.
For most of the great diseases, the growth of population in earlier 
centuries represented a one-time "investment" of our species into 
developing resistance to mass killers; once our ancestors had suffered 
this experience, later generations could go about their lives with less 
threats.
A different sequence: By causing the land to be cropped closely, 
increasing population density reduces the virulence of malaria, the 
greatest killer of all; an important example was South China, which 
was only colonized after this process had made it habitable.
A body of knowledge about the prevention and cure of diseases also 
has evolved, much of it in a prescientific trial-and-error process; an 
older example is the practice of quarantine. More recently, health 
knowledge has begun to evolve from systematic scientific work; an 
example is smallpox vaccination. Such advances in medical practice 
can be attributed to the combination of a scientific attitude and a 
greater base of scientific medical knowledge, both of which were
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enhanced by the industrial revolution; these advances occurred in 
countries that were experiencing the industrial revolution, and did not 
occur in countries such as India and China that were outside the ambit 
of the industrial revolution. This greater capacity to deal actively with 
the disease environment may be seen as a consequence of population 
growth.
Events during the industrial revolution are instructive in this regard. 
The causes of the fall in the death rate are also somewhat unclear, 
though in recent years scholars have made rapid progress in under 
standing the phenomenon. Some part of the mortality drop may have 
been unconnected with economic progress; the climate may have 
improved and yielded better crops, the rat population may have sponta 
neously altered its species composition in such fashion that the rigors 
of plague diminished, and the disease environment may otherwise have 
become less dangerous. Some part of the improvement may stem from 
economic progress in only very indirect fashion, if at all, notably 
through shorter periods of breastfeeding and hence less inhibition of 
pregnancy. But economic progress was surely responsible for most of 
the improved life expectancy.
Economic progress, which interactively is the result of population 
growth, helped people live longer by providing better diets. McKeown 
(McKeown and Brown 1955; McKeown 1985) has argued forcefully 
that "the slow growth of the human population before the eighteenth 
century was due mainly to lack of food, and the rapid increase from 
that time resulted largely from improved nutrition" (1985, p. 29). 
Fogel's (1989) work agrees. (The importance of nutrition is surpris 
ingly difficult to establish conclusively, however.)
Economic progress also helped people live longer through develop 
ment of the physical infrastructure of society, especially provision of 
purer communal drinking water. Such improvements were not mainly 
intended to improve health and reduce death, but they nevertheless did 
so to an important degree. Building such infrastructure requires farm 
ing to be sufficiently efficient so that society can afford to employ peo 
ple on such community projects. Also required is that the population be 
sufficiently large and dense that such projects are economical. The 
same is true for roads and other communication systems that contrib 
uted to the spread of health technology. (See earlier discussion of road 
density and population density.)
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In some places greater population density must have had short-term 
negative effects upon health by temporarily lowering the standard of 
living the Malthusian "positive check." But in the longer run, the 
overall result of population growth on the incidence of disease clearly 
has been positive.
Social and Political Organization
Though it is difficult to pin down statistically, the effect of popula 
tion size and density upon social and political organization and its role 
in economic development is given ever greater importance by such 
scholars as Jones (1981) and McNeill (1963).
Population density and size seem to be related to the mode of orga 
nization and the size of the government sector. Stevenson (1968) 
argues that increasing density leads to better-articulated organization 
of society; this seems plausible, but the phenomenon is difficult to 
quantify.
The relationship of population growth to the abolition of feudalism 
and slavery is controversial and needs further investigation.
It is enlightening to keep in mind a question that is frequently asked: 
If more people cause there to be more ideas and knowledge, more 
growth of markets and cities, and hence higher productivity and 
income, why did not the modernization revolution begin in India and 
China? This requires more lengthy discussion than this introduction to 
the subject permits; suffice it to say that it ties into discussion of what 
Jones calls "the European miracle."
In Europe there seems to have been a nexus of interconnections 
between loosening of feudal ties, growth of cities, personal economic 
freedom, political freedom, openness of societies, competition among 
European states, economic advance, popular government, and popula 
tion growth. McNeill (1963), Jones (1981) and others have suggested 
that over several centuries the relative looseness and changeableness of 
social and economic life in Europe, compared to China and India, 
helps account for the emergence of modern growth in the West rather 
than in the East. Change implies economic disequilibria which, as 
Schultz (1975) reminds us, imply exploitable opportunities leading to 
augmented effort. (Such disequilibria also cause the production of new 
knowledge, it would seem.)
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Evolved Cultural Patterns
The processes of evolutionary growth extend into technical knowl 
edge, social institutions, language, law, morals, rituals, and practices, 
all of which affect human productive capacities just as does the evolv 
ing stock of land, tools, shelter, and other physical capital one of the 
most interesting aspects of this subject. It is plausible that these aspects 
of human life changed only under the pressure of necessity, as repre 
sented by increased population, and then in turn the new conditions 
influenced the growth of population. If humankind had not developed 
patterns of behavior and association that increased rather than 
decreased the amounts of resources available to us, we would not still 
be here. If, as humankind's numbers increased (or even as numbers 
remained nearly stationary), behavior had led to diminished supplies of 
plants and animals, less flint for tools, and disappearing wood for fires 
and construction, I would not be writing these pages, and you would 
not be reading them. These processes cannot now be documented for 
prehistory, of course, but we have begun to develop knowledge about 
the operation of similar processes in recent decades and the present, 
e.g., changes in institutions for agricultural research (Hayami and Rut- 
tan 1987).
Evolved cultural patterns include voluntary exchange among indi 
viduals, and the markets that function to provide resources in increas 
ing quantities, as discussed above; institutions that pass on knowledge, 
such as schools; libraries, legends and storytellers, all of which store 
knowledge; and monasteries, laboratories, and research-and-develop- 
ment departments which produce knowledge.
Humankind has evolved into creators and problem solvers to an 
extent that people's constructive behavior has outweighed their 
destructive behavior, as evidenced by our increasing life expectancy 
and richness of consumption. And in recent centuries and decades, this 
positive net balance has been increasing rather than decreasing. This 
view of the human as (on balance) a builder conflicts with the view of 
the human as destroyer, which underlies the thought of many doom- 
say ers.
Paradoxically, rules and customs that lead to population growth 
rather than to population stability or decline may be part of our inher 
ited capacity to deal successfully with resource problems in the long
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run, though the added people may exacerbate the problems in the short 
run. Such rules and customs probably lead to long-run success of a 
society in two ways. First, as noted above, high fertility leads to 
increased chances of a group's survival, other things being equal. For 
example, though the Parsis of India have been, as individuals, very 
successful economically, as a people they seem doomed to the failure 
of disappearance in the long run due to their marriage and fertility pat 
terns. Second, high fertility leads to resource problems, which then 
lead to solutions to the problems that usually leave humanity better off 
in the long run than if the problems had never arisen, in the process 
discussed earlier. In a more direct chain of events, rules and customs 
leading to high fertility yield an increased supply of human ingenuity, 
which responds productively to the increased demand for goods.
Particularly slow to change are basic institutions of law and conven 
tion. These institutions tend to evolve gradually rather than being 
altered by political upheaval or legislation. Hayek (1989) argues that 
property rights and the family are the two most important institutions 
in determining the economic progress of a nation. He suggests that 
they, as well as the rest of the rich tapestry of cultural patterns, develop 
by a process of cultural selection wherein communities that grow in 
numbers are more likely to have their institutions be dominant in the 
wider world than are groups that do not increase in population. Much 
of this evolutionary process has taken place over thousands of years. 
But the effects were important for economic development; for exam 
ple, the system of Anglo-Saxon common law and its protection for 
property surely aided the course of the industrial revolution in 
England. Therefore, these slow-moving effects of population increase 
should not be forgotten in our survey of demographic consequences.
Linguistics may be able to cast some light on the rate of change of 
language to population size. In this respect language may be an impor 
tant model for change in other subtle elements in culture.
The effect of population density and size upon the refinement and 
the changes in direction that occur in the law has been hinted at by pre 
liminary studies in the United States relating the size of state to the 
extent to which decisions are cited. This theme needs to be developed.
Most difficult of all to pin down is the effect of population growth 
and the industrial revolution, and their proximate effects discussed ear 
lier, upon individual psychology and small-group sociology. Adam
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Smith remarks that "the progressive state is in reality the cheerful and 
the hearty state to all the different orders of the society. The stationary 
is dull; the declining melancholy." And it was a commonplace during 
the earlier part of the industrial revolution that industrial work disci 
pline, including attention to the daily time schedule for work hours, 
was both important and slow to develop. Many writers have discussed 
the mentality of progress and the notion of systematic scientific 
progress; both ideas were concomitants of the industrial revolution. 
However accurate these observations about psychological and small- 
group effects may be, however, they do not stand on the same level of 
demonstrated fact as do the phenomena discussed in the earlier parts of 
this paper. Yet the brevity of this treatment should not be taken as sug 
gesting that these factors may not be of great significance. (On the 
other hand, perhaps human nature should be seen as having been 
changed relatively little by the industrial revolution. The meaning of 
"little" and "much" are quite subjective, of course.)
Summary and Conclusions
This paper outlines a theory of the role of "human capital" that fits 
the very-long-run trends. It discusses some of the elements that affect 
the speed of adjustment to population change, conditions which are 
different at different times in history and vary from place to place.
1. The state of knowledge clearly is the dominant element that var 
ies in the long run. It is affected by population growth and density, as 
knowledge in turn affects population growth and density.
2. Interrelated with changes in knowledge and production technique 
are changes in the structure of society. These structural changes also 
are influenced by population variables, and vice versa. There is 
increasing recognition of the importance of social and economic struc 
ture in economic development in even the short run. And population 
affects these forces in the long run.
3. The growth of markets, with their many associated phenomena, 
has been a function of population size and density. More people mean 
both more buyers and more sellers, and hence less monopoly and more 
competition and competitive effort.
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4. Slowest-changing are the habits, rituals, language, law, morals, 
and all manner of social institutions, including sexual and childraising 
practices. All of these elements are subject to processes of evolutionary 
change. They not only are affected by population variables, but in turn 
influence population growth and differentially the likelihoods of 
survival of different human groups. Also disease affects in both direc 
tions. Here we have moved all the way to full biology-like evolution 
ary thinking, which is at the other end of the methodological spectrum 
from the sort of physics-like thinking that we apply in very-short-run 
analysis when the relevant elements are known and fixed. But the evo 
lutionary processes in question are social and cultural rather than bio 
logical.
NOTE
1 A more recent estimate is 3.8 billion before 40,000 BCE, 39 billion from 40,000 BCE to the 
start of the Common Era, and 22 6 billion from the year 1 up until the year 1750, plus another 
10 4 billion from then until 1950, and 4 3 billion from then until 1987, for a total of perhaps 80.3 
billion (Bourgeois-Pichat 1989, p 90). The fact that, although Bourgeois-Pichat did not make ref 
erence to Desmond (1975), the two estimates are so close to each other lends confidence to them.
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